Alliance Networks, Corporate Investment, and Firm Valuation by Lee, Sangho
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Finance Dissertations Department of Finance
7-29-2017
Alliance Networks, Corporate Investment, and
Firm Valuation
Sangho Lee
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/finance_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Finance at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Finance Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Sangho, "Alliance Networks, Corporate Investment, and Firm Valuation." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2017.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/finance_diss/32
 
      
    
 
 
 
Alliance Networks, Corporate Investment, and Firm Valuation 
 
 
BY 
 
 
Sangho Lee 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2017 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
 
Sangho Lee 
 
2017 
 
 
 
 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the Sangho Lee’s Dissertation 
Committee.  It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it 
has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Business Administration in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business of 
Georgia State University. 
 
 
 Richard Phillips, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
 
Dr. Omesh Kini (Chair) 
Dr. Mark A. Chen 
Dr. Dalida R. Kadyrzhanova 
Dr. Sudheer Chava (External: Georgia Tech) 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This dissertation would not have been completed without the support of many people. 
The finance faculty at Georgia State University provided exceptional help throughout 
my Ph.D. education. I first thank you to my dissertation committee of Omesh Kini, Mark 
Chen, and Dalida Kadyrzhanova. I especially thank Omesh Kini for being the best 
advisor and mentor in my life. I thank Chip Ryan for providing me with a chance to join 
this great program six years ago. I am also indebted to Sudheer Chava at Georgia Tech 
for his guidance as a member of my dissertation committee. I am grateful to my fellow 
Ph.D. students for their friendship and wonderful memories we created together at the 
heart of Atlanta. I thank my family for their encouragement and generous support 
during my journey. 
 
My wife, Yunhee, and I share every single moment of my Ph.D. student years. Her love 
and companionship made this work possible. I dedicate this dissertation to her. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Alliance Networks, Corporate Investment, and Firm Valuation 
 
BY 
 
Sangho Lee 
 
June 20, 2017 
 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Omesh Kini 
 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Finance 
 
This paper examines whether corporate alliance networks convey information about 
new investment opportunities. I hypothesize that firms located more centrally in their 
networks are exposed to greater information flows, which allows managers to rely less 
on their own stock prices as a source of information to make future investment 
decisions. Supporting this prediction, higher alliance network centrality leads to lower 
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their informational advantages from alliance networks. Additional tests exploiting 
quasi-exogenous changes in centrality due to indirect connections via alliance partners 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate alliances are collaborative organizational structures on an intermediate point 
on the market-hierarchy continuum of firm boundary choices (Williamson 1975) that includes a 
variety of contractual forms such as joint ventures, (cross-) licensing agreements, manufacturing 
agreements, marketing agreements, and research and development (R&D) agreements. Alliances 
promote tighter connections between partners than arm’s length market transactions (Johnson 
and Houston 2000) without sacrificing organizational flexibility (Chan, Kensinger, Keown and 
Martin 1997), thereby enhancing firm value and performance.1 One important source of gain 
stems from reducing the cost of transferring knowledge between partners (Jensen and Meckling 
1992). Specifically, partners in alliances can have easier access to other members’ information 
resources (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996), which can increase knowledge flows between 
partners (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe 2006). Moreover, alliances establish channels of 
private communication between managers (Robinson and Stuart 2007) who can then obtain new 
information and incorporate it in corporate decisions. For example, alliance connections can be 
conduits for conveying information about future investment opportunities, thereby influencing 
corporate investment decisions. 
This paper empirically tests this idea using network analysis on a large sample of 
corporate alliances. I use network analysis to model the structure of information transmission not 
only between alliance partners, but also all firms indirectly connected through the chain of 
alliance connections. Alliance networks may transmit a variety of information about technology-
related knowledge, product or geographic market prospects, human capital, and more general 
economic conditions, which can eventually help managers detect future investment opportunities. 
More connected firms have access to a wider range of knowledge resources available over the 
networks (Schilling and Phelps 2007), and may thus possess informational advantages vis-à-vis 
less connected firms in the networks. This paper shows that these informational advantages have 
                                                     
1 For example, the stock market positively reacts to announcements of joint ventures (Johnson and Houston 
2000; McConnell and Nantell 1985) and strategic alliances (Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 1997). 
Schilling (2015) provide evidence that alliances lead to more innovation outcomes. 
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a value-enhancing effect on investment decisions, thereby supporting the argument that 
managers can learn valuable information from alliance networks and subsequently use this 
information when making investment decisions. 
I construct time-varying networks of alliances between 1994 and 2013 using a large sample 
of alliance deals from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Joint Venture and Strategic Alliance 
Database (SDC). An alliance network is a snapshot of all ongoing alliance connections at the end 
of each calendar year. For each firm in an alliance network, I calculate the Bonacich measure of 
power and centrality (“Bonacich centrality”) (Bonacich 1987) as a measure of network centrality 
that proxies for the firm’s informational advantages. This measure offers two important benefits 
for my research objectives. First, it provides measurement flexibility to handle fluctuations in the 
size and density of time-varying networks. Second, the measure can be decomposed into direct 
and indirect components of connections. Thus, I can design a test to isolate the impact of direct 
connections which create identification issues due to the endogenous nature of alliance formation 
decisions. 2 
Using time-varying alliance networks and Bonacich centrality, I find that firms with a 
higher alliance network centrality show a lower sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q, a measure 
of price-based investment opportunities. The investment-to-price sensitivity of central (at the 75th 
percentile of centrality distribution) firms is about 20% less than that of non-central firms (at the 
25th percentile). This finding is consistent with the argument that more centrally located firms in 
alliance networks are exposed to greater information flows, which then allows managers to rely 
less on their stock prices as a source of information for making future investment decisions. The 
negative relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity remains 
significant after controlling for the amount of private information in stock prices and the extent 
of corporate diversification, which can generate the same empirical predictions without the 
channel of information flows from alliance networks (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 2007). In 
                                                     
2 I provide details regarding the Bonacich measure of centrality in Section 3.2. 
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addition, I use the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s Regulation SHO that contains a 
pilot program that reduces the cost of short selling for a limited period (Fang, Huang and Karpoff 
2016) as an exogenous shock that can increase the information in stock prices from which 
managers can learn and, thus, reduce their needs to learn from alliance networks. Consistent with 
this argument, the exogenous increase in stock price efficiency adversely affects the negative 
relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity. 
Previous research shows that financially constrained firms may have limited ability to 
respond to their investment opportunities immediately due to financial market frictions (Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen 1988). Thus, I examine whether financial constraints limit firms’ ability to 
exploit their informational advantages from alliance networks and thereby dampen the negative 
relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity. Consistent with 
the prediction, I find that the negative relation between alliance network centrality and 
investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger for financially unconstrained firms using both sub-
sample tests with different proxies for financial constraints as well as an exogenous and negative 
shock on firms’ financial constraints at the onset of the recent financial crisis. 
Alliance formation is likely endogenously determined with other corporate policies, 
thereby creating bias in the estimated coefficients from the OLS regressions. To address the 
endogeneity concern, I first conduct two tests using quasi-exogenous changes in alliance network 
centrality due to changes in indirect connections via alliance partner firms.3 My first test follows 
a similar strategy as in Anjos and Fracassi (2015) who focus on the within-firm variation in the 
alliance network centrality of firm-year observations without the initiation of new alliances. 
Second, following Larcker, So and Wang (2013), I test the impact of the indirect part of alliance 
network centrality, which is likely to be relatively exogenous, on investment-to-price sensitivity 
using a sub-sample of firms with no changes in their direct alliance connections. Finally, I address 
the self-selection issue that not all firms participate in alliance networks using exogenous state-
                                                     
3 Ideally, a natural experiment that only affects alliance network centrality can effectively establish causality 
from centrality to investment decisions. Unfortunately, such experiment is extremely hard to find, as 
Robinson and Stuart (2007) suggest. 
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level variation in corporate income reporting requirement as an instrument to predict alliance 
participation (Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov 2013). The estimated coefficients from all tests are 
consistent with my argument that alliance networks provide alternative sources of information 
to make investment decisions, and thus reduce the need for managers to learn from their stock 
prices. 
There is a considerable level of heterogeneity in organizational forms and activities across 
alliances. My analysis shows that licensing, R&D, and technology transfer agreements are likely 
to occur between firms operating in an R&D-intensive environment (R&D-related alliances), 
while joint ventures, marketing, and manufacturing agreements are more popular in less R&D-
intensive environments. Consistent with the idea that R&D-related alliances provide more useful 
information about R&D investment rather than capital expenditure, the relation between alliance 
network centrality and R&D investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger for firms engaging in 
more R&D-related alliances.  
I perform several additional tests to check the sensitivity of my findings to alternative 
regressions and network specifications. Existing studies of investment regressions with Tobin’s 
Q show that the estimated OLS coefficients suffer from measurement errors because Tobin’s Q 
can only imperfectly proxy for true but unobservable firm-level investment opportunities 
(Erickson and Whited 2000; Erickson and Whited 2002). My findings remain similar using the 
Erickson, Jiang and Whited (2014) cumulant estimator, which addresses measurement errors in 
panel regressions. I also find similar results using alternative measures of price-based investment 
opportunities such as Total Q (Peters and Taylor 2017) or industry-level Q. My results are robust 
to non-linearity in investment-to-price sensitivity or additional firm characteristics and sample 
selection criteria. I also show that my results are robust to alternative assumptions about alliance 
durations and alternative measures of network centrality.4, 
                                                     
4 The SDC rarely reports the date of alliance termination, while most alliances last longer than the year of 
the alliance announcement.  
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Finally, I examine the association between alliance network centrality and firm value 
using panel regressions and event study analysis. First, if central firms in alliance networks 
possess informational advantages vis-à-vis peripheral firms in the networks, they should have 
better ability to select value-enhancing projects. Consistent with this argument, I find that alliance 
network centrality is positively related to firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q), and the relation 
becomes statistically significant for financially unconstrained firms. Alliance network centrality 
positively affects value changes when the firm faces industry-specific shocks, thereby showing 
that alliance networks convey valuable information that helps managers better anticipate future 
industry conditions. Second, my event study analysis documents higher announcement-period 
wealth effects when the increase in alliance network centrality due to new alliances is greater. 
This result shows that the stock market positively evaluates the greater access to information 
resources through alliance networks. Additionally, there is a higher value-creation at the alliance-
level when announcing firms are already central in alliance networks, which suggests that the 
market expects greater synergies from alliances between firms with greater informational 
advantages.  
This paper adds to several strands of the literature. First, this paper’s most direct 
contribution is related to corporate alliances. The existing body of alliance research examines the 
determinants of alliances (Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov 2013; Campbell, Galpin and Johnson 
2016; Lindsey 2008; Stonitsch 2014; Villalonga and McGahan 2005), announcement effects of 
alliances (Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 1997; Johnson and Houston 2000; McConnell and 
Nantell 1985), changes in operating and innovation performance (Allen and Phillips 2000; 
Schilling 2015; Schilling and Phelps 2007), contractual forms of alliances (Mathews 2006; 
Robinson 2008; Robinson and Stuart 2007), and spillover effects between alliance partners (Boone 
and Ivanov 2012; Cao, Chordia and Lin 2016). The evidence from this paper characterizes 
alliances as a channel for learning new information that affects corporate investment decisions, 
thus adding to the existing literature on the role of alliances in information sharing and 
knowledge transfer between partners (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe 2006; König, Liu 
and Zenou 2014; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996). 
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This paper also fits into the recently growing literature on the informational role of 
financial markets in corporate investment policies. Specifically, managers can learn from the 
information contained in their firm’s stock prices and incorporate it into investment decisions 
(Dow and Gorton 1997). Existing evidence shows that the amount of private information 
contained in stock prices (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 2007), the intensity of informed trading 
(Chen, Huang, Kusnadi and Wei 2014; Edmans, Jayaraman and Schneemeier 2016; Foucault and 
Frésard 2012), and product-market competitors’ stock prices (Dessaint, Foucault, Frésard and 
Matray 2016; Foucault and Fresard 2014) affect investment-to-price sensitivity. My results 
complement these findings by showing that the information flows through alliance connections 
can allow managers to rely less on price-based investment opportunities in making investment 
decisions, and thus reduce investment-to-price sensitivity. 
Most broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on network analysis application in 
financial economics. Network analysis has become increasingly popular in modelling industry- 
(Ahern 2013; Ahern and Harford 2014; Anjos and Fracassi 2015) or firm-level (Gao 2015) input-
output structures, product market rivalry (Hoberg and Phillips 2016), and information 
transmission through board connections (Fracassi 2016; Larcker, So and Wang 2013) or personal 
connections among investors (Ahern 2016). While the economics and management literature 
contains studies of alliance networks (Hagedoorn 2002; König, Liu and Zenou 2014; Rosenkopf 
and Schilling 2007; Schilling 2015; Schilling and Phelps 2007), this paper is the first to build 
alliance networks to analyze their informational roles and impact on corporate investment 
decisions and valuation. I also highlight the benefit of using Bonacich centrality to handle 
substantially time-varying networks and endogeneity in network participation. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and variables in the empirical tests. Sections 4 and 5 examine the 
impact of alliance network centrality on corporate investment decisions and the value-
implication of alliance network centrality. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
Corporate alliances are often considered an intermediate point on the market-hierarchy 
continuum of firm boundaries (Williamson 1975). Specifically, alliances offer a tighter connection 
between firms than discrete market transactions while the firms maintain separate ownership 
and control structures, in contrast to full integration. Jensen and Meckling (1992) point out that a 
network-form of organizations such as alliances can ease the costly transfer of knowledge among 
members. Consistent with this argument, other studies show the informational benefits of better 
access to partners’ knowledge resources (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996) and greater 
knowledge transfer between partners (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe 2006), which leads 
to a relationship between alliances and better operating performance (Allen and Phillips 2000) 
and innovation outcomes (Li, Qiu and Wang 2016; Schilling 2015; Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
While the previous alliance literature largely focuses on bilateral alliances, this paper 
investigates a more comprehensive impact of informational benefits from alliances using network 
analysis. Network analysis is an effective tool for modelling information transmission through 
both direct and indirect connections in networks (Jackson 2008). It is worth noting that accounting 
for “indirect” connections implies that alliances can convey not only alliance-specific knowledge 
but also more general information such as industry or economic conditions. Thus, a firm’s 
position in an alliance network determines the degree of exposure to information flows through 
the networks, captured by the measure of network “centrality.” A growing body of literature uses 
centrality in a variety of networks to model the information structure among network members. 
For example, Anjos and Fracassi (2015) use industry-level input-output networks to proxy for the 
information structure embedded in the economy. This paper adopts a similar view and estimates 
the extent of informational advantages from alliance networks using the measure of network 
centrality. 
This paper has three research objectives. I first examine whether and how alliance network 
centrality affects corporate investment decisions. Second, I investigate the influence of financial 
constraints on the relation between alliance network centrality and investment decisions. Finally, 
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I study the relation between alliance network centrality and firm value to test whether alliance 
networks are conduits for conveying value-enhancing information. 
I develop four testable hypotheses. First, I predict that higher alliance network centrality 
lowers the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q, a measure of price-based investment 
opportunities. Dow and Gorton (1997) propose that managers can learn from their own stock 
prices since stock prices not only reflect the outcome of past investment decisions but also send 
informative signals about future investment opportunities. Learning from the stock market has 
become an important research topic regarding the real effects of financial markets (Bond, Edmans 
and Goldstein 2012). For example, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) find a higher investment-to-
price sensitivity when stock price is more likely to contain private information from informed 
traders. They conclude that managers can learn more from these more informative stock prices. 
Managerial learning can stem from other sources of information such as the stock prices of their 
product market competitors (Foucault and Fresard 2014). Alliance networks may convey useful 
and publicly unavailable information about future investment opportunities because they offer 
links of private communication (Robinson and Stuart 2007) in pursuing risky projects (Robinson 
2008) that require a certain level of secrecy. In this case, the investment decisions of firms more 
central in alliance networks may depend less on price-based investment opportunities due to 
their informational advantages from the networks.5 This discussion leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Firms with a higher alliance network centrality exhibit a lower investment-to-price 
sensitivity. 
My second hypothesis is on the influence of financial constraints on the relation between 
alliance network centrality and investment decisions. Many studies of orporate investment show 
that financially constrained firms have limited ability to immediately respond to their investment 
opportunities due to frictions in financial markets (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988). For 
                                                     
5 In a recent theoretical work, Schneemeier (2016) shows that core-firms in a core-periphery network can 
make more efficient investment decisions because they can extract more accurate information from the 
financial market. This paper is similar, though focuses on an alternative source of information available 
outside the market, while Schneemeier (2016) examines information sources from inside the market. 
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example, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) find that a stronger positive impact from the amount 
of private information in stock prices on investment-to-price sensitivity for large firms than for 
small firms. They interpret the results as evidence that large firms are less likely to have financial 
constraints and have a better ability to incorporate new information from the stock market 
immediately in their investment decisions. Similarly, central and financially unconstrained firms 
in alliance networks should more easily translate their informational advantages into actual 
investments. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The negative impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity 
is stronger for financially unconstrained firms. 
Finally, I examine the value-implication of alliance network centrality. If alliance networks 
convey useful and publicly unavailable information about future investment opportunities, 
central firms in alliance networks possess informational advantages vis-à-vis peripheral firms in 
the networks. If these informational advantages are value-enhancing, alliance network centrality 
will have a positive association with firm value because more centrally located firms in alliance 
networks should have better ability to select value-maximizing projects. Furthermore, the 
informational benefit from new alliances should be greater when new alliances are expected to 
further increase the announcing firms’ alliance network centrality. I predict that the stock market 
positively evaluates the increase in firms’ exposure to information flows via alliance networks. 
Thus, my third and fourth hypotheses state that: 
Hypothesis 3. Alliance network centrality is positively associated with firm value. 
Hypothesis 4. The stock market reacts more positively to the announcement of alliances if the 
increase in the announcing firms’ alliance network centrality is greater. 
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3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Alliance network construction 
I obtain alliance information from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Joint Venture and 
Strategic Alliances database (SDC). The SDC provides by far the most comprehensive resource 
on alliances, including alliances those between public and private corporations and among 
universities, government agencies, and other types of institutions across a wide range of 
industries. (Schilling 2009). 6  To focus on the impact of corporate alliances on corporate 
investment decisions, I impose the following sample selection criteria. First, a deal must include 
at least two firms in the Compustat/CRSP merged database to focus on interfirm connections via 
alliances. My sample includes both bilateral alliances and alliances between three or more firms, 
thereby extending the existing literature, which concentrates on bilateral alliances (Chan, 
Kensinger, Keown and Martin 1997; Johnson and Houston 2000; Stonitsch 2014).7 Second, a deal 
must be announced between 1990 and 2013 because the SDC started systematic data collection 
only in 1990 (Stonitsch 2014).8 Third, a deal should not be classified as “rumored” or “intended,” 
which lack public announcements to ensure that I examine actual relations. Overall, my sample 
includes 16,021 alliance deals between 5,047 unique firms in the Compustat/CRSP merged 
database. 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the time-series trend of alliance activities between 1990 
and 2013. Column (1) first shows the dramatic surge in alliance activities during the early 1990s. 
Alliances were at their peak in 1999 and 2000, but experienced a downturn trend afterwards. The 
                                                     
6 Due to the lack of mandatory filing requirements, no alliance database is complete in the sense that any 
database can capture only a part of all alliance activities worldwide. Nevertheless, Schilling (2009) shows 
that a replication of previous studies using different datasets produces qualitatively similar results, 
suggesting that there is no systematic bias across datasets. 
7 Some alliance samples include private firms or nonprofit organizations, which I exclude from the network 
construction. Since about 93% of alliances in the SDC database are bilateral, this is unlikely to have a 
substantial impact. 
8 The number of announced alliance deals from SDC increases from 953 in 1989 to 3,318 in 1990. I find no 
comparable gap in the number of alliances announced between 1988 and 1989, which implies that no 
systematic trend drives the increase of alliance activities between 1989 and 1990. 
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severe impact of the financial crisis in the late 2000s on alliance activities is evident in the total 
number of announced deals in 2009-2011, which is only about the number of deals announced in 
2008. The time-series trend is consistent with recent alliance research (König, Liu and Zenou 2014; 
Schilling 2015). Columns (2) and (3) report that on average, 639 Compustat/CRSP firms (525 U.S. 
firms) engage in new alliances per year. In addition, the percentage of U.S. firms participating in 
new alliances per year is 8.69% of all U.S. firms on average (Column 4). Finally, domestic alliances 
between U.S. public firms are about 61% of my sample alliances, while U.S. firms take accounts 
for 82% (= 525 / 639) of firms that initiate new alliances per year. Hence, international firms in my 
sample tend to initiate more alliances per firm. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Firms can establish various forms of corporate alliances. The SDC classifies alliances into 
several categories: joint ventures and other contractual agreements such as licensing, 
manufacturing, marketing, R&D, and technology transfer. Joint ventures establish a separate 
entity and typically require equity investments from the parent firms.9 Licensing agreements 
involve an announcement of licensing and cross-licensing activities for products or technology 
between partners. Marketing agreements generally indicate a platform to use one firm’s 
distribution networks for the other firms’ products and services. R&D agreements pursue joint 
development of innovative technology and products explicitly. Finally, a technology transfer 
agreement usually applies when an alliance explicitly indicates the integration or combination of 
alliance partners’ products or knowledge assets. The SDC also provides a brief synopsis for each 
alliance deal, mostly drawn from the alliance announcement, from which it is possible to find 
several keywords to determine the alliance categories. 
These alliance types are not mutually exclusive since alliance announcements may 
indicate that some alliance objectives belong to different SDC categories. In this paper, I use all 
                                                     
9 Joint ventures are often treated as a specific type of corporate partnerships in contrast to other “looser” 
types of alliances (The Economist 2015). Hagedoorn (2002) documents a decline in joint ventures during 
the 1990s, but Internet Appendix Table 1 shows that joint ventures grew more popular after the financial 
crisis in the late 2000s. 
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types of alliances for three reasons. First, any alliance type can promote knowledge transfer 
between partners and thus provide a path for information flows (Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
Second, Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) suggest that alliances may target a wider range of 
activities than those described in alliance announcements, blurring the actual boundaries 
between alliances types. Finally, I can present a more comprehensive picture of alliance networks 
that extends the literature, which focuses on R&D alliance networks (König, Liu and Zenou 2014; 
Schilling 2015; Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
Panels B – D of Table 1 summarize the information about the SDC classification of alliance 
types. First, Panel B shows that 25.62% of the sample alliances are classified into no specific type. 
They are neither joint ventures nor belong to any other contractual agreement. Of the remaining 
74.38%, more than half belong to only one category, while about 5,000 belong to multiple 
categories. In terms of category distribution, marketing (manufacturing) agreements are the most 
(least) popular. Next, Panel C shows an interesting pattern in the overlap between alliance types. 
Specifically, licensing and technology transfer agreements are most likely to overlap, at 40 – 45%, 
while the likelihood of overlap with joint ventures is less than 10%. R&D agreements have a 36% 
chance to overlap with technology transfer agreements. In general, manufacturing and marketing 
agreements tend to overlap with many other types of alliances. Finally, Panel D compares the size 
of assets, capital expenditure, and R&D expenditure of firms that participate (or not) in each 
alliance type. Firms engaging in joint ventures are much larger and spend substantially less on 
R&D on average. On the other hand, licensing, R&D, and technology transfer agreements are 
more likely to occur between firms operating in R&D-intensive environments. Manufacturing 
and marketing agreements are in the middle of the distribution. 
An alliance network is estimated as a snapshot of ongoing alliances at the end of each 
calendar year. The SDC rarely reports the date of termination for a given alliance, creating a 
severe data limitation for measuring the ongoing status of alliances. In fact, only 274 out of 16,021 
(1.71%) deals in the sample report the date of termination. Since it is unlikely that an alliance 
exists only for the year of formation, existing studies on alliance networks typically assume a 
specific and universal length of alliance duration, generally three years (Schilling 2015; Schilling 
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and Phelps 2007) or five (König, Liu and Zenou 2014; Robinson and Stuart 2007) to seven years 
(König, Liu and Zenou 2014). Most alliances indicate an open-length contract, but a small fraction 
of alliances specify the expected length. Of the 16,021 deals, 768 (4.79%) report a mean and median 
“expected” alliance duration of 6.24 years and 5 years, respectively. In addition, the 25th and 75th 
percentiles of this expected alliance duration are 3 and 7 years, respectively. Hence, I conclude 
that it is reasonable to use the five-year assumption for alliance duration in the base specification. 
Moreover, Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe (2006) provide evidence that the magnitude of 
knowledge flows between alliance partners (measured by patent cross-citations) become weaker 
six years after the beginning of the alliances. Using the five-year assumption, I construct 20 time-
varying alliance networks between 1994 and 2013. The time series begin in 1994 because it is the 
first year for which alliance data exist for the previous five years (1990 – 1994). For example, the 
alliance network in 1998 is estimated as a collection of alliance connections through alliances 
announced between 1994 and 1998. 
A network includes nodes (participants) and edges (connections), and can be represented 
as an adjacency matrix in which each matrix element indicates the strength of connection between 
two nodes in the network. More precisely, a network is a 𝑛𝑛×𝑛𝑛 matrix, where n is the number of 
nodes in the network. The (i, j) component of the matrix indicates the status of the connection 
between the i-th and j-th nodes in the network. Following the literature on alliance networks (König, 
Liu and Zenou 2014; Robinson and Stuart 2007; Schilling and Phelps 2007), I represent an alliance 
network as an unweighted and undirected adjacency matrix. Each element of the unweighted 
matrix equals 1 if two nodes are connected and 0 otherwise. Thus, it treats all connections equally. 
An undirected network matrix imposes a symmetric relationship between nodes. This symmetry 
assumption is less realistic, but can ensure that all eigenvalues of the matrix are real and help to 
compute the eigenvector-related centrality measures in the network analysis (Ahern and Harford 
2014). 
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the alliance networks between 1994 and 2013. 
First, the alliance networks follow a similar time-series trend to the trend of alliance activities in 
Panel A of Table 1, with a lag of three to five years. For example, Column (1) reports that network 
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size (indicated by the number of nodes) peaks in 2000-2003, while Table 1 shows that the number 
of announced deals peaks in 1997-2000. Similarly, a sharp decrease in the number of new alliances 
in 2008-2009 seems to affect network size in 2012-2013. This pattern is natural since the size of an 
alliance network in one year relies on the intensity of alliance activities during the previous five 
years. This trend is also comparable to trends reported in recent alliance research (König, Liu and 
Zenou 2014; Schilling 2015). 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Alliance networks have gradually decentralized during the sample period. Column (3) 
shows that the mean Degree centrality (the number of direct connections per firm = edges / nodes) 
is generally decreasing, despite the fluctuation in network size. Consequently, alliance networks 
have become less clustered. Column (4) further shows this trend: Clustering Coefficient, which 
captures the extent to which a node’s neighborhood (directly connected nodes) is also connected 
each other, is also generally decreasing,  
3.2. Network centrality measure 
Network centrality is the key variable that captures the position of firms in alliance 
networks in this paper, thereby proxying the extent of information flows available for firms in 
the networks. More connected participants are more likely to find their positions in the more 
central part of a network. For example, Figure 1 illustrates that IBM and Microsoft, which are 
linked to many other firms via alliances (Table 3), appear in the very central part of their networks. 
Centrality thus distinguishes more-connected “central” nodes from less-connected “peripheral” 
nodes. 
Prior studies propose several measures of centrality, and all which have unique focuses 
and limitations. I use Bonacich centrality (Bonacich 1987) to capture the extent of information 
flows via direct and indirect connections (König, Liu and Zenou 2014; Robinson and Stuart 2007). 
The Bonacich centrality best fits to this paper’s research objectives for two reasons. First, the 
parameterization provides reliable time-series comparability in centrality values. Alliance 
networks substantially fluctuate in their size and density (Figure 1). Thus, the measure conforms 
 15 
 
well to the standard investment regressions with firm fixed effects focusing on the impact of 
within-firm variation in determinants of investment decisions. Second, I can decompose Bonacich 
centrality into direct and indirect connections through networks. Thus, I can design a test that 
controls for the impact of direct alliance connections largely related to endogeneity concerns in 
alliance formation decision. 
Consider a network consisting of 𝑛𝑛 nodes. Bonacich centrality 𝑪𝑪 is defined as: 
 𝑪𝑪 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑰𝑰 − 𝛽𝛽𝑮𝑮)−1𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 (1) 
where 𝑮𝑮 is an 𝑛𝑛×𝑛𝑛 adjacency matrix, 𝑰𝑰 is an 𝑛𝑛×𝑛𝑛 identity matrix, and 𝑮𝑮 is an 𝑛𝑛×1 vector of ones. 
For a sufficiently small value of 𝛽𝛽, 𝑪𝑪 is well defined. 𝛼𝛼 is a scaling factor. 𝛽𝛽 is a discounting factor 
for the impact of indirect connections – an indirect connection works at a probability of 𝛽𝛽 in each 
trial of information transmission. 𝛽𝛽 must be sufficiently small to ensure a well-defined measure, 
because the measure is the sum of all direct and indirect connections to which a node can reach 
through the network via all possible paths. For a well-defined measure, any parametrization of 
Bonacich centrality preserves the ordinal ranking of centrality within a network. Appendix 2 
provides more detail on the construction of Bonacich centrality.  
While the choice of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 might be arbitrary, existing studies suggest a guideline to the 
choice of parameters. I choose parameters to measure the absolute importance of nodes. 
Specifically, each direct connection has the same value and I discount each indirect connection at 
the same rate, regardless of network size and density. The intuition is as follows. Notice that an 
isolated single pair of nodes (two nodes connect only to each other) must be the least connected 
nodes in any networks. To the extent that they engage in no new alliances, other connections 
available in the networks will not affect their isolated connection. Capturing the absolute 
importance of nodes implies that these nodes will have the same, minimum value of centrality in 
any alliance network. To achieve this objective, I first obtain the plausible range for 𝛽𝛽 following 
Robinson and Stuart (2007): 𝛽𝛽 is set to three-quarters of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of 
𝑮𝑮. I represent the 20 networks 20 different adjacency matrices, thereby generating 20 estimated 
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values of 𝛽𝛽. My analysis suggests that the 𝛽𝛽 between 0.01 and 0.03 will produce a stable value of 
Bonacich centrality in any of 20 the networks. Therefore, I use 0.02 as my base parameter value of 
𝛽𝛽. For a robustness check, I also run tests using 0.01 and 0.03 and show similar results (Section 
4.6). It is worth noting that even a change of 0.01 in the value of 𝛽𝛽 largely increases or decreases 
the value of centrality (Table A2 of Appendix 2) since the measure considers all possible paths of 
information flows. Finally, I choose 𝛼𝛼 such that the minimum value of centrality always equals 
unity, thus setting the value of each direct connection to 1.10  
Columns (5) – (9) of Table 2 report the summary statistics of Bonacich centrality. First, the 
decrease in the mean value of Bonacich centrality is consistent with the decentralization in 
alliance networks (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2). Thus, the measure design effectively captures the 
changes in the size and density of networks. The minimum value of Bonacich centrality is always 
1 by construction, indicating that two nodes in an isolated single pair are always assigned a fixed 
minimum value. Additionally, Columns (8) and (9) suggest that the measure is highly right-
skewed, which can distort the estimates in linear specifications. Following Ahern (2013), I take 
the natural logarithm of Bonacich centrality, Log(Centrality), for the regressions.  
Table 3 lists the changes in the top 25 central U.S. public firms during the sample period. 
Since my alliance networks largely overlap in a short horizon, Table 3 reports the alliance network 
centrality ranking for six selected years to show the distinct changes in the list of key firms. 
Several giant firms in the networks such as IBM, Microsoft, HP, GE, GM, and AT&T are easy to 
identify. Given their importance in the U.S. economy, it is unsurprising to find these firms among 
the most central in alliance networks. Moreover, the list includes several firms operating in the 
media and entertainment sectors, such as News Corp, Time Warner, and Walt Disney. Thus, my 
alliance networks capture alliance activities between firms in a wide range of industries, thereby 
extending the literature, which generally focuses on manufacturing sectors (König, Liu and 
Zenou 2014; Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
                                                     
10  Robinson and Stuart (2007) choose 𝛼𝛼  such that 𝑪𝑪′𝑪𝑪 = 𝑛𝑛 . This parametrization scales the measure of 
centrality upward for small networks, which is inconsistent with the decentralization shown in Section 3.1. 
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[Insert Table 3 around here] 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
I use an unbalanced panel of U.S. public firms in alliance networks to isolate the impact 
of the country-specific characteristics of international firms cross-listed in the U.S. stock market. 
I exclude financial (SIC 6000–6999) and utility (SIC 4900–4999) firms due to the strong regulations 
on these industries. Sample firms should have at least $10 million (in 2009 dollars) of assets (at) 
and non-missing values of Tobin’s Q ([at – ceq + prcc_f * csho] / at) and capital expenditure (capx). 
I also restrict the sample to firms with at least 30 daily stock return observations to compute a 
firm-specific return variation as a proxy for the private information contained in stock prices 
(Section 4.2). My final sample consists of 18,830 firm-year observations between 1994 and 2013. 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical tests. All 
but indicator and log-transformed variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to avoid 
distortion due to extreme outliers. The sample mean (median) value of Log(Centrality) is 1.158 
(0.854). To understand the importance of indirect connections on the value of Bonacich centrality, 
I also present the summary statistics of Log(Degree), the natural logarithm of degree centrality 
equal to the number of direct connections. The sample mean (median) value of Log(Degree) is 
0.745 (0.693), which is 36% (19%) lower than the mean (median) value of Log(Centrality). Since 
Bonacich centrality counts all possible paths of information flows through the networks, a small 
chance of communication through indirect connections (𝛽𝛽 : base value equals 2%) generates 
noticeable increases in the volume of information flows compared to an analysis that considers 
only direct connections. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
Regarding investment measures, the mean and median values of CAPEX are 6.0% and 
3.8%, respectively, while the mean and median values of CAPEX + R&D are 15.2% and 10.5%, 
respectively. On average, R&D has more importance in our sample firms’ investment than 
CAPEX, though about 25% of the firm-year observations report missing R&D items in Compustat. 
This difference becomes even greater for a sub-sample of 13,647 firms with non-missing R&D: the 
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mean value of R&D is 12.6% while that of CAPEX is 5.4% (= 0.180 – 0.126). In sum, the sample 
firms show a pattern that indicates the increasing importance of R&D in total investment, 
consistent with Brown and Petersen (2009) and Peters and Taylor (2017).   
Panel B presents the correlation coefficient table between Log(Centrality) and other key 
variables in the regressions. First, Log(Centrality) is positively correlated with both CAPEX and 
R&D, suggesting that firms more centrally located in alliance networks tend to invest more. 
Additionally, Log(Centrality) is positively correlated with Log(Assets) and Log(Age), implying that 
bigger and mature firms are more likely to be central in alliance networks. The positive correlation 
between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q indicates that growth firms tend to be more central. On the 
other hand, Log(Centrality) is negatively correlated with leverage, which is consistent with the fact 
that the highly central firms in Table 3 are mostly operating in high-tech industries that use less 
debt. Finally, the stock prices of more central firms are less likely to be informative and these 
firms are more likely to be diversified (Section 4.2 describes the variables). 
 
4. Does Alliance Network Centrality Reduce the Investment-to-Price Sensitivity? 
4.1. Baseline results 
To test whether the investment of more centrally located firms is less sensitive to their 
own stock prices, I estimate the following OLS regression model: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the measure of investment of firm i in year t. I use the following measures of corporate 
investment: capital expenditure (CAPEX: capx) to proxy for tangible capital investment, research 
and development expenditure (R&D: xrd) to proxy for intangible capital investment, and the sum 
of CAPEX and R&D (CAPEX + R&D) to capture total capital investment. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is scaled by the 
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beginning value of assets. 11  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich 
centrality of firm i in year t – 1. 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 proxies for the price-based investment opportunities of firm 
i in year t – 1. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is the cash flow (ib + dp + xrd) of firm i in year t – 1, and included in the 
regression to control for its impact on corporate investment (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988). 
I add R&D expenditures to cash flows as they are mostly expensed rather than capitalized under 
U.S. accounting practices (Brown and Petersen 2009; Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 2007). My 
baseline regression controls for the beginning value of assets, Log(Assets), since firm size may 
capture additional aspects of investment capacity (Foucault and Fresard 2014; Foucault and 
Frésard 2012). Finally, calendar year (𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡) and firm (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) fixed effects control for any unobservable 
constant time- and firm-specific heterogeneity.12  
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽2, which shows the impact of alliance network centrality on 
investment-to-price sensitivity. I predict a negative and statistically significant 𝛽𝛽2 (Hypothesis 1). 
To control for the channels through which alliance network centrality may directly affect 
corporate investment, I include Log(Centrality) in the regression. I have no specific prediction on 
the sign of the coefficient on Log(Centrality) (𝛽𝛽1), since the actual investment level will depend on 
whether the information from alliance networks indicates positive or negative prospects about 
future investment opportunities. I also include the interaction term between Log(Centrality) and 
CF to isolate the financing channel through which alliance network centrality can affect 
investment (𝛽𝛽4). Moreover, cash flows are a non-price based measure of investment opportunities 
(Edmans, Jayaraman and Schneemeier 2016). Therefore, a positive or insignificant interaction 
term between Log(Centrality) and CF in the opposite direction of my prediction for the interaction 
term between Log(Centrality) and Q can bolster my argument that alliance network centrality 
                                                     
11 Following Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), I normalize investment measures by total assets instead of 
physical capital (in general, property, plant and equipment) because my sample contains some non-
manufacturing firms relying less on physical assets. 
12  My findings are similar when I replace firm fixed effects with industry-year fixed effects (Internet 
Appendix Table 2). This result is consistent with Roberts and Whited (2013) who suggest that including 
firm fixed effects is less likely to produce materially different results for a regression in which the 
dependent variables are already first-differenced, such as corporate investment. 
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reduces managers’ need to learn from stock prices rather than the sensitivity of investment to a 
more general measure of investment opportunities.  
Table 5 reports the baseline results. First, Column (1) shows that the coefficient on 
Log(Centrality) × Q is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent 
with the first hypothesis that more central firms in alliance networks rely less on the information 
contained in stock prices for making future investment decisions. On the other hand, the 
coefficient on Log(Centrality) × CF is positive and insignificant. Thus, alliance network centrality 
shows no significant influence on investment-to-cash flow sensitivity and does not reduce the 
sensitivity of investment to non-price based measure of investment opportunities. Regarding the 
other variables, both Tobin’s Q and cash flows (CF) positively predict the amount of future 
investment, which is consistent with findings from the vast literature on corporate investment. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
I further investigate the impact of alliance network centrality on the sensitivity of 
intangible capital investment to stock prices, either as a part of total capital investments (Columns 
2 and 3: CAPEX + R&D) or as a standalone measure of investment (Column 4: R&D). Using R&D 
as a dependent variable needs careful attention because firms may strategically choose not to 
report an R&D item in their financial statements. Given the greater importance of R&D than 
CAPEX in the sample firms (Table 4), it is important to examine the influence of missing R&D 
firms. I use two approaches. In Column (2), I set the missing R&D items to zero, following many 
prior studies, particularly when R&D is an independent variable. In Columns (3) and (4), I 
exclude the missing R&D firms from the regression sample, without filling in a zero for missing 
R&D firms when R&D is a standalone dependent variable. The takeaway from Columns (2) – (4) 
is that the coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q are all negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting a negative and significant impact of alliance network centrality on both 
intangible and total investment-to-price sensitivity. 
The economic significance of my findings can be calculated as follows. Table 4 shows that 
Log(Centrality) at the 25th percentile of the sample distribution is 0.101, while Log(Centrality) at the 
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75th percentile is 1.859. This difference corresponds to 1.54 standard deviations of Log(Centrality). 
Using the estimated coefficients from the regression of CAPEX in Column (1) of Table 5, the 
investment-to-price sensitivity of “central” firms (at the 75th percentile) is 0.180 less (= 0.117 × 1.54) 
than that of “peripheral” firms (at the 25th percentile). This reduction corresponds to 17% of the 
baseline sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q (𝛽𝛽3 = 1.048) for the least connected firms in their 
networks (Log(Centrality) = 0). A similar calculation shows a reduction in the investment-to-price 
sensitivity from central to peripheral firms by 16% (CAPEX + R&D in Column 2), 22% (non-
missing CAPEX + R&D in Column 3), and 24% (non-missing R&D in Column 4). 
4.2. Alternative explanations 
In this section, I address the concern that alliance network centrality can proxy for firm 
characteristics other than the informational advantages that networks provide. First, Table 3 
shows that the most central U.S. public firms in alliance networks tend to be large and old with a 
greater visibility. Thus, alliance network centrality may indicate a dearth of private information 
contained in stock prices, since these firms tend to operate in a rich informational environment 
with a significant amount of public information. In this case, alliance network centrality will 
negatively affect the investment-to-price sensitivity because managers learn less from stock prices 
(Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 2007), regardless of the information flows through alliance networks. 
To isolate the impact of the volume of private information in stock prices, I add the measure of 
private information contained in stock prices and their interaction terms with Tobin’s Q in the 
regression. First, following Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Foucault and Fresard (2014), I 
use firm-specific return variation as a proxy for the informativeness of stock prices (Durnev, 
Morck and Yeung 2004; Foucault and Fresard 2014): 
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = log (1 − 𝑅𝑅2
𝑅𝑅2
) (3) 
where 𝑅𝑅2 is the R-squared from the regression of daily individual stock returns on the daily 
returns of value-weighted market and industry (SIC 3-digit) portfolios. I require at least 30 
observations of daily returns each calendar year to compute Informativeness (Chen, Goldstein and 
 22 
 
Jiang 2007). Second, I use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a proxy for the private 
information contained in stock prices. I obtain the PIN dataset used in Brown and Hillegeist (2007) 
from Stephen Brown’s website (available until 2010).13 
Alliance network centrality can also proxy for the extent of corporate diversification. Chen, 
Goldstein and Jiang (2007) find that more diversified firms’ investments are less sensitive to price-
based investment opportunities because the market may have less ability to evaluate the 
operation of diversified firms compared to focused firms. Robinson (2008) shows that alliances 
are more likely to occur in diversified businesses than in core businesses since they often pursue 
a risky project with uncertain outcomes but greater upside potentials. Thus, firms with a higher 
alliance network centrality are more likely to be diversified, which can lead to a lower investment-
to-price sensitivity, regardless of the information flows from alliance networks. To rule out the 
channel of corporate diversification, I include a measure of corporate diversification, 
Diversification, and its interaction term with Tobin’s Q in the regression, following Chen, 
Goldstein and Jiang (2007). Diversification is one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the 
SIC 4-digit business segment sales reported in the Compustat historical segment database.  
Table 6 reports the estimation results after including additional control variables related 
to the volume of private information contained in stock prices and the extent of corporate 
diversification. Consistent with Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), I find that the interaction terms 
between Tobin’s Q and both Informativeness and PIN positively predict future investment, except 
for Column (1), where I estimate the impact of Informativeness on the sensitivity of CAPEX to 
Tobin’s Q. For other investment measures, both Informativeness and PIN show a statistically 
significant and positive impact on the investment-to-price sensitivity at the 1 – 5% level. These 
alternative explanations do have explanatory powers, thereby reducing the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the findings, particularly regarding R&D investment. However, more 
importantly, the coefficient on Log(Centrality) × Q is still negative and statistically significant in 
six of eight columns. Even in Columns (7) and (8), where non-missing R&D is the dependent 
                                                     
13 I thank Stephen Brown for making the PIN dataset publicly available. 
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variable, the coefficient is negative and very close to statistically significance (t-stats are -1.64 and 
-1.63). These results suggest that the negative impact of alliance network centrality on investment-
to-price sensitivity is not driven simply by the volume of private information contained in stock 
prices or the extent of diversification.14 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 Foucault and Fresard (2014) show that managers learn more (less) from other information 
resources such as product market competitors’ stock prices when their own stock prices are less 
(more) informative. This finding implies that the informational impact of alliance networks on 
investment-to-price sensitivity might be weaker if managers can extract more information from 
their own stock prices. To test this argument, I use a controlled experiment based on the SEC’s 
Regulation SHO that includes a pilot program that decreases the cost of short selling for an 
arbitrarily chosen group of Russell 3000 index stocks.15 Fang, Huang and Karpoff (2016) show 
that the pilot program improves price efficiency of selected stocks. Thus, the negative relation 
between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity may decrease for these 
pilot stocks because managers have less incentives to learn from alliance networks. 
Following Fang, Huang and Karpoff (2016), I estimate the following Difference-in-
Differences regression on the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1×𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2×𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1×𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽3×𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1×𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽4×𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1×𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶×𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿+ 𝛽𝛽5×𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽6×𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽7×𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶×𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(4) 
                                                     
14 As a robustness check, I also examine the results after including the natural log of the number of following 
analysts in year t – 1, Log(Analyst), and its interaction term with Tobin’s Q in the regressions with or without 
stock price informativeness. I do not include analysts-related variables in my main tests because their 
economic channels overlap with Informativeness or PIN. My findings remain similar, except for the 
regression with non-missing R&D as a standalone dependent variable, which shows a negative but 
insignificant coefficient (t-stats are around -0.9 to -1.3). I report these results in Internet Appendix Table 3.  
15 I thank Vivian Fang for generously providing me with the CRSP PERMNO-matched dataset of Russell 
3000 index firms with an indicator variable of pilot stocks. 
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where Pilot is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to the pilot stocks and 0 
otherwise. During is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the observation is drawn from the 
experiment period (2005 – 2007) and 0 otherwise (2001 – 2003). The year of implementation (2004) 
is excluded. 𝛽𝛽4 measures the treatment effect of pilot program on investment-to-price sensitivity. 
Year and firm fixed effects are included to control for the time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity 
in the level of investment. Sample firms should have at least four observations of Bonacich 
centrality during these six years, which reduces the sample size for this test to 3,352 firm-year 
observations. 
However, the goal of this test is not examining the impact of experiment on investment-
to-price sensitivity per se. Rather, I need to test the impact of alliance network centrality on the 
coefficient on the triple-interacted term (𝛽𝛽4). Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to interpret 
quadrupole interaction terms that involves alliance network centrality as an additional layer of 
interaction. Instead, I divide the sample firms into two groups: Central and Non-central based on 
the median value of Bonacich centrality, which is calculated by the average of centrality across 
all pre- and during-experiment periods (2001 – 2003 and 2005 – 2007). I expect 𝛽𝛽4 is more positive 
and stronger for Central than Non-central firms since the reversal impact of increase in stock price 
efficiency should be greater for more central firms. 
Table 7 reports the estimation results. In all specifications, the estimated coefficients on Q 
× Pilot × During are all positive and significant in Central sub-sample, but negative or insignificant 
in Non-central sub-sample. This adverse impact of stock price efficiency on the network effect is 
consistent with the informational implication of alliance networks, which suggests that managers 
may have less incentives to learn from alliance networks when they can extract more information 
from their own stock prices. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
4.3. The impact of financial constraints 
My main results show that more central firms in alliance networks rely less on stock prices 
for making future investment decisions since they have better access to alternative sources of 
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information about new investment opportunities. However, existing studies provide evidence 
that financially constrained firms might lack the ability to immediately respond to new 
investment opportunities due to frictions in financial markets (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
1988). Therefore, it is interesting to investigate whether firms’ financial constraints also affect the 
impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity. Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2007) find that the positive impact of stock price informativeness on investment-to-price 
sensitivity is stronger for large firms than small firms. They interpret the results as evidence that 
large firms are less likely to be financially constrained and have a better ability to immediately 
incorporate new information from the stock market into their investment decisions. Similarly, 
central but financially constrained firms might be less able to exploit their informational 
advantages from alliance networks. In sum, I predict that the negative impact of alliance network 
centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity will be stronger for financially unconstrained firms 
(Hypothesis 2). 
To test this hypothesis, I first conduct a sub-sample test with some proxies for financial 
constraints. In this paper, I use three different measures of financial constraints. First, large firms 
are less likely to be financially constrained due to having better experience and reputation, which 
can help them secure external financing from financial markets more easily. I use Firm Size 
(measured by total assets) as a measure of financial constraints, following Almeida and Campello 
(2007), Bakke and Whited (2010), and Edmans, Jayaraman and Schneemeier (2016). Second, 
Almeida and Campello (2007) argue that firms with available bond ratings are more likely to have 
easier access to financial markets because the ratings provide investors with an external 
validation of the firms’ financial status. I create an indicator variable Bond Rating equal to 1 if 
firms have either short- or long-term bond ratings from Standard and Poor’s (S&P) available in 
Compustat, and 0 otherwise. I exclude firms with zero leverage from this sub-sample 
construction. Finally, I use a popular measure of financial constraints, the WW Index (Whited 
and Wu 2006), defined as: – 0.091 × CF – 0.062 × Dividend Payer Dummy + 0.021 × Long-term Debt  
– 0.044 × Log(Assets) + 0.102 × Industry Sales Growth (SIC 3-digit) – 0.035 × Firm Sales Growth. 
Appendix 1 provides detailed definitions of the variables. 
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Using the three measures of financial constraints, I construct a sub-sample of financially 
unconstrained and constrained firms. I double-sort the sample firms to balance the variation in 
alliance network centrality within each sub-sample since centrality and the measures of financial 
constraints are correlated: positively for Firm Size and negatively for WW Index.16 Specifically, I 
first divide the sample firms into two groups by above and below the median value of the 
Bonacich centrality, and then further divide firms into two groups by above and below the 
median value of each measure of financial constraints within each centrality group. I then 
combine the financially constrained (unconstrained) group from each centrally group into a sub-
sample of financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. The balance of centrality variation 
between two sub-samples largely improve after double-sorting. 
 Table 8 reports the estimation results using double-sorted sub-samples based on the three 
measures of financial constraints: Firm Size, Bond Rating, and WW Index. For brevity, I report only 
the coefficient of interest, Log(Centrality) × Q (see Internet Appendix Table 4 for the full 
coefficients). In all columns, the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients are 
greater for the group of financially unconstrained firms: large firms, firms with a bond rating, 
and firms with a low WW Index. Moreover, all estimated coefficients in the group of financially 
constrained firms (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) are statistically insignificant with t-stats close to zero. 
The estimated coefficients in Column (7) in which non-missing R&D is the dependent variable 
are still negative but insignificant for large firms and firms with a bond rating, while their t-stats 
are close to significance (-1.51 for both). The coefficient in Column (7) for firms with a low WW 
Index is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, the findings show that 
central and financially unconstrained firms can better exploit the informational advantages from 
alliance networks. 
Next, I examine the impact of exogenous changes in firms’ financial constraints using the 
2007-2008 financial crisis. Specifically, I identify the impact of short-term debt maturing at the 
onset of financial crisis on the relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-
                                                     
16 Since Bond Rating is an indicator variable, I do not double-sort the variable. 
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price sensitivity. Following Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012) and Kini, 
Shenoy and Subramaniam (2017), I first restrict the sample to firms with fiscal year-end dates 
between July 2007 and January 2008. The key variable is DD1Due equal to the proportion of long-
term debt maturing in one year after the fiscal year-end dates (dd1) over total amount of long-
term debt (dd1 + dltt). This variable measures the financial pressure due to debt maturing on the 
onset of financial crisis. Importantly, the shock is less likely to be anticipated when debt contracts 
were made. The sample size reduces to 512 because the sample only includes one observation per 
firm with non-missing value of Bonacich centrality. 
To test the impact of an exogenous shock on firms’ financial constraints due to the 
financial crisis, I estimate the following OLS regression models: 
 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛤𝛤×𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(5) 
where the coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽3  that measures the additional effect of DD1Due on the 
relationship between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity. I expect a 
positive coefficient of 𝛽𝛽3 that indicates a weaker relation between alliance network centrality and 
investment-to-price sensitivity. 
Table 9 summarizes the estimated coefficients. Consistent with the prediction, 𝛽𝛽3  is 
always positive and significant at the 5% level in three of four regressions. Hence, the results 
further provide evidence that financial constraints limit firms’ ability to exploit the informational 
advantages from alliance networks. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
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4.4. Identification strategy 
My main results report OLS estimates on the impact of alliance network centrality on 
investment-to-price sensitivity. However, these estimates can be biased due to the endogenous 
nature of alliance formation decision that affects alliance network centrality. Specifically, alliance 
formation can be endogenously determined with other corporate policies such as investment and 
financing decisions. There are two layers of alliance formation decision. First, some latent factors 
may affect both the decision of engaging in new alliances in addition to existing alliances and 
corporate investment policies (omitted variables). Second, some firms may never enter alliance 
networks, or enter the networks in one time and exit in another time. Therefore, I can observe the 
relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-prices sensitivity only for firms 
in the networks (self-selection). This section addresses these omitted variables and self-selection 
issues. First, I control for the influence of the initiation of new alliances using quasi-exogenous 
changes in alliance network centrality due to changes in indirect connections through alliance 
networks. Second, I use a state-level variation in corporate income reporting requirement to 
investigate the concern of self-selection into alliance networks. 
4.4.1. Exogenous changes in centrality due to changes in indirect connections 
The purpose of this section is to control for the influence of the initiation of new alliances. 
I use two approaches. My first set of tests follows the method used in Anjos and Fracassi (2015). 
Specifically, changes in alliance network centrality consist of three distinct parts: (i) changes in 
centrality due to heterogeneity in firm characteristics, (ii) changes in centrality due to the 
initiation of new alliances and/or the termination of existing alliances, and (iii) changes in 
centrality due to changes in overall network structures. Firm fixed effects can control for time-
invariant firm-level heterogeneity, and thus largely reduces the endogeneity concern on (i). I have 
little concern about (iii) since it is unlikely for a single firm to engage in alliances to alter the 
structure of entire alliance networks. Thus, (ii) is most likely affected by the firms’ endogenous 
alliance formation decision. In my empirical setting, changes in centrality due to the termination 
of existing alliances are less problematic, since the alliance networks are built on an assumption 
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that all alliances universally terminate after five years.17 In sum, the initiation of alliances is the 
most severe identification in this paper. 
To control for changes in centrality due to the initiation of alliances, I define a firm-cohort 
that consists of all subsequent firm-year observations without forming new alliances. For example, 
suppose that a firm announces four alliances in 1993, 1996, 1997, and 2001. In 1994, the first year 
of my alliance networks, the first firm-cohort “Firm-1994” is defined by the alliance announced 
in 1993. “Firm-1994” continues until 1995 because the firm initiates no alliances in 1995. Then, 
“Firm-1994” is replaced by a new firm-cohort in 1996, namely “Firm-1996”, as the firm initiates a 
new alliance in 1996. By the same token, “Firm-1996” is replaced by a new firm-cohort in 1997 
(“Firm-1997”) that continues until 2000. The final firm-cohort will be “Firm-2001” in the above 
example, and last for five years until 2005 based on the five-year assumption of alliance duration. 
Using the series of firm-cohorts defined at the firm-year level, I include firm-cohort fixed 
effects in the regressions. The firm-cohort fixed effects largely control for the changes in centrality 
due to the initiation of alliances, since any observable effects of alliance network centrality in firm-
year observations with new alliances will be absorbed by the firm-cohort fixed effects. Moreover, 
the firm-cohort fixed effects control for (i) above, because they are subsets of the firm fixed effects. 
In sum, any remaining observable effects of alliance network centrality can be attributed to (iii) 
the changes in centrality due to changes in overall network structure, which are less likely driven 
from the endogenous alliance formation decision. 
Columns (1) – (4) of Table 10 report the estimation results using the firm-cohort fixed 
effects instead of firm fixed effects. Other regression specifications are the same as earlier, but I 
exclude the interaction term between alliance network centrality and cash flows (Log(Centrality) 
× CF) because there is no prior reason to believe that the changes in information flows due to 
overall network structure changes will affect investment-to-cash flow sensitivity. The coefficients 
on Log(Centrality) × Q are all negative but only significant at the 10% level in Columns (3) and (4). 
These weaker results can be explained by two factors. First, direct connections should have much 
                                                     
17 Section 4.6 shows that my findings are robust to different assumptions on alliance duration. 
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greater impacts on investment-to-price sensitivity, which is intuitive and incorporated in the 
design of measure. My base specification assumes that each indirect connection has a chance of 
2% (𝛽𝛽 in the Bonacich centrality) per each trial of information transmission. Second, using the 
firm-cohort fixed effects only rely on the within-firm variation in alliance network centrality for 
firms that do not regularly engage in new alliances, and thus creates a considerably restrictive 
testing environment. Specifically, the number of firm-cohort fixed effects is about 2.5 times the 
number of firm fixed effects: 8,460 vs. 3,303 (Columns 1 and 2) and 6,296 vs. 2,417 (Columns 3 and 
4). Many frequent initiators of alliance (on an annual basis or even more frequently), including 
the most central firms in alliance networks such as IBM or Microsoft, can provide very little 
contributions to the power of test because their changes in centrality are likely to be absorbed by 
the firm-cohort fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
My second test follows Larcker, So and Wang (2013), which also relies on the changes in 
indirect connections through networks. Bonacich centrality is the sum of both direct and indirect 
connections with discounts. I can decompose it into two mutually exclusive parts of centrality: 
direct and indirect connections. Since I set the strength of each direct connection to 1, the sum of 
direct connections is equivalent to degree centrality. Thus, I define a measure of indirect part of 
centrality, Indirect, as the difference between Bonacich and degree centrality. Finally, I add one to 
Indirect centrality to retain samples with no indirect connections. In sum, I test the impact of 
Indirect centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity, controlling for the impact of Degree centrality 
(= direct connections).  
I focus on a sub-sample of firms that (i) engage in no new alliances, and (ii) experience no 
changes in degree centrality. Thus, any changes in Bonacich centrality of this sub-sample of firms 
should be driven by the changes in indirect connections. A negative and significant impact of the 
Indirect centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity can alleviate the endogeneity concern in the 
alliance formation decision. Columns (5) – (8) of Table 10 report the estimation results. The sample 
size reduces to 8,346 (Columns 5 and 6) and 5,827 (Columns 7 and 8). Regression specifications 
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include the firm fixed effects, thereby relying on the within-firm variation in Indirect centrality. 
Still, the coefficients on Log(Indirect + 1) × Q are always negative, though they are only statistically 
significant at the 5% level in Column (5) and the 10% level in Column (6).  
Overall, Table 10 provides some evidence that the impact of alliance network centrality 
on the investment-to-price sensitivity are not entirely driven by the endogenous decision of 
alliance participation that affects alliance network centrality.  
4.4.2. Self-selection: state-level variation in corporate income reporting requirement 
There is a self-selection issue that only some firms voluntarily participate in alliances. 
Other firms never participate in alliances, or enter and then exit from time to time. To address the 
self-selection issue, I estimate a Heckman model with the two-step estimator (Heckman 1979) in 
which the first stage estimates a model for the likelihood of participating in alliance networks and 
the second stage tests the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity.  
In the selection stage of regressions, I exploit a state-level variation in corporate income 
reporting requirement as an instrument for the decision of engaging in alliance networks, 
following Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2013). Many U.S. firms operate in multiple states, and 
each state has different income reporting requirement. More than one third of U.S. states adopt 
combined reporting rule that treats the parent and subsidiaries of corporations as a single entity 
for state income tax purposes (Mazerov 2009). 18  On the other hand, separate reporting rule 
requires each subsidiary (including the parent) to report income to the state in which it operates. 
Combined reporting rule has become more popular as it can nullify the tax benefit from income-
shifting from states with high tax rates to states with low tax rates or tax-haven states. For example, 
many firms have established a subsidiary in the State of Delaware that holds trademarks that 
generate a substantial amount of loyalty income (Mazerov 2009). Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov 
(2013) argue that combined reporting rule reduces the cost of engaging in alliances. According to 
Robinson (2008) that views strategic alliances as a commitment technology to execute new risky 
projects, forming alliances is an alternative to internal project execution. Thus, combined 
                                                     
18 Appendix 3 summarizes the list of states that have adopted combined reporting requirements. 
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reporting rule reduces the tax benefit from internal transactions (between parent and 
subsidiaries), thereby increasing the relative benefit of forming alliances. In sum, firms operating 
more intense in states with combined reporting requirement are more likely to engage in alliances.  
To calculate a firm-level index of combined reporting requirement, I use the dataset of 
geographic footprint of U.S. public firms, which is constructed by García and Norli (2012).19 This 
dataset contains firm-level geographic dispersion of operating activities by parsing 10-K or 
equivalent documents from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database. 
Specifically, the dataset includes firm-level identifiers and provides firm-state-year level scores 
that measure the intensity of operations. Using the included Compustat identifiers, I match the 
dataset to the state-level adoption status of combined reporting requirement (Appendix 3) to 
assign a weight of 1 or 0 that is determined by whether each state has adopted combined reporting 
requirement by the year of index construction. Finally, I aggregate the firm-state-year level scores 
at the firm-year level by computing a weighted average with the weight described above. This 
index variable is called Combined Reporting. I begin with 65,412 firm-year observations between 
1994 and 2013 in Compustat/CRSP merged database that meet my sample selection criteria 
(Section 3.3). As the geographic footprint dataset is only available until 2008, my final sample size 
reduces to 38,255 in the first stage and 13,252 in the second stage.20 
Table 11 reports the estimation results of Heckman model. Specifically, the dependent 
variable in the first stage is an indicator variable of whether a firm is a member of the alliance 
network in year t (Columns 1 and 4). To be consistent with regression specifications in previous 
sections, I include Q, CF, Log(Assets), Price Informativeness, Price Informativeness × Q, Diversification, 
                                                     
19 I appreciate Diego Garcia and Oyvind Norli for making the dataset publicly available. 
20 I also use two variations of firm-level index of combined reporting requirement. First, I use the historical 
headquarter information from S&P Capital IQ and construct a binary version of firm-level index, which is 
limited to capture operating activities outside headquartered states. Second, I use the original dataset of 
Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2013) that contains the information about corporate subsidiaries from Dun 
and Bradstreet. This dataset spans on the period between 1998 and 2004, thereby substantially reducing 
sample size (I do not extrapolate the scores before and after). Using these variations produces very similar 
results to Table 9, which are reported in Internet Appendix Table 6. I appreciate Andriy Bodnaruk for 
generously sharing the dataset. 
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and Diversification × Q as predictors of participating into alliance networks. I also include year 
and industry (SIC 3-digit) dummy variables.21 First, Combined Reporting positively predicts the 
selection decision with a statistical significance at the 1% level. More importantly, in the outcome 
regression (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6), the coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q are all negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratio are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (except for the regressions predicting CAPEX), which suggests a 
presence of selection bias in the relation between alliance and investment decisions. In sum, Table 
11 shows that the negative impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity 
is less likely to be affected by the self-selection into alliance networks. 
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
4.5. Alliance types: R&D vs. Non-R&D alliances 
My baseline results make no distinction between alliance types, since all types of alliances 
share a feature specialized in knowledge transfer between alliance partners (Schilling and Phelps 
2007). However, there is a substantial heterogeneity in organizational forms and activities across 
alliances. Many studies in the alliance literature exclusively focus on the networks of R&D-related 
alliances (König, Liu and Zenou 2014; Schilling 2015; Schilling and Phelps 2007), because alliances 
are often pursued for risky projects (Robinson 2008) that typically involve joint research or mutual 
exchange of technology (Schilling 2009). Table 1 shows that licensing, R&D, and technology 
transfer agreements are likely to occur between firms operating in an R&D-intensive environment 
(R&D-related alliances), while joint ventures, marketing, and manufacturing agreements are 
more popular in less R&D-intensive environments. Intuitively, R&D-related alliances are likely 
to convey useful information about R&D, and thus affect negatively on the sensitivity of R&D to 
stock prices rather than the sensitivity of CAPEX. In this section, I test the above prediction. 
                                                     
21 I do not include firm dummies in the Probit model of selection equation as the model generally does not 
converge. Even at the SIC 3-digit level of industry dummies, I exclude the observations from SIC 3-digit 
industries that the industry classification perfectly predicts the selection decision (i.e. no variation in 
alliance decisions within the same SIC 3-digit industry). Otherwise, the model generally does not converge. 
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I divide my sample alliances into two groups: R&D Alliance and Non-R&D Alliance. Based 
on the discussion in Section 3.1 and statistics shown in Panel D of Table 1, the group of R&D 
Alliance includes licensing, R&D, and technology transfer agreements. On the other hand, the 
group of Non-R&D Alliance includes joint ventures, manufacturing, and marketing agreements, 
after excluding alliance that belong to R&D Alliance.22 Then, I separately construct an alliance 
network and calculate Bonacich centrality for each group of alliances: Bonacich R&D and Bonacich 
Non-R&D. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the size of two sub-networks are comparable: R&D 
Alliance networks produce 10,475 firm-year observations, while Non-R&D Alliance networks 
produce 9,964 observations. Finally, I compute R&D Alliance Ratio defined as the ratio of Bonacich 
R&D to the sum of Bonacich R&D and Bonacich Non-R&D. For firms with a missing centrality in 
only one sub-network, I set the centrality in that sub-network to zero. However, I exclude firms 
only participating in alliances that report no specific types (i.e., missing centrality in both sub-
networks). Two sub-samples are constructed by above and below the median value of R&D 
Alliance Ratio: High and Low. The median value of R&D Alliance Ratio is 0.567. 
Table 12 examines whether the impact of alliance network centrality on R&D investment-
to-price sensitivity is stronger for firms in the High R&D Alliance Ratio group. The dependent 
variable is non-missing R&D in Columns (1) and (2). The coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q are 
negative in both models, but only significant in High group (Column 1). As related tests, Columns 
(3) and (4) further examine whether the impact of alliance network centrality on the CAPEX 
investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger for firms in the Low R&D Alliance Ratio group. The 
coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q are negative in both models, but only significant in Low group 
(Column 4). Thus, the results generally support my prediction on differential impacts of different 
types of alliances on investment-to-prices sensitivity. Nevertheless, the differences in the 
magnitude and statistical significance of coefficients between two groups seem immaterial. A 
possible explanation is that actual alliance activities might reach beyond those announced at the 
beginning of alliances, which can blur the boundary between alliance types reported in the SDC. 
                                                     
22 Alliances that report no specific types are excluded from this analysis. 
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[Insert Table 12 around here] 
4.6. Robustness tests 
This section tests the robustness of my findings to a variety of regression and network 
specifications as well as network centrality measures. The dependent variable is CAPEX (Column 
1), CAPEX + R&D (Column 2), and CAPEX + R&D (Column 3) or R&D (Column 4) of firms 
reporting non-missing items. For brevity, I only report the coefficient of interest, Log(Centrality) × 
Q in Table 13. Full coefficients are reported in Internet Appendix Table 7. 
[Insert Table 13 around here] 
First, I investigate the robustness of my findings to alternative specifications of investment 
regressions. Existing studies on the investment regression with Tobin’s Q show that the estimated 
OLS coefficients suffer from measurement errors because Tobin’s Q is only able to imperfectly 
measure true but unobservable firm-level investment opportunities (Erickson and Whited 2000; 
Erickson and Whited 2002). Hence, I use the cumulant estimator of Erickson, Jiang and Whited 
(2014) that provides unbiased estimates of coefficients in errors-in-variables panel regressions (a 
STATA module xtewreg is available). Specification (1) estimates the baseline regression (Equation 
2) using the third-order cumulant estimator that specifies two mismeasured regressors: Tobin’s 
Q and its interaction term with Log(Centrality). The estimated coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q 
are negative and statistically significant. 
I also use two alternative measures of price-based investment opportunities. Specification 
(2) uses Total Q developed by Peters and Taylor (2017) that capitalizes R&D and a portion of 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) as a part of total capital to measure price-
based investment opportunities, which seems a better proxy for investment opportunities. 
Specification (2) uses Industry Q defined as a value-weighted average of Tobin’s Q at the SIC 3-
digit industry level. Both Q measures generate negative and statistically significant coefficients. 
It is possible that the negative impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price 
sensitivity may capture some non-linearity in the relationship between corporate investment and 
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Tobin’s Q. For example, if corporate investment is concave in Q and more centrally located firms 
in alliance networks tend to have higher Q, then the investment of firms with a higher alliance 
network centrality will be less sensitive to Q. In fact, the correlation between Log(Centrality) and 
Q is positive (0.086 from Panel B of Table 4). To address this concern, Specification (4) controls for 
the squared term of Q, following Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 
(2007). The coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q are still negative and statistically significant in all 
regression models. 
Specification (5) additionally controls for a set of firm characteristics that potentially affect 
future investment decisions: firm age, sales growth, leverage, and cash holding. This choice of 
variables follows Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) and Edmans, Jayaraman and 
Schneemeier (2016). Some of these variables may proxy for investment opportunities or financial 
constraints that are not captured by Tobin’s Q and cash flows. Internet Appendix Table 7 shows 
that the estimated coefficients on these variables are generally significant, particularly for firm 
age and leverage which are negatively associated with the investment. However, my findings are 
very similar after the inclusion of these additional controls. 
In Specification (6), I exclude firms from the sample if they report more than 20% changes 
in their total assets, as these firms might be undergoing material changes in their operations such 
as mergers or delisting. 23  Specification (7) estimates Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama and 
MacBeth 1973) to investigate cross-sectional differences in the impact of alliance network 
centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity. Still, the estimated coefficients are negative in all 
regression models, and statistically significant in most of them. 
Specifications (8) – (11) use alternative specifications of alliance networks to check the 
robustness of my results. First, my base specification assumes the five-year duration for all 
alliances (Section 3.1). Hence, I also use two alternative assumptions: three and seven years. 
Specifications (8) and (9) show that my findings are robust to different assumptions of alliance 
duration. Second, there might be a concern about a potential bias in my findings due to some 
                                                     
23 The results are similar for alternative cutoff values: 15% or 25%. 
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systematic differences between domestic and international alliance deals, as my sample only 
includes U.S. domestic while it counts on the alliance connections between domestic and 
international firms. I test the potential influence of this choice in two different ways. Particularly, 
Specification (10) constructs alliance networks that only consist of domestic deals that involve at 
least two U.S. public firms. On the other hand, Specification (11) constructs alliance networks that 
consist of entire global alliance deals involving not only firms but also universities, government 
agencies, and other institutions. Regardless of alliance network specifications, the estimated 
coefficients are negative in all regression models, and statistically significant in most of them. 
Finally, I examine the sensitivity of my results to a variety of network centrality measures 
(Specifications 12 – 16). First, I investigate alternative parameter choices in the calculation of 
Bonacich centrality. My base parameter value for 𝛽𝛽 is 0.02 (Section 2.2), which determines the 
strength of indirect connections in information trasnmission. Notice that any parametrization of 
the Bonacich centrality preserves the ordinal ranking of centrality within a network, to the extent 
that 𝛽𝛽 is sufficiently small to ensure well-defined value of measures. Hence, I additionally use 
0.01 and 0.03 as alternative choices of parameter values: “Bonacich-” and “Bonacich+”. I also use 
the degree centrality that equals the number of direct connections, which is identical to the 
Bonacich centrality with a zero 𝛽𝛽. Specifications (12) – (14) report the estimation results using 
Bonacich-, Bonacich+, and degree centrality. An interesting pattern emerges as the impact of 
alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity is likely to be stronger for centrality 
measures that assign greater values on the chance of information transmission per each indirect 
connection (0%, 1% and 3% for degree, Bonacich- and Bonacich+). Therefore, ignoring indirect 
connections through alliance networks seemingly underestimates the informational advantages 
from firms in the networks. More importantly, the estimated coefficients are always negative, and 
statistically significant in most of regression models. 
Second, I use two other popular measures of centrality: eigenvector and betweenness 
centrality (See Appendix 2 for more detail on network centrality measures). First, the eigenvector 
centrality is similar to Bonacich centrality in the sense that both measures consider indirect 
connections to determine network centrality. Eigenvector centrality is more efficient in static or 
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stable networks such as industry-level input-output networks (Ahern and Harford 2014), 
whereas Bonacich centrality provides more measurement flexibility with parametrization for 
scaling and discount factors. On the other hand, betweenness centrality represents the extent that 
a node stands like a gate for the information flows through networks. It is higher when the node 
is in the middle of “shortest paths” between many other nodes. Betweenness centrality assumes 
that information can only flow along the shortest paths. Borgatti (2005) points out that 
information flows are less likely to be the case as knowledge transfer can occur along any paths, 
not necessarily limited to the shortest path between two nodes. Despite this shortcoming, it is 
conceivable that nodes with high betweenness centrality are more likely to be exposed to greater 
information flows through alliance networks.24 Specifications (15) and (16) use eigenvector and 
betweenness centrality to test the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price 
sensitivity. Still, the takeaway from these tests is that the coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Q are 
always negative, and statistically significant in most of regression models. 
 
5. Do Alliance Networks Convey Valuable Information? 
5.1. Market value regression 
This paper documents a negative and statistically significant impact of alliance network 
centrally on investment-to-price sensitivity, which can be explained by that alliance networks are 
conduits of useful and publicly unavailable information about future investment opportunities. 
Thus, more central firms possess informational advantages vis-à-vis peripheral firms in alliance 
networks. In this section, I test whether these informational advantages are value-enhancing 
using panel regressions and event study analysis. If the informational advantages from alliance 
networks are value-enhancing, alliance network centrality will be positively associated with firm 
value (Hypothesis 3) as more central firms should have better ability to select value-increasing 
projects. On top of that, the informational benefit from forming a new alliance will be greater if 
                                                     
24 Appendix 2 reports positive correlations (0.36 – 0.52) between the betweenness other centrality measures. 
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the new alliance further increases the announcing firm’s alliance network centrality. Hence, I 
predict a positive relation between alliance announcement wealth effects and the magnitude of 
increase in alliance network centrality due to the new alliance (Hypothesis 4). 
First, to test Hypothesis 3, I estimate the following OLS regression model: 
 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽×𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (6) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is Tobin’s Q of firm i in year t, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm of the 
Bonacich centrality of firm i in year t – 1, and 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of control variables in year t – 1. 
Following the previous literature such as Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), I control for 
Log(Assets), Log(Age), ROA, PPE, R&D, CAPEX, leverage, and stock return volatility measured as 
a standard deviation of daily returns. I also include calendar year and firm fixed effects. 
Table 14 presents the estimation results. Column (1) shows a positive but insignificant (t-
stats = 1.20) coefficient on Log(Centrality). Hence, I delve into a sub-sample test using some proxies 
for financial constraints since Table 8 shows that the impact of alliance network centrality on 
investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger for financially unconstrained firms. Using the same 
three measures (Firm Size, Bond Rating, and WW Index), Columns (2) – (7) show that the impact of 
alliance network centrality on Tobin’s Q is positive and statistically significant at the 1 – 5% level 
for financially unconstrained firms, but negative and insignificant for financially constrained 
firms. Hence, this result is also consistent with the previous finding that central and financially 
unconstrained firms in alliance networks may have better ability to exploit their informational 
advantages from alliance networks. 
[Insert Table 14 around here] 
5.2. Value responses to industry-specific shocks 
Alliance networks can be conduits for conveying information such as technology-related 
knowledge, product or geographic market prospects, human capital, and more general economic 
conditions that help detecting future investment opportunities. As an alternative angle of value-
implication of alliance networks, I test whether the informational advantages from alliance 
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networks enable more central firms to better anticipate future industry conditions. Dass, Kini, 
Nanda, Onal and Wang (2014) argue that directors from related industries help firms predict 
future industry prospects more accurately. They find that the effect of industry-specific shocks 
on firm value is more positive for firms with a presence of those directors from related industries. 
Similarly, I investigate whether the value responses to industry-specific shocks are more positive 
for firms with a higher alliance network centrality. 
To measure industry-specific shocks, I follow Harford (2005) and extract the first principal 
component of seven variables that proxy for industry status: asset turnover, capital expenditure, 
employee growth, net profit margin, R&D expenditure, return on assets, and sales growth. I use 
the median value of variables from each year and industry (SIC 3-digit) to estimate the principal 
component: Industry Shock Index.  
I estimate the following OLS regression model: 
 Δ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
where Δ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the change in Tobin’s Q of firm i between year t – 1 and t. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is 
the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality of firm i in year t – 1. Industry Shock Index is 
measured at year t to test whether the informational advantages from alliance networks help 
firms anticipate future industry conditions more accurately. 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is a vector of control variables 
measured at year t – 1, including Log(Assets), Log(Age), ROA, PPE, R&D, CAPEX, leverage, and 
stock return volatility as well as calendar year and firm fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is 
𝛽𝛽1 that captures the impact of informational advantages from alliance networks on the value 
responses to industry-specific shocks. It is also worth noting that 𝛽𝛽2, which captures the impact 
of Industry Shock Index on firm value, is expected to be positive. 
Firms can benefit more from the informational advantages from alliance networks in 
extreme circumstances where industries are undergoing substantially positive or negative shocks. 
To examine this argument, I create an indicator variable Positive (Negative) Industry Shock equal to 
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1 if Industry Shock Index belongs to the top (bottom) 10th percentile of the index distributions. I 
then estimate the following OLS regression model: 
 Δ𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜ℎ)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(8) 
where variable definitions are identical to those in Equation (7). The coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝛽1 
and 𝛽𝛽3 that estimate the impact of informational advantages from alliance networks on the value 
responses to extremely positive and negative industry shocks. It is also worth noting that 𝛽𝛽2 (𝛽𝛽4) 
that captures the impact of Positive Industry Shock (Negative Industry Shock) on firm value is 
expected to be positive (negative). 
 Notice that Industry Shock Index is an exogenous shock from the perspective of firms, and 
thus reduce the endogeneity concern in the OLS regression. Nevertheless, to further alleviate the 
endogeneity concern in the endogenous nature of alliance formation decision, I also present the 
estimation results where the firm fixed effects are replaced by the firm-cohort fixed effects that 
exploit the within-firm variation in alliance network centrality of firm-year observations without 
an initiation of alliances (Section 4.4.1). 
 Table 15 reports the test results. In Columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on Log(Centrality) 
× Industry Shock Index are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, firms more 
centrally located in alliance networks better anticipate future industry conditions on average, 
suggested by more positive value responses to industry-specific shocks. Interestingly, alliance 
network centrality asymmetrically affects the value responses to positive and negative industry 
shocks. Specifically, in Columns (3) and (4), the estimated coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Positive 
Industry Shock are positive and statistically significant at the 5 – 10% level, while the estimated 
coefficients on Log(Centrality) × Negative Industry Shock are negative (significant at the 10% level 
in Column 4). A possible explanation is that more central firms in alliance networks are more 
likely to face the transmission of micro-level shocks though alliance connections, consistent with 
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Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) who propose a similar idea in input-
output networks. In fact, Boone and Ivanov (2012) find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance 
partners experience negative stock returns around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing 
announcement. When industries possess many growth options, however, the informational 
advantages from alliance networks help more central firms detect new investment opportunities 
and make better investment decisions. 
[Insert Table 15 around here] 
5.3. Alliance announcement effects 
In this section, I test whether the stock market reacts more positively to the announcement 
of alliances if the new alliance more largely increases the announcing firm’s alliance network 
centrality, reflecting the greater informational benefits from the new alliance (Hypothesis 4). 
Additionally, I test whether alliances between more central firms are expected to create greater 
synergies using their informational advantages, which leads to more positive combined wealth 
effects around the period of alliance announcements.  
I calculate the increase in the Bonacich centrality due to new alliances as follows: 
 Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 1 + 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 × 𝛽𝛽 (9) 
where Partner Centrality is Bonacich centrality of partner firm measured at the previous year of 
alliance announcement. 𝛽𝛽 is the discounting factor of parameter in the calculation of Bonacich 
centrality, with a base value of 0.02. In this setting, the increase in Bonacich centrality due to new 
alliances is defined as the sum of new direct connection (= 1) and all new indirect connections 
through the partner firm (Partner Centrality × 0.02). Notice that this definition is unable to fully 
estimate the changes in existing indirect connections not via new alliances (e.g. one of current 
alliance partner of announcing firm has been allied with the new partner firm). Measuring this 
change is computationally cumbersome since the alliance networks are estimated as a snapshot 
at the calendar year-level, rather than at the announcement-level. However, my definition of the 
increase in Bonacich centrality still provides a good approximation, because the magnitude of 
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indirect connections is relatively small and thus unlikely to be the first-order factor of centrality 
increases. 
The event study sample consists of alliances between firms with non-missing alliance 
network centrality in the previous year of announcements. Since the alliance networks span on 
the period between 1994 and 2013, the event study sample is drawn from alliances announced 
between 1995 and 2013. Following the existing literature (Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov 2013; 
Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 1997; Stonitsch 2014), I restrict the sample to bilateral 
alliances between two U.S. public firms. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated in a 
three-day window (-1, 1) using market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted index).25 CAR is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of extreme outliers.  
Table 16 provides descriptive statistics of variables used in the event study analysis. First, 
the stock market positively reacts to the announcement of alliances on average. The mean and 
median value of three-day CAR are 0.959% and 0.176%, respectively. This positive market 
reaction is consistent with the existing literature (Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 1997; 
Johnson and Houston 2000; McConnell and Nantell 1985). On the other hand, the sign of wealth 
effects at the alliance-level is mixed on average. The mean and median value of three-day 
Combined CAR are 0.128% and -0.024%, and the mean and median value of three-day Combined 
Dollar Gain are 8.001 and -1.490 million dollars, respectively. 
[Insert Table 16 around here] 
To test whether a greater increase in centrality due to new alliances leads to higher 
announcement effects, I estimate the following OLS regression models: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1×𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2×𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (9) 
                                                     
25 My findings remain qualitatively similar when I use a two-day event window (-1, 0) as well as market-
model in which parameters are estimated within the window (-239, 6). These results are reported in the 
Internet Appendix Table 8. 
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where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i around the alliance announcement in 
year t. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated in a three-day window (-1, 1) using 
market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted index). 26  The main independent variable is 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  that measures the increase in Bonacich centrality due to new alliances. I 
include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 in the regression to control for the current extent of informational 
advantages from alliance networks. 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is a vector of additional control variables in year t – 1, 
including the firm’s market capital measured at 50 trading days before the alliance announcement 
(Market Capital) and alliance types (R&D Alliance and Non-R&D Alliance). Chan, Kensinger, 
Keown and Martin (1997) observe greater wealth effects from horizontal alliances than non-
horizontal alliances. Thus, I also include an indicator variable equal to 1 if alliances are formed 
between firms operating in the same SIC 3-digit industry, and 0 otherwise (Horizontal Alliance). 
In some specifications, I control for additional firm characteristics including ROA, Cash Holding, 
and Leverage. Finally, calendar year and industry (SIC 2-digit level) fixed effects are included in 
the regression to control for unobservable time- and industry-specific factors. 
Table 17 shows the impact of increase in alliance network centrality due to new alliances 
on the firm-level announcement wealth effects. In all specifications, the estimated coefficients on 
Log(ΔCentrality) are positive and significant at the 1% level, thereby showing that the market 
positively evaluates the informational benefit from connecting to firms more centrally located in 
alliance networks. It is also worth noting that the estimated coefficients on Log(Centrality) are 
positive and significant at the 5-10% level, consistent with the idea that more central firms have 
a better ability to select value-enhancing projects. 
[Insert Table 17 around here] 
Next, to examine whether the stock market expects greater synergies from alliances 
between more central firms in alliance networks, I estimate the following OLS regression models: 
                                                     
26 Internet Appendix Table 9 shows that my results remain very similar when I use a two-day event window 
(-1, 0) as well as market-model in which parameters are estimated within the window (-239, 6). 
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 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 (or 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽×𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(or 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜞𝜞×𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (8) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal returns for firm i around an alliance announcement in 
year t. Combined CAR is calculated at the alliance-level by taking a value-weighted average, where 
the weight is determined by each firm’s market capital measured 50 trading days before the 
announcement. Combined Dollar Gain is the sum of firms’ dollar wealth gain calculated as CAR 
multiplied by each firm’s market capital at the beginning of the 3-day event period. The main 
independent variable is Both Central that is an indicator variable equal to 1 if both firms’ centrality 
values are above the median of the centrality distribution within the event study sample, and 0 
otherwise. As an alternative specification, I also use a continuous version of combined centrality 
variable: Combined Centrality is the sum of firms’ Bonacich centrality measured in the previous 
year of announcement. 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 is a vector of control variables in year t – 1, including the sum of 
two firms’ market capital measured 50 trading days before the announcement (Combined Market 
Capital) and alliance types (R&D Alliance, Non-R&D Alliance, and Horizontal Alliance). Finally, 
calendar year fixed effects are included to control for unobservable time-specific factors. 
 Table 18 shows the impact of combined alliance network centrality on combined wealth 
effects around alliance announcements. Columns (1) and (3) estimate the impact on Combined 
CAR, and Columns (2) and (4) estimate the impact on Combined Dollar Gain. First, the estimated 
coefficients on Both Central are positive and significant at the 1% level, thereby showing that the 
market expects greater synergies from alliances between firms already central in alliance 
networks. Specifically, if both firms are central, three-day Combined CAR is 0.613% higher, and 
three-day Combined Dollar Gain is 565 million dollars greater. On the other hand, the coefficients 
on One Central are positive but statistically insignificant. Turning to the continuous version of 
combined centrality variable, Column (3) shows a positive and statistically significant impact of 
Combined Centrality on Combined CAR. However, the impact of Combined Centrality on Combined 
Dollar Gain is insignificant with t-stats close to zero (Column 4). A possible explanation is that this 
continuous version of combined centrality variable is limited to distinguish the expected 
synergies from alliances between firms both central or one central and the other peripheral. 
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Overall, the results show that the market reacts more positively to the alliance announcements 
when both firms possess greater informational advantages from alliance networks. 
[Insert Table 18 around here] 
For other variables in the regression, Combined Market Capital is negatively associated with 
combined wealth effects. Also, consistent with the finding of Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 
(1997) Horizontal Alliance is positively related with combined wealth effects, though the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Finally, no significant association is observed between 
combined wealth effects and types of alliances measured by R&D Alliance and Non-R&D Alliance, 
compared to the base group of alliances that report no specific types. 
  
6. Conclusion 
This paper performs a large-scale network analysis to study the impact of corporate 
alliances on corporate investment decision and valuation. One important benefit of participating 
in alliances is the organizational structure specialized in information sharing and knowledge 
transfer between partners. I characterize a network of alliances as a conduit for conveying useful 
and publicly unavailable information about future investment opportunities. I empirically 
construct time-varying alliance networks and calculate network centrality that captures the idea 
that more connected firms tend to find their location in more central part of networks. Hence, 
firms with a higher alliance network centrality can possess informational advantages in detecting 
future investment opportunities. My research objective is to examine whether alliance network 
centrality affects corporate investment policies, when the influence of centrality becomes stronger, 
and how the centrality is related to firm valuation. 
My main hypothesis predicts that the investment of firms with a higher alliance network 
centrality is less sensitive to Tobin’s Q that proxies for price-based investment opportunities, 
since managers may rely less on the information contained in stock prices for making investment 
decisions. Supporting this hypothesis, alliance network centrality negatively affects investment-
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to-price sensitivity. The investment of central (at the 75th percentile of the centrality distribution) 
firms is 15 – 20% less sensitive to Tobin’s Q than that of non-central firms (at the 25th percentile). 
The negative relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity 
becomes insignificant for financially constrained firms, suggesting that financial constraints may 
limit firms’ ability to exploit the informational advantages from alliance networks. To address the 
endogeneity concern in alliance formation decision, I show that quasi-exogenous changes in 
alliance network centrality due to changes in the indirect connections via alliance partner firms 
also negatively affect the sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q. My findings are not fully driven 
by several alternative explanations and self-selection issues into alliance networks. Finally, the 
results are robust to a variety of regressions and network specifications as well as measures of 
network centrality. 
Alliance network centrality is positively related to firm value (measured by Tobin’s Q) on 
average. In addition, firms more centrally located in alliance networks better anticipate future 
industry conditions, suggested by the more positive value responses when facing industry-
specific shocks. Moreover, I find a positive relation between the magnitude of increase in 
centrality from new alliance and the announcement wealth effects, consistent with the prediction 
that the stock market positively evaluates the better access to the information resources of more 
central firms via alliance networks. There is also a higher value creation for alliances between 
firms already central in alliance networks, suggesting that the market expects greater synergies 
using these firms’ greater informational advantages.  
This paper has three main contributions to the finance literature. First, the evidence from 
this paper characterizes alliances as a channel for learning new information that affects corporate 
investment decisions, thus adding to the existing literature on the role of alliances in information 
sharing and knowledge transfer between partners. Second, this paper fits into the recently 
growing literature on the informational role of financial markets in corporate investment 
decisions. Specifically, I show that the information flows through alliance networks can reduce 
the sensitivity of investment to price-based investment opportunities. Finally, I contribute to the 
literature on network analysis application in financial economics. This paper is the first to present 
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a comprehensive picture of time-varying alliance networks to analyze their informational impacts 
on specific corporate policies. Moreover, this paper highlights the benefit of using Bonacich 
centrality to handle substantial time-series variations in network characteristics and endogeneity 
concerns in the decision of network participation.
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Table 1  
Characteristics of Sample Alliance Deals 
This table summarizes the characteristics of sample alliance deals. The sample consists of 16,021 alliance 
deals announced in 1990-2013 and formed between at least two firms in Compustat/CRSP merged (CCM) 
database. Panel A presents the number of announced deals (Column 1), the number of CCM firms in 
alliance deals Column (2), the number of U.S. CCM firms in alliance deals (Column 3), the ratio of U.S. 
CCM firms in alliance deals to total U.S. CCM firms (Column 4), and the proportion of domestic (Column 
5) and international deals (Column 6). Panel B reports the number of alliance deals classified into none, 
single, multiple categories, and each of categories defined by SDC. Panel C summarizes the frequency of 
combinations of different alliance types. Panel D compares firm size and investments of firms participating 
in each alliance type. 
Panel A: Alliance Trends 
Year Deals 
Announced 
All 
Firms 
U.S. 
Firms 
U.S. Firms with New 
Alliances / Total U.S. 
CCM Firms (%) 
Domestic 
Deals (%) 
International 
Deals (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1990 509 473 403 6.91 60.12 39.88 
1991 826 639 549 9.18 67.31 32.69 
1992 1,003 759 676 10.72 72.68 27.32 
1993 1,025 819 713 10.18 68.78 31.22 
1994 1,136 930 809 11.01 65.67 34.33 
1995 1,141 1,044 890 11.92 70.90 29.10 
1996 868 887 770 9.76 72.93 17.07 
1997 1,227 1,132 966 12.29 69.85 30.16 
1998 1,229 1,145 950 12.71 64.28 35.72 
1999 1,447 1,228 1,045 14.45 68.90 31.10 
2000 1,272 1,000 776 11.24 48.19 51.81 
2001 768 704 530 8.48 46.75 53.26 
2002 499 561 417 7.09 51.50 48.50 
2003 543 625 783 13.90 55.80 44.20 
2004 409 516 387 6.89 54.77 45.23 
2005 458 558 452 8.15 61.57 38.43 
2006 391 472 385 7.06 60.87 39.13 
2007 360 484 374 6.98 62.22 37.78 
2008 278 365 273 5.41 54.68 45.32 
2009 115 171 119 2.49 53.04 46.96 
2010 72 122 84 1.82 47.22 52.78 
2011 134 211 173 3.82 65.67 34.33 
2012 181 265 216 4.85 63.54 36.46 
2013 130 214 168 3.72 62.31 37.69 
Total 16,021 639 525 8.69 61.23 38.77 
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Panel B: SDC Classification of Alliance Types 
SDC Classification Obs. % Obs. 
No Category 4,105 25.62 
Single Category 6,831 42.64 
Multiple Categories 5,175 32.30 
2 3,474 21.68 
3 1,254 7.83 
4+ 447 2.79 
Total 16,021 100.00 
   
SDC Categories Obs. % Obs. (over 11,916 = Alliances  
Classified into Any of Categories) 
Joint Venture 3,391 28.46 
Licensing Agreement 2,992 25.11 
Manufacturing Agreement 2,111 17.72 
Marketing Agreement 4,358 36.57 
R&D Agreement 3,253 27.30 
Technology Transfer 3,288 27.59 
 
Panel C: Overlap of Alliance Types 
  % of Alliances Types Overlap: Column / Row Obs. 
Category Obs. Single  J.V.  Licensing Manufacturing Marketing R&D Tech. 
Joint Venture 3,391 60.54 . 1.62 20.50 15.10 11.21 7.96 
Licensing 2,992 27.37 1.84 . 15.37 27.77 19.02 49.23 
Manufacturing  2,111 22.07 32.92 21.79 . 32.88 22.55 44.20 
Marketing  4,358 45.20 15.74 19.07 15.92 . 25.15 22.60 
R&D 3,253 31.02 11.68 17.49 14.63 33.69 . 36.64 
Tech. Transfer 3,288 15.63 8.21 44.80 28.38 29.96 36.25 . 
 
Panel D: Characteristics of Firms Announcing Alliances by Alliance Types 
Firms in Alliance Types Participating Not Participating 
Category Obs. Assets 
($B) 
CAPEX 
(%) 
R&D 
(%) 
Obs. Assets 
($B) 
CAPEX 
(%) 
R&D 
(%) 
Joint Venture 4,963 58.03 7.08 3.21 14,549 23.76 6.08 11.04 
Licensing Agreement 5,119 17.52 6.01 13.41 14,393 37.80 6.45 7.50 
Manufacturing Agreement 3,168 29.64 6.51 8.51 16,344 33.03 6.30 9.15 
Marketing Agreement 7,350 24.77 6.22 9.37 12,162 37.14 6.41 8.90 
R&D Agreement 5,537 23.98 6.51 13.23 13,975 35.84 6.27 7.39 
Tech. Transfer 5,565 21.28 6.46 11.95 13,947 36.95 6.29 7.89 
Any of Categories 19,512 32.48 6.33 9.05 6,266 45.71 5.75 5.85 
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Table 2  
Characteristics of Alliance Networks and Bonacich Centrality 
This table reports the statistics for alliance networks and Bonacich centrality between 1994 and 2013. An 
alliance network is a snapshot of all ongoing alliances measured at the end of each calendar year, based on 
the assumption that each alliance exists for five years after the announcement of alliances. Nodes indicate 
the number of participants in the networks. Edges indicate the total number of pairwise connections 
between participants in the networks. Degree is the average number of direct connections per node, which 
equals the ratio of Edges to Nodes. Clustering Coefficient is the average ratio of a node’s existing connections 
to all possible connections between its directly connected nodes. The next four columns provide summary 
statistics for Bonacich centrality. See Appendix 2 for details on the definition and construction of Bonacich 
Centrality. 
 Network  Bonacich Centrality 
Year Nodes Edges Degree Clustering 
Coefficient  
 Mean Median Min Max Skewness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1994 1,753 8,576 4.89 0.281  11.13 3.41 1 372.21 6.02 
1995 1,988 9,398 4.73 0.265  10.97 3.26 1 381.57 6.29 
1996 2,108 9,802 4.65 0.267  10.87 3.33 1 400.28 6.61 
1997 2,297 10,166 4.43 0.240  9.71 3.14 1 369.52 6.98 
1998 2,369 10,134 4.28 0.212  8.68 2.96 1 323.87 7.16 
1999 2,445 10,030 4.10 0.196  8.25 2.73 1 323.81 7.82 
2000 2,354 10,322 4.38 0.213  9.15 3.08 1 344.72 7.42 
2001 2,151 9,690 4.50 0.197  9.24 3.09 1 339.93 7.26 
2002 1,973 8,648 4.38 0.188  8.36 3.00 1 296.31 7.08 
2003 1,789 7,826 4.37 0.183  7.73 2.74 1 246.89 6.79 
2004 1,571 6,454 4.11 0.192  6.35 2.45 1 187.69 6.54 
2005 1,433 4,634 3.23 0.135  4.23 2.02 1 116.36 6.66 
2006 1,312 3,782 2.88 0.101  3.55 2.00 1 93.17 6.76 
2007 1,270 3,536 2.78 0.097  3.35 1.88 1 85.24 6.53 
2008 1,167 3,040 2.60 0.094  3.07 1.44 1 72.33 6.36 
2009 1,036 2,552 2.46 0.100  2.85 1.27 1 58.49 5.78 
2010 840 1,996 2.38 0.100  2.68 1.21 1 45.97 5.19 
2011 742 1,642 2.21 0.103  2.45 1.15 1 33.59 4.73 
2012 655 1,478 2.26 0.186  2.48 1.16 1 26.47 3.56 
2013 599 1,254 2.09 0.220  2.25 1.09 1 17.46 2.97 
Mean 1,593 6,248 3.59 0.192  6.37 2.32 1 206.79 8.19 
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Table 3  
Alliance Network Centrality Ranking Between 1994 and 2013 
This table lists the top 25 central U.S. public firms (non-financial and non-utility) in alliance networks for selected years. 
Rank\Year 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2013 
1 IBM IBM IBM Microsoft Microsoft GE 
2 AT&T Microsoft Microsoft IBM GE Comcast 
3 HP HP AOL Time Warner Motorola IBM Microsoft 
4 Digital Equipment AT&T HP Sun Microsystems Yahoo Anadarko Petro. 
5 Motorola Motorola Sun Microsystems Intel Intel AT&T 
6 Apple AOL Oracle GE Google News Corp. 
7 GE Sun Microsystems GE HP HP Exxon Mobil 
8 Microsoft Intel Lucent Tech. Cisco Time Warner Yahoo 
9 Novell Compaq Cisco Merck & Co Motorola Google 
10 Sun Microsystems Oracle AT&T Yahoo Oracle EMC 
11 Oracle Apple Intel EMC News Corp. Johnson & Johnson 
12 GM Novell Motorola Disney CBS Chevron 
13 Intel GE GM Applera Corp. EMC Disney 
14 Texas Instruments Unisys 3Com Comcast AT&T Pfizer 
15 DuPont Texas Instruments EDS Oracle Comcast Intel 
16 Bellsouth GM Ford CBS Honeywell Apache 
17 Tandem Computers Eastman Kodak Yahoo Johnson & Johnson Johnson & Johnson Enterprise Products 
18 Bell Atlantic Cisco RealNetworks Time Warner Verizon Chesapeake 
19 Compaq Bell Atlantic Siebel Systems DuPont Adobe IBM 
20 Silicon Graphics DuPont Eastman Kodak Ebay Qualcomm Qualcomm 
21 GTE Lucent Tech. I2 Tech. Abbott Lab. ConocoPhillips Verizon 
22 Eastman Kodak Adobe Ariba Sprint Nextel United Tech. Merck & Co 
23 US West Inc. GTE Dell Ford Cisco Time Warner Cable 
24 National Semicon. Silicon Graphics Commerce One First Data Bristol-Myers Time Warner 
25 NYNEX Qualcomm SBC Comm. RealNetworks Viacom Cablevision 
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Table 4  
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents the summary statistics for variables used in the regressions. My sample consists of 18,830 
U.S. firm-year observations in alliance networks between 1994 and 2013. See Appendix 1 for the complete 
list of variable definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for network 
centrality measures (Bonacich and Degree), Assets, Age, Price Informativeness, PIN, Diversification, Bond Rating, 
Combined Reporting (HQ), and Industry Shock Index. Panel B shows the correlation coefficients between 
Log(Centrality) and a host of variables used in the empirical tests. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 N Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
Network Centrality Measures       
Log(Centrality) 18,830 1.158 1.141 0.101 0.854 1.859 
Log(Degree) 18,830 0.745 0.930 0 0.693 1.099 
Log(Bonacich R&D) 10,475 0.786 0.911 0.035 0.533 1.242 
Log(Bonacich Non-R&D) 9,964 0.545 0.746 0 0.122 0.809 
Dependent Variables       
CAPEX 18,830 0.060 0.072 0.019 0.038 0.073 
CAPEX + R&D 18,830 0.152 0.150 0.051 0.105 0.201 
CAPEX + R&D (non-missing) 13,647 0.180 0.160 0.073 0.131 0.230 
R&D (non-missing) 13,647 0.126 0.145 0.024 0.082 0.172 
Other Variables       
Assets ($ billion) 18,830 7.243 31.656 0.117 0.564 3.335 
Age (years) 18,830 19.944 16.025 8 13 28 
Q 18,830 2.385 1.839 1.265 1.748 2.755 
CF 18,830 0.083 0.178 0.038 0.104 0.177 
Price Informativeness 18,830 1.586 2.124 0.340 1.530 2.894 
PIN 17,325 0.163 0.085 0.104 0.147 0.207 
Diversification 18,830 0.127 0.219 0 0 0.204 
Leverage 18,830 0.202 0.204 0.012 0.161 0.316 
Cash Holding 18,830 0.243 0.246 0.039 0.150 0.390 
Sales Growth 18,830 0.274 0.822 -0.017 0.097 0.272 
Asset Growth 18,830 0.133 0.440 -0.060 0.051 0.194 
PPE 18,830 0.227 0.206 0.074 0.155 0.311 
Return Volatility 18,830 0.038 0.021 0.022 0.034 0.049 
Total Q 18,830 1.744 2.705 0.428 0.895 1.842 
Industry Q 18,830 2.193 1.082 1.400 1.950 2.642 
Bond Rating 15,733 0.437 0.496 0 0 1 
WW Index 18,807 -0.300 0.126 -0.394 -0.292 -0.205 
Combined Reporting 13,480 0.416 0.309 0.136 0.390 0.667 
Combined Reporting (HQ) 18,545 0.406 0.491 0 0 1 
Industry Shock Index 18,827 -0.298 1.243 -0.470 -0.166 0.172 
 58 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables 
Number of Observations: 18,830 
 Bonacich CAPEX R&D Assets Age Q CF Leverage Cash Informa. Diversifi. 
Log(Centrality) 1           
CAPEX 0.024 1          
R&D 0.043 -0.054 1         
Log(Assets) 0.318 0.029 -0.440 1        
Log(Age) 0.095 -0.075 -0.318 0.580 1       
Q 0.086 0.147 0.450 -0.222 -0.238 1      
CF 0.106 0.100 0.027 0.220 0.163 0.054 1     
Leverage -0.067 0.091 -0.275 0.281 0.176 -0.187 -0.166 1    
Cash Holding -0.010 -0.122 0.607 -0.435 -0.412 0.411 -0.068 -0.403 1   
Informativeness -0.180 -0.011 0.241 -0.706 -0.432 0.029 -0.179 -0.086 0.195 1  
Diversification 0.094 -0.065 -0.248 0.340 0.376 -0.174 0.005 0.130 -0.299 -0.227 1 
 
 59 
 
Table 5  
Main Results: Alliance Network Centrality and Investment-to-Price Sensitivity 
This table shows the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity. The 
dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (1), capital plus research and development 
expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (2), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Column 
(3), and non-missing R&D in Column (4). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. 
Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main 
independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based 
investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the 
list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.126 0.879*** 1.153*** 1.093*** 
 (1.11) (4.45) (4.94) (5.58) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.117*** -0.218*** -0.319*** -0.206*** 
 (-2.97) (-3.37) (-4.54) (-3.43) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.391 0.738 1.042 0.303 
 (1.05) (1.17) (1.45) (0.51) 
Q 1.048*** 2.083*** 2.234*** 1.340*** 
 (12.85) (15.31) (14.71) (10.47) 
CF 2.320*** 3.779*** 3.883*** 1.785 
 (3.88) (3.36) (2.89) (1.56) 
Log(Assets) -1.075*** -5.550*** -6.712*** -5.879*** 
 (-7.57) (-20.18) (-20.24) (-20.12) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.193 0.288 0.329 0.263 
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Table 6  
Alternative Explanations: Private Information in Stock Prices / Diversification 
This table examines whether the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity is driven 
by two alternative channels that might be captured by alliance network centrality: the volume of private 
information contained in stock prices and the extent of corporate diversification. The dependent variable is capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (1) and (2), capital plus research and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) 
in Column (3) and (4), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Column (5) and (6), and non-missing R&D 
in Column (7) and (8). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the natural 
logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the interaction term 
between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the 
complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) 0.122 0.095 0.666*** 0.627*** 0.915*** 0.867*** 0.826*** 0.823*** 
 (1.06) (0.81) (3.34) (3.06) (3.85) (3.57) (4.22) (3.98) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.121*** -0.109*** -0.137** -0.129* -0.232*** -0.220*** -0.104 -0.110 
 (-2.94) (-2.65) (-2.00) (-1.87) (-3.08) (-2.91) (-1.64) (-1.63) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.357 0.390 0.755 0.747 1.094 1.075 0.391 0.345 
 (0.96) (1.06) (1.20) (1.17) (1.55) (1.46) (0.67) (0.55) 
Q 1.028*** 0.991*** 1.658*** 1.587*** 1.799*** 1.778*** 0.833*** 0.839*** 
 (10.69) (7.85) (9.64) (7.05) (9.14) (7.11) (4.81) (3.85) 
CF 2.302*** 2.341*** 3.880*** 3.944*** 3.950*** 3.858*** 1.874* 1.815 
 (3.87) (3.69) (3.49) (3.35) (2.99) (2.70) (1.67) (1.47) 
Log(Assets) -1.266*** -1.364*** -5.731*** -6.163*** -6.876*** -7.308*** -5.876*** -6.254*** 
 (-8.67) (-8.32) (-20.70) (-20.64) (-20.45) (-19.57) (-20.22) (-19.58) 
Informativeness -0.248***  -0.670***  -0.696***  -0.568***  
 (-3.59)  (-5.95)  (-4.86)  (-4.64)  
Informativeness × Q -0.005  0.172***  0.174***  0.209***  
 (-0.20)  (3.99)  (3.42)  (4.66)  
PIN  -4.778***  -12.886***  -12.311***  -10.359*** 
  (-3.17)  (-5.26)  (-4.10)  (-4.06) 
PIN × Q  0.185  2.951***  2.608**  3.063*** 
  (0.29)  (2.59)  (2.01)  (2.82) 
Diversification 0.482 0.710 4.255*** 4.756*** 5.113*** 5.259*** 4.162*** 4.355*** 
 (0.61) (0.87) (3.57) (3.85) (3.43) (3.42) (4.17) (4.06) 
Diversification × Q -0.030 -0.083 -1.571** -1.716** -1.790** -1.866** -1.595*** -1.672*** 
 (-0.07) (-0.19) (-2.31) (-2.46) (-2.15) (-2.19) (-3.27) (-3.24) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 17,325 18,830 17,325 13,647 12,611 13,647 12,611 
Within R2 0.195 0.194 0.293 0.296 0.334 0.337 0.271 0.273 
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Table 7  
Price Efficiency: The Impact of Regulation SHO Pilot Program 
This table examines whether the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity is 
adversely affected by an exogenous increase in stock price efficiency. I exploit the SEC’s Regulation SHO that 
includes a pilot program that reduces the cost of short selling for a randomly chosen group of stocks. See Section 
4.2 for more detail on the experiment. The dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (1) and 
(2), capital plus research and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (3) and (4), CAPEX + R&D of 
firms with non-missing R&D in Column (5) and (6), and non-missing R&D in Column (7) and (8). All dependent 
variables are measured in percentage points. Central and Non-central sub-samples are constructed using the median 
value of Bonacich centrality around the experiment period. The main independent variable is the triple-interaction 
term between Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities, Pilot which indicates the experiment 
stocks, and During which indicates the experiment period. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable 
definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
Sub-sample Central Non-
Central 
Central Non-
Central 
Central Non-
Central 
Central Non-
Central 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Q 0.523*** 0.388** 1.125** 1.374*** 1.007 1.428*** 0.491 0.995** 
 (3.44) (2.44) (2.00) (3.53) (1.60) (3.30) (0.86) (2.32) 
Q × Pilot 0.024 0.700** -0.428 0.362 -0.514 0.311 -0.531 -0.438 
 (0.11) (2.09) (-0.68) (0.55) (-0.74) (0.41) (-0.85) (-0.69) 
Q × During -0.121 0.628*** 0.643 0.670 0.999* 0.746 1.032** 0.097 
 (-0.69) (3.04) (1.31) (1.58) (1.81) (1.49) (2.31) (0.25) 
Q × Pilot × During 0.476* -0.947*** 1.854** -0.867 2.023** -1.055 1.646** 0.405 
 (1.72) (-2.61) (2.33) (-1.28) (2.24) (-1.20) (1.99) (0.57) 
During -0.484 -2.090* -1.773 -0.834 -2.848* -0.526 -1.955 2.153 
 (-0.79) (-1.82) (-1.31) (-0.52) (-1.74) (-0.24) (-1.43) (1.50) 
Pilot × During -0.792 0.997 -3.241** 0.633 -3.675** 1.080 -3.028* -1.264 
 (-1.21) (1.16) (-2.09) (0.44) (-1.99) (0.57) (-1.81) (-0.82) 
Q 0.581*** 1.650*** 0.581*** 1.650*** 1.811*** 1.234*** 1.234*** 1.234*** 
 (6.25) (5.29) (6.25) (5.29) (5.40) (3.87) (3.87) (3.87) 
CF 2.487*** 2.876*** 1.869 3.579 1.611 4.285 -0.777 1.347 
 (4.45) (2.99) (1.52) (1.59) (1.13) (1.56) (-0.64) (0.60) 
Log(Assets) -0.764*** -0.743** -4.914*** -5.014*** -6.304*** -5.835*** -5.597*** -5.714*** 
 (-3.61) (-2.21) (-6.74) (-5.85) (-7.25) (-5.21) (-6.86) (-5.59) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,677 1,675 1,677 1,675 1,286 1,260 1,286 1,260 
R2 0.120 0.116 0.186 0.184 0.210 0.200 0.186 0.167 
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Table 8  
The Impact of Financial Constraints: Sub-sample Tests 
This table examines whether the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger 
for financially unconstrained firms than for financially constrained firms. The dependent variable is capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (2), capital plus research and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) 
in Columns (3) and (4), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Columns (5) and (6), and non-missing 
R&D in Columns (7) and (8). To construct a sub-sample of financially unconstrained and constrained firms, I use 
the following measures of financial constraints: total assets (Firm Size), the availability of corporate bond rating 
(Bond Rating), and the Whited and Wu Index (WW Index). Sub-samples are double-sorted (first by the Bonacich 
centrality and second by the measure of financial constraints) to balance the dispersion of alliance network 
centrality within each sub-sample. All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the 
natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the 
interaction term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities. Only the 
coefficients of interest are reported for a brevity (full coefficients in Internet Appendix Table 2). See Appendix 1 for 
the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
FC Measure: Firm Size Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.258*** -0.013 -0.307*** 0.036 -0.354*** -0.030 -0.116 0.015 
 (-3.29) (-0.24) (-2.79) (0.35) (-3.12) (-0.26) (-1.51) (0.17) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,414 9,416 9,414 9,416 5,972 7,675 5,972 7,675 
Within R2 0.218 0.162 0.260 0.269 0.321 0.301 0.169 0.266 
         
FC Measure: Bond Rating Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.279*** -0.040 -0.377*** 0.038 -0.383*** -0.018 -0.154 0.003 
 (-2.71) (-0.62) (-2.81) (0.34) (-2.80) (-0.14) (-1.51) (0.03) 
         
Controls and FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,874 8,859 6,874 8,859 4,179 6,729 4,179 6,729 
Within R2 0.226 0.172 0.241 0.316 0.294 0.361 0.122 0.326 
         
FC Measure: WW Index Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.278*** -0.011 -0.371*** -0.010 -0.438*** -0.080 -0.170** -0.021 
 (-4.53) (-0.20) (-4.09) (-0.11) (-4.51) (-0.73) (-2.17) (-0.22) 
         
Controls and FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,414 9,416 9,414 9,416 5,972 7,675 5,972 7,675 
Within R2 0.218 0.162 0.260 0.269 0.321 0.301 0.169 0.266 
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Table 9  
The Impact of Financial Constraints: The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis 
This table uses the 2007-2008 financial crisis to test whether an exogenous shock in firms’ financial constraints 
dampens the negative relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-price sensitivity. The 
dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (1), capital plus research and development 
expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (2), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Column (3), and 
non-missing R&D in Column (4). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the 
natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the triple-
interaction term between Log(Centrality), Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities, and DD1Due 
which measures the unexpected financial pressure due to the financial crisis. See Appendix 1 for the complete list 
of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) -2.309*** 2.919* 4.450** 6.046*** 
 (-2.98) (1.84) (2.51) (3.25) 
Log(Centrality) × Q 0.118 -1.405* -1.929** -1.814** 
 (0.34) (-1.76) (-2.29) (-2.04) 
Log(Centrality) × Q × DD1Due 0.317 6.005** 6.759** 6.285** 
 (0.41) (2.24) (2.35) (2.03) 
Log(Centrality) × DD1Due  1.069 -11.542* -14.927** -14.895** 
 (0.57) (-1.80) (-2.14) (-2.01) 
Q × DD1Due 0.750 0.047 -0.682 -1.183 
 (1.01) (0.02) (-0.21) (-0.36) 
DD1Due -4.410*** 1.283 4.079 6.330 
 (-2.62) (0.19) (0.55) (0.84) 
Q 0.195 4.000*** 4.381*** 3.813*** 
 (0.48) (4.75) (4.89) (3.92) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.181 9.710 13.279* 9.546 
 (0.09) (1.53) (1.71) (1.30) 
CF 3.516 4.183 0.753 0.487 
 (1.61) (0.63) (0.10) (0.07) 
Log(Assets) 0.654*** -1.901*** -2.573*** -3.093*** 
 (3.87) (-4.90) (-5.69) (-6.84) 
     
Observations 512 512 365 365 
Adjusted R2 0.066 0.289 0.366 0.377 
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Table 10  
Endogeneity: Controlling for the Influence of Alliance Initiation 
This table addresses the endogeneity issues in alliance network centrality by controlling for the firm-year observations with new alliances in two 
different approaches. The first method is to control for firm-cohort fixed effects (Firm-Cohort FE) that assigns a firm-cohort dummy for each firm-
year observation with new alliances, thereby relying on the within-firm variation of alliance network centrality without new alliances. The second 
method is to examine the impact of indirectly connected parts of alliance network centrality using a sample of firm-year observations experiencing 
no changes in their direct alliance connections. The dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (5), capital plus research 
and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Columns (2) and (6), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Columns (3) and (7), and 
non-missing R&D in Columns (4) and (8). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the 
Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. Log(Degree) is the natural logarithm of the degree centrality that equals the number of direct connections.  
Log(Indirect + 1) is one plus the natural logarithm of the indirect centrality that equals the difference between Bonacich and degree centrality. The 
main independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) (Columns 1 – 4) or Log(Indirect + 1) (Columns 5 – 8) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy 
for price-based investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) -0.057 0.249 0.586* 0.549*     
 (-0.35) (0.85) (1.65) (1.91)     
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.048 -0.134 -0.213* -0.157*     
 (-0.83) (-1.29) (-1.84) (-1.65)     
Log(Indirect + 1)     0.628** 1.154** 1.003 0.775 
     (2.06) (2.17) (1.55) (1.59) 
Log(Indirect + 1) × Q     -0.254** -0.324* -0.244 -0.147 
     (-2.36) (-1.69) (-1.18) (-0.90) 
Log(Degree)     -0.505 -0.261 0.257 0.249 
     (-1.19) (-0.40) (0.33) (0.37) 
Log(Degree) × Q     0.260 0.306 0.015 0.087 
     (1.30) (1.02) (0.05) (0.30) 
         
        Continued… 
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Table 10 (Continued)         
         
Q 0.984*** 1.597*** 1.673*** 0.841*** 1.032*** 1.687*** 1.726*** 0.879*** 
 (8.88) (8.25) (7.33) (4.16) (7.60) (6.81) (5.88) (3.22) 
CF 2.786*** 3.930*** 3.709*** 0.918 2.207*** 2.294** 3.201** 0.556 
 (7.92) (5.24) (4.17) (1.20) (4.19) (2.16) (2.52) (0.53) 
Log(Assets) -2.355*** -8.374*** -10.249*** -8.222*** -1.193*** -5.284*** -6.973*** -5.779*** 
 (-10.91) (-19.90) (-19.50) (-17.92) (-5.16) (-12.24) (-12.90) (-13.52) 
Informativeness -0.083 -0.333*** -0.472*** -0.371*** -0.111 -0.412*** -0.461** -0.344* 
 (-1.08) (-2.81) (-3.10) (-2.97) (-1.22) (-2.69) (-2.24) (-1.96) 
Informativeness × Q -0.047 0.072 0.077 0.129*** -0.038 0.099 0.074 0.118 
 (-1.54) (1.50) (1.37) (2.65) (-0.94) (1.45) (0.90) (1.57) 
Diversification 1.413* 4.314*** 4.839*** 3.595*** -0.067 2.067 2.343 2.604* 
 (1.80) (3.26) (2.90) (3.05) (-0.05) (1.03) (0.84) (1.93) 
Diversification × Q -0.213 -1.319* -1.035 -1.014* 0.325 -0.617 -0.439 -1.197* 
 (-0.56) (-1.89) (-1.20) (-1.77) (0.41) (-0.52) (-0.26) (-1.69) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 8,346 8,346 5,827 5,827 
Within R2 0.136 0.233 0.279 0.245 0.145 0.227 0.272 0.225 
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Table 11  
Self-selection: Heckman Model Using Combined Reporting Index 
This table examines self-selection issues regarding the choice of participating in alliance networks using Heckman 
two-step procedure of sample selection model. The first stage estimates a Probit regression model in which the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is inside alliance network, 0 otherwise (Columns 
1 and 4). The instrument is Combined Reporting that is a firm-level index of combined income reporting requirement 
based on the geographic dispersion of firm operations (Section 3.3). The second stage estimates an OLS regression 
model in which the dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (2), capital plus research and 
development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (3), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in 
Column (5), and non-missing R&D in Column (6). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points.  
Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. See Appendix 1 for the 
complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Estimation 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Dependent Variable Inside 
Network? 
CAPEX CAPEX + 
R&D 
Inside 
Network? 
CAPEX + 
R&D (non-
missing) 
R&D 
(non-
missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Centrality)  0.088 1.998***  2.561*** 2.323*** 
  (1.07) (12.16)  (12.68) (12.98) 
Log(Centrality) × Q  -0.133*** -0.300***  -0.391*** -0.231*** 
  (-5.76) (-6.31)  (-7.29) (-4.85) 
Log(Centrality) × CF  0.264 2.736***  3.193*** 2.249*** 
  (1.08) (5.71)  (5.77) (4.59) 
Q 0.010 0.968*** 2.119*** 0.012 2.316*** 1.365*** 
 (1.30) (16.10) (16.53) (1.50) (15.61) (10.35) 
CF -0.432*** 2.793*** 8.720*** -0.332*** 6.752*** 5.177*** 
 (-9.51) (6.16) (9.31) (-6.79) (6.36) (5.49) 
Log(Assets) 0.292*** -0.044 -4.680*** 0.277*** -4.985*** -4.834*** 
 (45.34) (-0.40) (-19.44) (37.91) (-19.22) (-20.96) 
Informativeness -0.089*** -0.106 -0.464*** -0.104*** -0.452** -0.417** 
 (-12.06) (-1.59) (-3.22) (-12.09) (-2.41) (-2.49) 
Informativeness × Q 0.014*** -0.007 0.185*** 0.017*** 0.149*** 0.169*** 
 (6.09) (-0.42) (5.04) (6.54) (3.43) (4.34) 
Diversification -0.043 -2.218*** 0.459 -0.077 0.653 2.421** 
 (-0.59) (-4.88) (0.45) (-0.95) (0.52) (2.16) 
Diversification × Q 0.156*** 0.581*** -2.473*** 0.183*** -2.586*** -2.927*** 
 (4.68) (3.09) (-5.68) (5.06) (-5.13) (-6.51) 
Combined Reporting 0.183***   0.253***   
 (7.35)   (9.22)   
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.220 -12.604***  -12.268*** -11.158*** 
  (-0.37) (-9.86)  (-8.55) (-8.75) 
       
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38,255 13,252 13,252 34,849 9,846 9,846 
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Table 12  
The Impact of Alliance Types: R&D vs. Non-R&D Alliances 
This table examines the impact of alliance types by calculating Bonacich centrality in two sub-networks 
based on alliance types: R&D and Non-R&D alliances. Specifically, R&D alliances include licensing 
agreements, R&D agreements, and technology transfer agreements. Non-R&D alliances include joint 
ventures, manufacturing agreements, and marketing agreements, excluding any overlapping deal with 
R&D alliances. Sample firms are divided into two groups based on the ratio of the number of participating 
R&D alliances to total number of participating alliances: above median (High) and below median (Low). 
The dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (2), and non-missing research 
and development expenditure (R&D) in Columns (3) and (4). All dependent variables are measured in 
percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 
3.2. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of 
variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX R&D (non-missing) 
Ratio of R&D Alliances to Total Alliances High Low High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) -0.072 0.025 0.867** 0.506** 
 (-0.41) (0.12) (2.55) (2.09) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.058 -0.151* -0.170** -0.098 
 (-1.32) (-1.92) (-2.22) (-0.93) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.453 0.486 0.318 0.402 
 (0.97) (0.92) (0.37) (0.42) 
Q 0.752*** 1.166*** 1.163*** 0.706*** 
 (6.14) (6.57) (4.69) (2.61) 
CF 2.283*** 1.843* 2.150 1.144 
 (2.66) (1.75) (1.18) (0.58) 
Log(Assets) -0.994*** -1.894*** -8.036*** -4.086*** 
 (-5.26) (-7.42) (-17.93) (-10.03) 
Informativeness -0.305*** -0.286*** -0.631*** -0.323* 
 (-3.22) (-2.71) (-3.39) (-1.90) 
Informativeness × Q 0.047 -0.015 0.163*** 0.145** 
 (1.44) (-0.43) (2.83) (2.05) 
Diversification 1.452 0.992 3.150** 3.179** 
 (1.55) (0.96) (2.26) (2.14) 
Diversification × Q -0.517 -0.389 -1.980*** -1.080 
 (-1.25) (-0.64) (-4.25) (-1.30) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,127 8,111 6,753 5,419 
Within R2 0.176 0.195 0.311 0.210 
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Table 13  
Robustness Tests 
This table tests the robustness of the negative impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity. The dependent variable is 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (1), capital plus research and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (2), CAPEX + R&D of 
firms with non-missing R&D in Column (3), and non-missing R&D in Column (4). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points.  
Specifications (1) – (7) use alternative settings of investment regressions. Specification (1) estimates the cumulant estimator of Erickson, Jiang and 
Whited (2014) that provides unbiased estimates of coefficients in errors-in-variables panel regressions. Specification (2) uses Total Q (Peters and 
Taylor 2017) that incorporates both tangible and intangible capital in estimating firms’ total capital to measure price-based investment opportunities. 
Specification (3) uses a value-weighted industry-level (SIC 3-digit) Tobin’s Q to measure price-based investment opportunities. Specification (4) 
includes the square-term of Tobin’s Q to control for the potential non-linearity in investment-to-price sensitivity. Specification (5) controls for 
additional set of firm characteristics that may affect investment decisions: firm age, sales growth, book leverage, and cash holding. Specification (6) 
excludes firms experiencing more than 20% of changes in total assets to isolate the impact of firms with ongoing material changes in operations. 
Specification (7) reports the cross-sectional differences in the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity by estimating 
Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Specifically, the reported coefficients are the average of cross-sectional coefficients estimated 
each alliance network between 1994 and 2013 with industry (SIC 3-digit) fixed effects. Specifications (8) – (11) test alternative assumptions for the 
construction of alliance networks. Specifications (8) and (9) test the robustness of results for alternative assumptions on alliance duration: 3- and 7-
year (see Section 2.1). Specification (10) uses centrality measures constructed from alliance networks consisting of alliance deals involving at least 
two U.S. firms in Compustat/CRSP merged database. Specification (11) uses centrality measures constructed from alliance networks consisting of 
entire global alliance deals involving not only firms but also universities, government agencies, and other institutions. Specifications (12) – (16) test 
the robustness of results for alternative measures of network centrality. Specification (12) uses the degree centrality that only counts for the impact 
of direct connections. Specifications (13) and (14) use alternative parameter choices for the calculation of Bonacich centrality. Specifications (15) and 
(16) check the robustness of results using eigenvector and betweenness centrality. See Section 3.2 and Appendix 2 for more detail on various 
measures of network centrality. Only the coefficients of interest are reported for a brevity. The reported coefficient is associated with the interaction 
term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities. All specifications include the same set of control 
variables in Column (1) of Table 6 with calendar year and firm fixed effects (except for Specification 1 that uses the baseline model in Table 5). See 
Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable  CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Alternative Setting of Investment Regression      
Cumulant Estimator (Erickson, Jiang and Whited 2014)  (1) -1.982*** -2.105*** -2.404*** -3.061*** 
  (-6.95) (-6.52) (-6.29) (-4.50) 
     Continued… 
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Table 13 (Continued)      
      
Total Q (Peters and Taylor 2017) (2) -0.094*** -0.113*** -0.171*** -0.066* 
  (-3.20) (-2.58) (-3.52) (-1.74) 
Industry Q (3) -0.154*** -0.212** -0.310*** -0.155* 
  (-3.11) (-2.47) (-2.98) (-1.88) 
Non-linearity: Controlling for Q2 (4) -0.103** -0.124* -0.225*** -0.108* 
  (-2.47) (-1.79) (-2.96) (-1.71) 
More Controls: Age, Sales Growth, Leverage, and Cash (5) -0.129*** -0.148** -0.239*** -0.106* 
  (-3.19) (-2.22) (-3.24) (-1.70) 
Excluding Firms with More than 20% of Asset Changes (6) -0.067* -0.075 -0.190** -0.115* 
  (-1.89) (-1.01) (-2.24) (-1.68) 
Fama-MacBeth Regressions (7) -0.066 -0.104 -0.300* -0.275** 
  (-1.54) (-1.06) (-1.96) (-2.12) 
Alternative Assumption for Alliance Network Construction      
3-year Alliance Duration (8) -0.126*** -0.146* -0.245*** -0.110 
  (-2.59) (-1.89) (-2.92) (-1.56) 
7-year Alliance Duration (9) -0.114*** -0.120* -0.196*** -0.078 
  (-3.11) (-1.93) (-2.83) (-1.33) 
Within U.S. Networks (10) -0.107** -0.128* -0.214*** -0.113 
  (-2.40) (-1.71) (-2.61) (-1.59) 
Entire Global Networks (11) -0.076*** -0.102** -0.157*** -0.072* 
  (-3.19) (-2.57) (-3.55) (-1.91) 
Alternative Measures of Network Centrality      
Bonacich- (12) -0.134*** -0.138* -0.241*** -0.095 
  (-2.75) (-1.75) (-2.77) (-1.29) 
Bonacich+ (13) -0.088*** -0.109** -0.180*** -0.093** 
  (-2.98) (-2.17) (-3.23) (-2.00) 
Degree (14) -0.129** -0.116 -0.216** -0.072 
  (-2.44) (-1.38) (-2.31) (-0.90) 
Eigenvector (15) -0.075** -0.124** -0.184*** -0.123*** 
  (-2.51) (-2.46) (-3.37) (-2.67) 
Betweenness (16) -3.748 -13.634* -18.797*** -13.796*** 
  (-0.45) (-1.95) (-3.59) (-2.88) 
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Table 14  
Alliance Network Centrality and Market Valuation 
This table examines the impact of alliance network centrality on market valuation. The dependent variable is 
Tobin’s Q. The main independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality), the natural logarithm of 
the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Column (1) 
reports the estimation results for the full sample. Columns (2) – (7) report the estimation results for a sub-sample 
of financially unconstrained and constrained firms, using the same three measures of financial constraints in Table 
8: Firm Size (Columns 2 and 3), Bond Rating, and WW Index (Columns 6 and 7). Sub-samples are double-sorted (first 
by the Bonacich centrality and second by the measure of financial constraints) to balance the dispersion of alliance 
network centrality within each sub-sample. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 
4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q Full Sample Sub-sample: Financial Constraints 
  Firm Size Bond Rating WW Index 
  Large Small Yes No Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log(Centrality) 0.029 0.064** -0.039 0.064*** -0.013 0.055** -0.007 
 (1.20) (2.39) (-0.88) (2.79) (-0.29) (2.02) (-0.15) 
Log(Assets) -0.666*** -0.576*** -0.780*** -0.505*** -0.610*** -0.587*** -0.813*** 
 (-16.86) (-8.90) (-14.05) (-8.61) (-11.80) (-10.09) (-14.47) 
Log(Age) -0.492*** -0.292** -0.416** -0.188 -0.523*** -0.387*** -0.438** 
 (-4.64) (-1.99) (-2.13) (-1.14) (-2.97) (-2.58) (-2.21) 
ROA 0.817*** 2.950*** 0.133 2.705*** 0.182 3.033*** 0.163 
 (5.04) (7.44) (0.83) (5.96) (0.88) (8.07) (0.96) 
PPE -0.678*** -0.572** -1.222*** -0.151 -0.917** -0.530** -1.219*** 
 (-2.97) (-2.30) (-3.18) (-0.61) (-2.41) (-2.14) (-3.21) 
R&D 1.918*** 3.637*** 0.973** 2.951** 1.757*** 4.554*** 0.999** 
 (5.35) (3.46) (2.51) (2.11) (3.80) (4.41) (2.45) 
CAPEX 0.413 -0.191 0.608 -0.223 0.166 -0.007 0.818* 
 (1.28) (-0.50) (1.21) (-0.55) (0.37) (-0.02) (1.69) 
Leverage -1.862 3.990*** -3.695** 6.652*** -2.723* 3.732** -3.640** 
 (-1.51) (2.58) (-2.27) (3.83) (-1.68) (2.23) (-2.35) 
Return Volatility -1.788 3.894** -3.632** 6.524*** -2.701* 3.584** -3.545** 
 (-1.46) (2.54) (-2.23) (3.82) (-1.67) (2.15) (-2.29) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 9,414 9,416 6,874 8,859 9,404 9,426 
Within R2 0.190 0.255 0.167 0.240 0.162 0.267 0.182 
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Table 15  
Alliance Network Centrality and Value Response to Industry-Specific Shock 
This table examines the impact of alliance network centrality on the value responses to industry-level shocks. The 
dependent variable is the change in Tobin’s Q between year t – 1 and t (ΔQ). Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm 
of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the interaction term between 
Log(Centrality) and Industry Shock Index (Positive or Negative Industry Shock), which is the principal component of 
seven variables that proxy for industry status (Harford 2005). Positive (Negative) Industry Shock is an indicator 
variable if Industry Shock Index belongs to the top (bottom) 10th percentile of the index distributions. All Industry 
Shock variables are measured at year t to test whether the informational advantages from alliance networks help 
more central firms to better anticipate future industry conditions. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable 
definitions. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: ΔQ (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.012 -0.029 0.006 -0.044 
 (0.69) (-0.75) (0.33) (-1.18) 
Log(Centrality) × Industry Shock Index 0.033** 0.059**   
 (1.99) (2.28)   
Industry Shock Index 0.064*** 0.045*   
 (2.99) (1.76)   
Log(Centrality) × Positive Industry Shock   0.060* 0.166** 
   (1.65) (2.46) 
Positive Industry Shock   0.063 0.001 
   (0.98) (0.01) 
Log(Centrality) × Negative Industry Shock   -0.061 -0.140* 
   (-1.30) (-1.77) 
Negative Industry Shock   -0.320*** -0.238*** 
   (-4.60) (-2.80) 
Log(Assets) -0.093*** -0.031 -0.096*** -0.034 
 (-3.43) (-0.52) (-3.57) (-0.58) 
Log(Age) 0.386*** 0.256 0.367*** 0.246 
 (5.57) (1.28) (5.32) (1.23) 
ROA -1.376*** -1.464*** -1.373*** -1.458*** 
 (-7.67) (-6.10) (-7.67) (-6.08) 
PPE 0.779*** 0.199 0.776*** 0.172 
 (3.94) (0.56) (3.93) (0.49) 
R&D 0.053 -0.134 0.044 -0.155 
 (0.13) (-0.24) (0.11) (-0.28) 
CAPEX -2.296*** -1.925*** -2.296*** -1.884*** 
 (-5.97) (-3.67) (-5.96) (-3.62) 
Leverage 0.422*** 0.690*** 0.413*** 0.689*** 
 (3.61) (3.64) (3.52) (3.66) 
Return Volatility -1.592 2.646 -1.810 2.407 
 (-1.09) (1.41) (-1.24) (1.29) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm or Firm-cohort FE Firm Firm-cohort Firm Firm-cohort 
Within R2 0.109 0.099 0.110 0.100 
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Table 16 
Summary of Alliance Announcements 
This table reports the summary statistics for alliance announcements. The event study sample contains 
3,391 alliance announcements between two U.S. public firms in Compustat/CRSP merged database. Sample 
announcements range from 1995 to 2013 to restrict the sample to firms with a non-missing value of alliance 
network centrality in the previous year of announcement. All dollar denominated variables are deflated to 
2009 dollars using U.S. GDP deflator. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated over a 3-day (-1, 
1) event-period using market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted index). Combined CAR is a value-
weighted CAR of the portfolio of two firms, where the weight is determined by each firm’s market capital 
measured 50 trading days before the announcement. Combined Dollar Gain is the sum of firms’ dollar wealth 
gain calculated as CAR multiplied by each firm’s market capital at the beginning of the 3-day event period. 
Combined Centrality is the sum of two firms’ Bonacich centrality measured in the previous year of 
announcement. Both Central is an indicator variable that equals 1 if both firms’ centrality values are above 
the median of centrality distribution within the event study sample, and 0 otherwise. One Central is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if only one firm’s centrality value is above the median of the centrality 
distribution within the event study sample, and 0 otherwise. Combined Market Capital is the sum of two 
firms’ market capital measured 50 trading days before the announcement. All variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for Both Central, R&D Alliance, Non-R&D Alliance, and Horizontal Alliance. 
See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. 
 Obs. Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
Wealth Effects       
CAR (%) 6,782 0.959 6.777 -2.234 0.176 3.004 
Combined CAR (%) 3,391 0.128 4.002 -1.869 -0.024 2.026 
Combined Dollar Gain ($ million) 3,391 8.001 3,680.859 -501.300 -1.490 527.732 
       
Independent Variables       
Both Central 3,391 0.287 0.452 0 0 1 
One Central 3,391 0.426 0.495 0 0 1 
Combined Centrality 3,391 113.801 123.392 17.929 57.013 181.854 
Combined Market Capital ($ billion) 3,391 75.235 103.104 8.280 33.535 98.708 
R&D Alliance 3,391 0.431 0.495 0 0 1 
Non-R&D Alliance 3,391 0.315 0.465 0 0 1 
Horizontal Alliance 3,391 0.278 0.448 0 0 1 
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Table 17  
Increase in Centrality and Announcement Wealth Effects 
This table investigates whether the stock market reacts more positively to the announcement of alliances if 
new alliances more largely increase the announcing firm’s alliance network centrality. The dependent 
variables are the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) estimated over a 3-day (-1, 1) event-period using 
market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted index). Log(Centrality) (at t – 1) is the natural logarithm of 
the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2, measured at the previous year of alliance announcements. 
The main independent variable is Log(ΔBonacich) which measures the increase in Bonacich centrality of the 
announcing firm, calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus Bonacich centrality of alliance partner 
firm multiplied by 0.02 (see Section 5.3 for more detail on the calculation). See Appendix 1 for the complete 
list of variable definitions. See Table 16 for the list of winsorized variables. Industry fixed effects are defined 
at the SIC 2-digit level. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable 3-day Market-Adjusted CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) (at t – 1) 0.209*** 0.282*** 0.140* 0.207** 
 (2.68) (2.85) (1.80) (2.13) 
Log(ΔBonacich) 0.699*** 0.801*** 0.718*** 0.803*** 
 (4.24) (4.68) (4.35) (4.69) 
R&D Alliance 0.418* 0.213 0.318 0.173 
 (1.77) (0.86) (1.35) (0.70) 
Non-R&D Alliance -0.021 -0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (-0.10) (-0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.454** 0.330 0.303 0.295 
 (2.21) (1.48) (1.51) (1.34) 
Log(Market Capital) -0.586*** -0.647*** -0.345*** -0.384*** 
 (-9.31) (-8.85) (-5.02) (-4.74) 
ROA   -4.266*** -4.277*** 
   (-4.83) (-4.46) 
Cash Holding   1.457*** 1.391** 
   (2.62) (2.29) 
Leverage   0.563 0.539 
   (0.93) (0.78) 
     
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,782 6,782 6,782 6,782 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.054 0.053 0.065 
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Table 18  
Synergy: Combined Centrality and Combined Announcement Wealth Effects  
This table investigates whether the stock market reacts more positively to the announcement of alliances 
involving firms more centrally located in alliance networks. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are 
estimated over a 3-day (-1, 1) event-period using market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted index). In 
Columns (1) and (3), the dependent variable is Combined CAR which is a value-weighted CAR of the 
portfolio of two firms, where the weight is determined by each firm’s market capital measured 50 trading 
days before the announcement. In Columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is Combined Dollar Gain that 
is the sum of firms’ dollar wealth gain calculated as CAR multiplied by each firm’s market capital at the 
beginning of the 3-day event period. Combined CAR is measured in percentage points, and Combined Dollar 
Gain is measured in million dollars. Both Central is an indicator variable that equals 1 if both firms’ centrality 
values are above the median of centrality distribution within the event study sample, and 0 otherwise. One 
Central is an indicator variable that equals 1 if only one firm’s centrality value is above the median of the 
centrality distribution within the event study sample, and 0 otherwise. Combined Centrality is the sum of 
two firms’ Bonacich centrality measured in the previous year of announcement. See Appendix 1 for the 
complete list of variable definitions. See Table 14 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Combined 
CAR 
Combined 
Dollar Gain 
Combined 
CAR 
Combined 
Dollar Gain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Both Central 0.613*** 564.943***   
 (2.69) (3.07)   
One Central 0.057 65.722   
 (0.28) (0.52)   
Combined Centrality   0.001** 0.380 
   (2.03) (0.45) 
R&D Alliance 0.091 -89.287 0.067 -104.927 
 (0.46) (-0.48) (0.34) (-0.56) 
Non-R&D Alliance 0.145 192.698 0.129 175.741 
 (0.73) (0.97) (0.65) (0.88) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.127 104.284 0.127 99.763 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.76) (0.71) 
Combined Market Capital ($ billion) -0.002** -2.256 -0.002** -1.729 
 (-2.09) (-1.38) (-2.07) (-1.01) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,391 3,391 3,391 3,391 
R2 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.010 
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(A) Alliance Network in 1994 (B) Alliance Network in 2002 (C) Alliance Network in 2010 
Number of nodes: 1,753 Number of nodes: 1,973 Number of nodes: 840 
Number of edges: 8,576 Number of edges: 8,648 Number of edges: 1,996 
 
Figure 1 
Snapshot of Alliance Networks 
This figure illustrates the snapshot of alliance networks for selected years. Each illustration consists of points (nodes) and lines (edges). I use Gephi 0.9.1 to visualize 
networks with the algorithm “Force Atlas 2” and the focus on central part of alliance networks. Each snapshot shows the location of top 25 central U.S. public firms 
listed in Table 3. The font size proportionately increases in the degree centrality (the number of direct connections) of each firm.
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
This table describes the definition of variables used in this paper. Compustat mnemonics are reported in 
parenthesis with bold fonts – Ex. Total Assets (at). 
Variables Description 
Bonacich Bonacich (1987): The sum of all direct and indirect connections. (Appendix 2) 
Degree The number of all direct connections. (Appendix 2) 
Indirect The sum of all indirect connections = Bonacich – Degree 
R&D Alliance An indicator variable which equals 1 if alliance connections are classified as 
R&D agreements, (cross-) licensing agreements, or (cross-) technology transfer 
agreements, 0 otherwise 
Non-R&D Alliance An indicator variable which equals 1 if alliance connections are classified as 
joint ventures, manufacturing agreements, or marketing agreements, 0 
otherwise. R&D alliances are excluded from Non-R&D alliances. 
Horizontal Alliance An indicator variable which equals 1 if an alliance connects two firms 
operating in the same SIC 3-digit industry, 0 otherwise 
CAPEX Capital Expenditure (capx) / lagged Total Assets (at). 
R&D Research and Development Expenditure (xrd) / lagged Total Assets (at). It is 
set to zero if regression samples include firms with missing R&D. 
Assets Total Assets (at), deflated to 2009 dollars using U.S. GDP deflator from Bureau 
of Economic Analysis 
Age 1 + the number of years appearing in Compustat 
Q  [Total Assets (at) – Common Equity (ceq) + (Common Share Price (prcc_f) * 
Common Shares Outstanding (csho))] / Total Assets (at). If prcc_f is missing, I 
use the CRSP daily stock price at the last trading date of the fiscal year. 
CF [Income Before Extraordinary Items (ib) + Depreciation and Amortization 
Expenses (dp) + R&D Expenditure (xrd)] / Total Assets (at) 
ROA Operating Income Before Depreciation and Amortization (oibdp) / Total 
Assets (at) 
Cash Holding Cash and Short-term Investments (che) / Total Assets (at) 
Leverage [Short-term Debt (dlc) + Long-term Debt (dltt)] / Total Assets (at) 
Asset Growth Change in Total Assets / lagged Total Assets 
Sales Growth Change in Sales (sale)/ lagged Sales 
PPE Net Property, Plant and Equipment (ppent) / Total Assets (at) 
Return Volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns. I drop measures obtained using less 
than 30 daily observations. 
Diversification 1 – HHI of Compustat business segment sales. Segments are defined at the SIC 
4-digit industry level. 
WW Index Whited and Wu (2006): -0.091 * CF – 0.062 * Dividend Payer Dummy + 0.021 * 
Long-term Debt (dltt / at) – 0.044 * Log(Assets) + 0.102 * Industry Sales Growth 
(SIC 3-digit) – 0.035 * Firm Sales Growth 
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Price Informativeness Foucault and Fresard (2014): ln(1 – R2 / R2) where R2 is R-square from the 
regression of daily stock return on market and industry (SIC 3-digit) value-
weighted portfolio returns. Regressions are estimated each calendar year. I 
drop measures obtained using less than 30 daily observations. 
PIN Measure of Probability of Informed Trading by Brown and Hillegeist (2007). 
The dataset is available at http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data. 
DD1Due Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012): Long-term debt 
maturing during the first-year after the annual report (dd1) / Total long-term 
debt (dd1 + dltt) 
Industry Shock Index Harford (2005): The first principal component from the seven economic shock 
variables: asset turnover (sale / at), capital expenditures (capex / at), employee 
(emp) growth, net profit margin (ni / at), research and development 
expenditures (xrd / at), return on assets (oibdp / at), and sales (sale) growth. 
Median values of variables are drawn from each year and industry (SIC 3-
digit) to perform the principal component analysis. 
Positive (Negative) 
Industry Shock 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if Industry Shock belongs to top 10% 
(bottom 10%) of distributions, 0 otherwise 
Combined Reporting A firm-level index of combined income reporting requirement based on the 
geographic dispersion of firm operations. I use the score of corporate 
geographic footprint that is used in García and Norli (2012) to measure the 
firms’ operating intensity for each state and fiscal year (the dataset is available 
at https://sites.google.com/site/financieru/resources/software. These scores are 
aggregated at the firm-year level by taking a weighted average with the 
weight of 1 or 0, depending on whether the state has adopted combined 
income reporting requirement or not. 
Combined Reporting 
(HQ) 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if firms are headquartered in states that 
have adopted combined income reporting requirement, 0 otherwise. Corporate 
historical headquarter information is obtained from S&P Capital IQ. 
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Appendix 2: Details of network centrality measures 
This appendix introduces the idea and mathematical formulation of Bonacich centrality  
(Bonacich 1987), and reports additional descriptive statistics of centrality measures used in this 
paper. See Chapter 2 of Jackson (2008) for a textbook introduction to centrality measures. 
Consider a network consisting of n nodes (members). Denote 𝑮𝑮  as an 𝑛𝑛×𝑛𝑛  adjacency 
matrix which has an element of unity if two nodes are connected, and zero otherwise. Also denote 
𝑮𝑮 as an 𝑛𝑛×1 vector of ones. Define a walk as a direct connection from one to another node in the 
network. Then 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 indicates the number of walks emanating from each node, i.e., the degree of 
each node. Furthermore, 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 = 𝑮𝑮2𝑮𝑮 indicates the number of indirect connections from each node 
where an indirect connection consists of two walks. For example, if 𝑛𝑛 = 4 and the third element 
of 𝑮𝑮2𝑮𝑮 is 2, then Node No. 3 can reach two other nodes via two walks, such as (3 → 1 → 2) and (3 
→ 4 → 1). Likewise, 𝑮𝑮𝑘𝑘𝑮𝑮 indicates the number of indirect connections from each node where an 
indirect connection consists of k walks. 
The idea of Bonacich centrality resides in that the influence of a node is determined by the 
strength of all direct and indirect connections emanating from the node. Suppose that there is a 
scalar 𝛽𝛽  which is a decaying factor that discounts the impact of each additional walk. The 
influence of a node then can be represented as a weighed sum of all connections emanating from 
the node. Denote 𝑷𝑷 e as a vector of nodes’ influence. 𝑷𝑷 can be written as: 
 𝑷𝑷 = 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 + 𝛽𝛽𝑮𝑮2𝑮𝑮 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑮𝑮3𝑮𝑮 + ⋯ (A1) 
 𝑷𝑷 = (𝑮𝑮 + 𝛽𝛽𝑮𝑮 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑮𝑮2 + ⋯ )𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 = (𝑰𝑰 − 𝛽𝛽𝑮𝑮)−1𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 (A2) 
𝑷𝑷 is well-defined for a sufficiently small 𝛽𝛽. Bonacich (1987) suggests that in absolute value, 𝛽𝛽 
must be less than the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of 𝑮𝑮. For example, Robinson and Stuart 
(2007) set 𝛽𝛽 to be three-quarters of the largest eigenvalue of 𝑮𝑮. 
Bonacich centrality 𝑪𝑪 is a scaled vector of the node’s influence,  
 𝑪𝑪 = 𝛼𝛼𝑷𝑷 = 𝛼𝛼(𝑰𝑰 − 𝛽𝛽𝑮𝑮)−1𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 (A3) 
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where 𝛼𝛼 is a scaling parameter that allows an adjustment in the base value for each connection. 
For well-defined measures, any parametrization of Bonacich centrality preserves the ordinal 
ranking of centrality within a network.  
There are other measures of network centrality popular in the existing literature, such as 
degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality. First, degree centrality measures the 
number of direct connections for a given node in a network. Therefore, degree centrality is 
equivalent to Bonacich centrality with a parametrization that assigns 1 to each direct connection 
and assumes zero 𝛽𝛽 (no weight for indirect connections). Because degree centrality is unable to 
measure the effect of indirect connections existing on the network, it fits less into this paper that 
investigates the impact of information flows through all direct and indirect connections in the 
network.  
Second, betweenness centrality measures the extent which a node is in the middle of 
shortest paths between nodes in a network. Specifically, a node’s betweenness centrality is high 
when the node is located on the shortest paths between many other nodes in a network. Third, 
closeness centrality is an average distance from a given node to all other nodes in a network. Both 
betweenness and closeness centrality assume that “flows” only occur along the shortest path 
between two nodes. Yet, Borgatti (2005) points out that information flows are hardly satisfy this 
assumption, since knowledge transfer can occur in any path without being limited to the shortest 
paths. Thus, both measures are less appropriate for my research objectives focusing on the 
information flows between firms in alliance networks.  
Finally, eigenvector centrality is similar to Bonacich centrality in several aspects. It is 
defined as: 
𝜆𝜆𝑬𝑬 = 𝑮𝑮𝑬𝑬 (A4) 
where 𝑮𝑮  is an 𝑛𝑛×𝑛𝑛  adjacency matrix, 𝑬𝑬  is an 𝑛𝑛×1  eigenvector, and 𝜆𝜆  is the corresponding 
eigenvalue. Both Bonacich and eigenvector centrality gauge the effect of direct and indirect 
connections, and are free from the shortest-path assumption of flows as in betweenness or 
closeness centrality. Eigenvector centrality is an efficient and popular workhorse for static or 
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stable networks. For example, Ahern and Harford (2014) use eigenvector centrality to evaluate 
the position of an industry in static input-output networks. On the other hand, Bonacich centrality 
provides greater measurement flexibility with parametrization to account for substantial time-
series variations in the size and density of alliance networks (Table 2 and Figure 1). In sum, 
Bonacich centrality best fits into my research objectives, since it effectively captures the extent of 
information flows in considerably time-varying networks.  
My base parameter value for 𝛽𝛽 in the computation of Bonacich centrality is 0.02 (Section 
3.2). As a robustness check, I construct two additional measures of the Bonacich centrality using 
0.01 and 0.03 as alternative values for 𝛽𝛽: “Bonacich-” and “Bonacich+”. Table A1 compares the 
summary statistics across different centrality measures: degree, Bonacich-, Bonacich, Bonacich+, 
eigenvector, and betweenness centrality. All centrality values are log-transformed. Panel A shows 
that both the mean and standard deviation of centrality measures monotonically increase from 
degree centrality to Bonacich+ centrality. Notice that degree centrality assigns no weight on 
indirect connections while Bonacich+ centrality assigns the greatest weight. Hence, this result 
supports that the value of each indirect connection is increasing from zero in degree centrality to 
the largest in Bonacich+.  
Panel B reports the correlation coefficients between the above centrality measures. It is 
worth noting that the correlation between degree centrality and other measures becomes lower 
as Bonacich centrality assigns greater weight (higher 𝛽𝛽) on indirect connections. Consequently, 
eigenvector centrality seems to more emphasize the impact of indirect connections. Additionally, 
the correlation coefficients between betwenness centrality and other centrality measures are 
among the lowest, reflecting that betweenness centrality relies on the shortest-path assumption 
that other measures do not.
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Table A1 
Summary of Network Centrality Measures 
This table summarizes centrality measures used in this paper. Panel A reports summary statistics. Panel B 
shows the correlation between centrality measures. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
Log(Degree) 18,830 0.745 0.930 0.000 0.693 1.099 
Log(Bonacich-) (β = 1%) 18,830 0.928 0.998 0.042 0.720 1.457 
Log(Centrality) (β = 2%) 18,830 1.158 1.141 0.101 0.854 1.859 
Log(Bonacich+) (β = 3%) 18,830 1.647 1.546 0.206 1.243 2.730 
Log(Eigenvector) 18,830 -5.002 1.814 -6.502 -5.061 -3.606 
Log(Betweenness) 18,830 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
Number of Observations: 18,830 
 Degree Bonacich- Bonacich Bonacich+ Eigenvector Betweenness 
Log(Degree) 1      
Log(Bonacich-) (β = 1%) 0.9750 1     
Log(Centrality) (β = 2%) 0.9180 0.9820 1    
Log(Bonacich+) (β = 3%) 0.7934 0.8984 0.9621 1   
Log(Eigenvector) 0.7195 0.8029 0.8421 0.8221 1  
Log(Betweenness) 0.5223 0.4852 0.4301 0.3302 0.3589 1 
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Appendix 3: State-level Adoption Status of Combined Reporting 
The following table lists states that requires combined reporting for corporate income tax. Effective is the 
first tax year in which combined reporting became effective. Blank indicates that the state has yet adopted 
the rule of combined reporting. This table refers the following sources: i) Mazerov (2009), ii) Willson and 
Barnett (2014) “Combined Reporting Developments” from www.sutherland.com. 
State Effective State Effective State Effective 
Alabama  Maryland  South Carolina  
Alaska Pre-1985 Massachusetts 2009 South Dakota  
Arizona Pre-1985 Michigan 2009 Tennessee  
Arkansas  Minnesota Pre-1985 Texas 2008 
California Pre-1985 Mississippi  Utah Pre-1985 
Colorado  Missouri  Vermont 2006 
Connecticut 2015 Montana Pre-1985 Virginia  
District of Columbia 2011 Nebraska Pre-1985 Washington  
Delaware  Nevada  West Virginia 2009 
Florida  New Hampshire Pre-1985 Wisconsin 2009 
Georgia  New Jersey  Wyoming  
Hawaii Pre-1985 New Mexico    
Idaho Pre-1985 New York 2007   
Illinois Pre-1985 North Carolina    
Indiana  North Dakota Pre-1985   
Iowa  Ohio    
Kansas Pre-1985 Oklahoma    
Kentucky  Oregon Pre-1985   
Louisiana  Pennsylvania    
Maine Pre-1985 Rhode Island 2014   
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Internet Appendix Table 1  
Time-series Trends in Alliance Types 
This table reports time-series trends in alliance types classified by SDC. The sample consists of 16,021 
alliance deals announced in 1990-2013 and formed between at least two firms in Compustat/CRSP merged 
(CCM) database. Alliance types are not mutually exclusive (Panel B – D of Table 1), and therefore the sum 
of their percentages may exceed or fall below 100%. 
Year Deals 
Announced 
Joint 
Venture 
(%) 
Licensing 
Agreement 
(%) 
Manufacturing 
Agreement  
(%) 
Marketing 
Agreement 
(%) 
R&D 
Agreement 
(%) 
Technology 
Transfer 
(%) 
1990 509 40.47 15.32 20.24 28.29 15.72 15.91 
1991 826 33.05 14.29 17.92 35.23 21.79 18.04 
1992 1,003 17.05 17.75 15.75 54.14 39.69 15.25 
1993 1,025 17.76 19.90 16.20 51.81 38.34 36.10 
1994 1,136 22.98 24.82 16.20 41.29 40.67 56.60 
1995 1,141 29.10 30.06 17.79 38.39 31.03 48.12 
1996 868 25.35 32.60 12.33 30.99 24.54 29.15 
1997 1,227 25.18 31.21 12.14 23.88 25.02 20.29 
1998 1,229 17.25 29.94 13.18 18.23 9.19 17.41 
1999 1,447 14.72 18.94 12.65 13.13 5.39 7.95 
2000 1,272 26.89 4.64 8.41 11.95 7.00 4.40 
2001 768 18.36 6.64 9.12 16.15 10.55 1.95 
2002 499 14.83 7.01 12.43 23.05 13.03 3.81 
2003 543 6.81 14.55 6.63 24.31 11.79 3.13 
2004 409 6.85 13.69 8.07 28.12 13.69 3.42 
2005 458 7.86 16.16 10.92 23.58 20.09 24.02 
2006 391 12.02 11.51 12.79 17.90 14.07 28.90 
2007 360 13.61 9.72 11.39 19.72 15.28 21.67 
2008 278 12.95 6.48 15.83 14.75 12.95 15.83 
2009 115 33.91 0.87 12.17 6.09 4.35 3.48 
2010 72 50.00 1.39 6.94 4.17 11.11 2.78 
2011 134 41.79 4.48 11.19 6.72 11.94 3.73 
2012 181 29.28 6.63 7.18 5.53 18.23 14.37 
2013 130 29.23 6.92 6.15 6.92 15.39 6.92 
Total 16,021 22.80 14.40 12.23 22.68 17.95 16.80 
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Internet Appendix Table 2 
Main Results: Controlling for Industry-Year Fixed Effects 
This table examines the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity. The 
dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (2), capital plus research and 
development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Columns (3) and (4), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-
missing R&D in Columns (5) and (6), and non-missing R&D in Columns (7) and (8). All dependent variables 
are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality 
described in Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) and 
Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of 
variable definitions. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-
statistics are in parentheses. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. ***, **, and * indicate the 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) -0.089 -0.094 2.350*** 1.874*** 2.935*** 2.414*** 2.953*** 2.465*** 
 (-0.80) (-0.83) (10.36) (8.27) (10.70) (8.67) (12.16) (9.88) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.067* -0.068* -0.421*** -0.240*** -0.512*** -0.338*** -0.420*** -0.256*** 
 (-1.73) (-1.66) (-5.38) (-2.93) (-6.18) (-3.81) (-5.66) (-3.17) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.182 0.217 1.806** 2.228*** 2.353*** 2.790*** 1.630** 2.037*** 
 (0.50) (0.61) (2.30) (2.90) (2.77) (3.33) (2.15) (2.74) 
Q 0.912*** 0.834*** 3.131*** 2.068*** 3.306*** 2.259*** 2.441*** 1.491*** 
 (12.11) (8.19) (18.91) (9.40) (18.32) (9.18) (14.19) (6.50) 
CF 2.553*** 2.405*** 6.559*** 6.497*** 5.751*** 5.533*** 4.141*** 3.973*** 
 (4.28) (4.07) (4.50) (4.49) (3.49) (3.38) (2.67) (2.59) 
Log(Assets) 0.062 -0.030 -2.417*** -2.767*** -2.929*** -3.269*** -3.067*** -3.338*** 
 (1.22) (-0.47) (-19.75) (-19.42) (-19.67) (-19.05) (-21.80) (-20.73) 
Informativeness  -0.201***  -1.499***  -1.576***  -1.390*** 
  (-2.65)  (-10.34)  (-8.79)  (-8.74) 
Informativeness × Q  0.005  0.358***  0.347***  0.325*** 
  (0.17)  (6.43)  (5.53)  (5.63) 
Diversification  -2.088***  0.298  0.355  1.348 
  (-2.96)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (1.02) 
Diversification × Q  0.487  -1.851***  -1.746***  -2.037*** 
  (1.58)  (-3.18)  (-2.70)  (-3.19) 
         
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 13,647 13,647 
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.374 0.443 0.454 0.431 0.440 0.459 0.468 
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Internet Appendix Table 3 
Main Results: Controlling for the Impact of Following Analysts 
This table examines whether the negative relation between alliance network centrality and investment-to-
price sensitivity is driven by the variation in the number of following analysts. The dependent variable is 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (2), capital plus research and development expenditures 
(CAPEX + R&D) in Columns (3) and (4), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Columns (5) and 
(6), and non-missing R&D in Columns (7) and (8). All dependent variables are measured in percentage 
points. Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main 
independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based 
investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 4 
for the list of winsorized variables. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) 0.147 0.134 0.672*** 0.587*** 0.594*** 0.537** 0.779*** 0.698*** 
 (1.28) (1.16) (3.37) (2.91) (2.73) (2.45) (3.94) (3.53) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.147** -0.118 -0.207*** -0.176** -0.094 -0.064 
 (-3.25) (-3.15) (-2.06) (-1.62) (-2.59) (-2.15) (-1.37) (-0.92) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.406 0.373 0.818 0.816 1.300* 1.373* 0.378 0.434 
 (1.10) (1.01) (1.31) (1.31) (1.78) (1.90) (0.65) (0.75) 
Q 0.985*** 0.910*** 2.454*** 1.924*** 2.683*** 2.142*** 1.865*** 1.347*** 
 (9.48) (6.28) (12.88) (7.76) (12.50) (7.40) (10.42) (5.56) 
CF 2.338*** 2.326*** 4.046*** 4.029*** 4.960*** 4.901*** 2.128* 2.076* 
 (3.90) (3.89) (3.57) (3.61) (3.60) (3.62) (1.86) (1.84) 
Log(Assets) -1.271*** -1.429*** -5.874*** -6.058*** -7.280*** -7.324*** -6.124*** -6.157*** 
 (-8.27) (-9.14) (-21.09) (-21.47) (-23.87) (-23.40) (-20.41) (-20.40) 
Log(Analyst) 0.367** 0.293* 1.538*** 1.195*** 2.035*** 1.659*** 1.708*** 1.363*** 
 (2.26) (1.71) (5.58) (4.32) (5.97) (4.84) (6.08) (4.90) 
Log(Analyst) × Q 0.045 0.055 -0.291*** -0.143 -0.365*** -0.199* -0.415*** -0.263*** 
 (0.95) (1.01) (-3.03) (-1.41) (-3.38) (-1.70) (-4.39) (-2.63) 
Informativeness  -0.271***  -0.564***  -0.382***  -0.376*** 
  (-3.65)  (-5.03)  (-2.81)  (-3.25) 
Informativeness × Q  0.013  0.140***  0.147***  0.140*** 
  (0.47)  (3.10)  (2.68)  (3.05) 
Diversification  0.575  4.453***  4.963***  4.243*** 
  (0.74)  (3.73)  (3.25)  (4.22) 
Diversification × Q  -0.042  -1.615**  -1.847**  -1.623*** 
  (-0.10)  (-2.37)  (-2.15)  (-3.29) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.194 0.197 0.291 0.295 0.320 0.323 0.270 0.274 
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Internet Appendix Table 4 
Do Financial Constraints Limit the Impact of Alliance Network Centrality? (Full Tables) 
This table examines whether the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity is stronger 
for financially unconstrained firms than for financially constrained firms. The dependent variable is capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (2), capital plus research and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) 
in Columns (3) and (4), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Columns (5) and (6), and non-missing 
R&D in Columns (7) and (8). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Each panel reports two 
sets of regression results for sub-samples of financially unconstrained or constrained firms, using the following 
measures of financial constraints: firm size (Panel A: Firm Size), availability of corporate bond rating (Panel B: Bond 
Rating), and the Whited and Wu Index (Panel C: WW Index). Sub-samples are double-sorted (first by the Bonacich 
centrality and second by the measure of financial constraints) to balance the dispersion of alliance network 
centrality within each sub-sample. Log(Centrality) is the natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in 
Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy 
for price-based investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 
for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm Size 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
Sub-sample Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) 0.392*** -0.219 0.531*** 0.429 0.798*** 0.531 0.345* 0.793** 
 (2.77) (-1.25) (2.62) (1.13) (3.15) (1.27) (1.80) (2.27) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.258*** -0.013 -0.307*** 0.036 -0.354*** -0.030 -0.116 0.015 
 (-3.29) (-0.24) (-2.79) (0.35) (-3.12) (-0.26) (-1.51) (0.17) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.721 0.313 2.127 0.226 2.257 0.451 1.426* -0.150 
 (0.77) (0.79) (1.51) (0.30) (1.46) (0.54) (1.88) (-0.20) 
Q 1.401*** 0.857*** 2.127*** 1.576*** 2.189*** 1.692*** 0.900*** 0.879*** 
 (7.59) (6.70) (7.81) (6.57) (6.85) (6.25) (3.28) (3.83) 
CF 3.389** 1.874*** 4.644** 4.266*** 6.222*** 4.387*** 2.800** 2.541* 
 (2.45) (2.92) (2.44) (3.30) (2.72) (2.96) (2.03) (1.95) 
Log(Assets) -1.283*** -1.144*** -2.562*** -7.725*** -3.074*** -9.037*** -1.951*** -8.112*** 
 (-5.67) (-5.34) (-8.66) (-16.08) (-8.22) (-16.21) (-7.98) (-16.86) 
Informativeness -0.403*** -0.176* -0.561*** -0.515*** -0.303** -0.711*** -0.155* -0.572*** 
 (-3.70) (-1.91) (-4.22) (-3.07) (-2.20) (-3.39) (-1.82) (-3.28) 
Informativeness × Q 0.033 0.008 0.107** 0.094 0.031 0.108 0.070** 0.127** 
 (0.91) (0.23) (2.10) (1.52) (0.60) (1.50) (2.07) (2.07) 
Diversification -0.436 2.156* 0.839 6.029*** 2.124* 7.105*** 1.550* 4.389** 
 (-0.50) (1.82) (0.74) (2.94) (1.72) (2.77) (1.91) (2.50) 
Diversification × Q 0.334 -0.526 -0.504 -2.167** -1.206** -2.236 -1.005*** -1.785** 
 (0.69) (-0.86) (-0.75) (-1.98) (-2.06) (-1.64) (-2.79) (-2.22) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,414 9,416 9,414 9,416 5,972 7,675 5,972 7,675 
Within R2 0.218 0.162 0.260 0.269 0.321 0.301 0.169 0.266 
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Panel B: Bond Rating 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
Sub-sample Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) 0.297 -0.007 0.538** 0.634* 0.711*** 0.623 0.444** 0.791** 
 (1.57) (-0.04) (2.27) (1.72) (2.75) (1.48) (2.22) (2.38) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.279*** -0.040 -0.377*** 0.038 -0.383*** -0.018 -0.154 0.003 
 (-2.71) (-0.62) (-2.81) (0.34) (-2.80) (-0.14) (-1.51) (0.03) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.865 -0.136 1.409 -0.010 1.594 0.239 0.400 0.134 
 (1.09) (-0.32) (1.36) (-0.01) (1.46) (0.30) (0.60) (0.20) 
Q 1.474*** 1.116*** 2.274*** 1.614*** 2.301*** 1.669*** 0.991** 0.796*** 
 (4.74) (6.99) (5.41) (6.51) (5.07) (5.75) (2.35) (3.34) 
CF 3.746** 3.186*** 4.971** 5.400*** 6.185*** 5.196*** 2.789* 2.020 
 (2.28) (4.22) (2.48) (4.07) (2.65) (3.23) (1.85) (1.46) 
Log(Assets) -1.574*** -1.104*** -2.599*** -7.231*** -2.730*** -8.581*** -1.664*** -7.624*** 
 (-5.20) (-5.14) (-7.27) (-17.03) (-6.82) (-17.24) (-5.58) (-17.52) 
Informativeness -0.408*** -0.181* -0.531*** -0.768*** -0.172 -0.946*** -0.150* -0.749*** 
 (-3.11) (-1.66) (-3.41) (-4.69) (-1.28) (-4.54) (-1.76) (-4.41) 
Informativeness × Q 0.034 -0.027 0.082 0.179*** -0.010 0.188** 0.055 0.224*** 
 (0.81) (-0.66) (1.45) (2.83) (-0.18) (2.50) (1.51) (3.66) 
Diversification -0.818 2.745** -0.397 6.485*** 1.126 6.989** 0.690 4.673*** 
 (-0.89) (1.96) (-0.35) (2.87) (1.00) (2.43) (0.85) (2.71) 
Diversification × Q 0.623 -0.909 0.292 -3.157** -0.588 -3.287* -0.615 -2.704*** 
 (1.17) (-1.14) (0.41) (-2.41) (-1.08) (-1.96) (-1.61) (-3.22) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,874 8,859 6,874 8,859 4,179 6,729 4,179 6,729 
Within R2 0.226 0.172 0.241 0.316 0.294 0.361 0.122 0.326 
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Panel C: WW Index 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
Sub-sample Low High Low High Low High Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) 0.262* -0.048 0.381* 0.786** 0.637** 0.853** 0.364* 0.930*** 
 (1.74) (-0.29) (1.79) (2.28) (2.53) (2.22) (1.86) (2.80) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.278*** -0.011 -0.371*** -0.010 -0.438*** -0.080 -0.170** -0.021 
 (-4.53) (-0.20) (-4.09) (-0.11) (-4.51) (-0.73) (-2.17) (-0.22) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 1.833** 0.022 3.979*** -0.269 4.196*** -0.107 2.112** -0.575 
 (2.32) (0.06) (3.46) (-0.38) (3.15) (-0.13) (2.19) (-0.82) 
Q 1.404*** 0.835*** 2.284*** 1.583*** 2.442*** 1.645*** 1.073*** 0.869*** 
 (8.52) (6.58) (9.04) (6.73) (8.41) (6.06) (4.24) (3.66) 
CF 2.442* 2.614*** 2.337 5.436*** 4.193 5.566*** 1.710 3.333*** 
 (1.67) (4.20) (1.07) (4.42) (1.52) (3.89) (0.78) (2.66) 
Log(Assets) -1.179*** -1.119*** -2.780*** -7.611*** -3.432*** -8.777*** -2.521*** -7.859*** 
 (-5.45) (-5.40) (-9.11) (-17.14) (-9.02) (-16.88) (-7.61) (-17.62) 
Informativeness -0.350*** -0.212** -0.623*** -0.582*** -0.391** -0.784*** -0.305** -0.589*** 
 (-3.14) (-2.32) (-4.10) (-3.60) (-2.34) (-3.84) (-2.35) (-3.39) 
Informativeness × Q 0.039 0.004 0.163*** 0.109* 0.105 0.135* 0.134** 0.146** 
 (1.12) (0.13) (2.71) (1.78) (1.64) (1.87) (2.53) (2.37) 
Diversification -0.403 1.881* 1.669 4.797** 2.948*** 6.187*** 2.443*** 3.656** 
 (-0.49) (1.87) (1.55) (2.54) (2.59) (2.67) (3.05) (2.11) 
Diversification × Q 0.473 -0.568 -0.525 -2.316** -1.177** -2.352** -1.114*** -1.925** 
 (1.04) (-1.25) (-0.84) (-2.43) (-2.20) (-2.01) (-3.30) (-2.37) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,404 9,426 9,404 9,426 6,021 7,626 6,021 7,626 
Within R2 0.233 0.160 0.287 0.285 0.355 0.315 0.196 0.281 
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Endogeneity: Controlling for the Influence of Alliance Initiation with the Cash Flow Interaction 
This table addresses the endogeneity issues in alliance network centrality by controlling for the firm-year observations with new alliances in two different 
approaches. The first method is to control for firm-cohort fixed effects (Firm-Cohort FE) that assigns a firm-cohort dummy for each firm-year observation 
with new alliances, thereby relying on the within-firm variations of alliance network centrality without new alliances. The second method is to examine the 
impact of indirectly connected parts of alliance network centrality using a sample of firm-year observations experiencing no changes in their direct alliance 
connections. The dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Columns (1) and (5), capital plus research and development expenditures (CAPEX 
+ R&D) in Columns (2) and (6), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Columns (3) and (7), and non-missing R&D in Columns (4) and (8). All 
dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is a natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. Log(Degree) 
is the natural logarithm of the degree centrality that equals the number of direct connections. Log(Indirect + 1) is one plus the natural logarithm of the indirect 
centrality that equals the difference between Bonacich and degree centrality. The main independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) 
(Columns 1 – 4) or Log(Indirect + 1) (Columns 5 – 8) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of 
variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log(Centrality) -0.030 0.360 0.730** 0.678**     
 (-0.18) (1.21) (2.03) (2.34)     
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.042 -0.108 -0.184 -0.130     
 (-0.72) (-1.03) (-1.57) (-1.35)     
Log(Centrality) × CF -0.380 -1.580** -1.822** -1.642**     
 (-1.18) (-2.40) (-2.34) (-2.49)     
Log(Indirect + 1)     0.578* 1.154** 0.996 0.849* 
     (1.88) (2.15) (1.49) (1.69) 
Log(Indirect + 1) × Q     -0.262** -0.325* -0.246 -0.138 
     (-2.43) (-1.67) (-1.18) (-0.83) 
Log(Indirect + 1) × CF     0.671 -0.076 0.086 -1.001 
     (1.09) (-0.05) (0.05) (-0.61) 
         
        Continued… 
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Log(Degree)     -0.345 -0.114 0.371 0.288 
     (-0.85) (-0.17) (0.45) (0.41) 
Log(Degree) × Q     0.280 0.329 0.034 0.100 
     (1.38) (1.08) (0.10) (0.35) 
Log(Degree) × CF     -2.254 -2.181 -1.551 -0.708 
     (-1.58) (-0.89) (-0.59) (-0.30) 
Q 0.979*** 1.576*** 1.646*** 0.818*** 1.031*** 1.680*** 1.726*** 0.874*** 
 (8.87) (8.12) (7.19) (4.02) (7.62) (6.77) (5.88) (3.21) 
CF 3.198*** 5.641*** 5.785*** 2.788** 2.628*** 3.178*** 3.733** 1.467 
 (6.33) (5.48) (4.52) (2.57) (4.11) (2.62) (2.50) (1.16) 
Log(Assets) -2.364*** -8.412*** -10.313*** -8.279*** -1.191*** -5.292*** -6.982*** -5.800*** 
 (-10.90) (-19.93) (-19.56) (-17.93) (-5.13) (-12.23) (-12.88) (-13.48) 
Informativeness -0.083 -0.332*** -0.473*** -0.371*** -0.111 -0.411*** -0.460** -0.342* 
 (-1.08) (-2.80) (-3.11) (-2.97) (-1.22) (-2.68) (-2.23) (-1.95) 
Informativeness × Q -0.047 0.071 0.076 0.129*** -0.038 0.099 0.073 0.117 
 (-1.54) (1.49) (1.36) (2.64) (-0.95) (1.44) (0.89) (1.56) 
Diversification 1.415* 4.322*** 4.836*** 3.593*** -0.108 2.038 2.329 2.593* 
 (1.80) (3.27) (2.91) (3.06) (-0.08) (1.02) (0.83) (1.92) 
Diversification × Q -0.208 -1.297* -1.006 -0.989* 0.352 -0.586 -0.422 -1.169* 
 (-0.54) (-1.87) (-1.18) (-1.73) (0.44) (-0.49) (-0.25) (-1.65) 
         
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 8,346 8,346 5,827 5,827 
Within R2 0.136 0.234 0.280 0.246 0.146 0.227 0.272 0.226 
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Self-selection: Heckman Model with Alternative Indices of Combined Reporting Index 
This table examines self-selection issues regarding the choice of participating in alliance networks using Heckman 
two-step procedure of sample selection model. The first stage estimates a Probit regression model in which the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is inside alliance network, 0 otherwise (Columns 
1 and 4). The instrument is Combined Reporting that is a firm-level index of combined income reporting requirement 
based on corporate historical headquarter locations from S&P Capital IQ (Panel A) or corporate subsidiaries dataset 
used in Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2013) (Panel B). The second stage estimates an OLS regression model in 
which the dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (2), capital plus research and development 
expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (3), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-missing R&D in Column (5), and 
non-missing R&D in Column (6). All dependent variables are measured in percentage points. Log(Centrality) is the 
natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 3.2. The main independent variable is the 
interaction term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based investment opportunities. See 
Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the list of winsorized variables. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Combined Reporting Index Based on Corporate Historical Headquarter Locations 
Estimation 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Dependent Variable Inside 
Network? 
CAPEX CAPEX + 
R&D 
Inside 
Network? 
CAPEX + 
R&D (non-
missing) 
R&D (non-
missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Centrality)  -0.041 1.882***  2.528*** 2.442*** 
  (-0.55) (12.89)  (13.76) (15.01) 
Log(Centrality) × Q  -0.080*** -0.193***  -0.330*** -0.223*** 
  (-3.91) (-4.69)  (-6.98) (-5.32) 
Log(Centrality) × CF  0.367* 2.829***  3.456*** 2.381*** 
  (1.68) (6.65)  (6.87) (5.35) 
Q 0.010* 0.894*** 1.993*** 0.004 2.324*** 1.429*** 
 (1.71) (17.26) (18.47) (0.56) (18.56) (12.86) 
CF -0.470*** 2.295*** 9.084*** -0.403*** 7.345*** 5.744*** 
 (-12.49) (5.84) (11.32) (-9.36) (7.95) (7.02) 
Log(Assets) 0.296*** 0.079 -4.758*** 0.292*** -4.989*** -4.827*** 
 (56.49) (0.75) (-21.32) (44.25) (-20.25) (-22.07) 
Informativeness -0.081*** -0.217*** -0.624*** -0.084*** -0.754*** -0.718*** 
 (-13.20) (-3.80) (-5.16) (-10.51) (-4.92) (-5.28) 
Informativeness × Q 0.015*** 0.002 0.195*** 0.014*** 0.194*** 0.220*** 
 (7.65) (0.16) (6.08) (6.20) (5.32) (6.78) 
Diversification -0.040 -1.884*** 0.907 -0.087 0.884 2.166** 
 (-0.65) (-4.59) (1.02) (-1.13) (0.79) (2.17) 
Diversification × Q 0.155*** 0.538*** -2.705*** 0.173*** -2.514*** -2.735*** 
 (5.33) (3.02) (-6.82) (5.03) (-5.48) (-6.70) 
Combined Reporting 0.110***   0.133***   
 (8.31)   (8.26)   
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.846 -11.737***  -11.263*** -12.140*** 
  (1.55) (-10.27)  (-8.66) (-10.22) 
       
      Continued… 
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Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 57,419 18,298 18,298 36,125 13,064 13,064 
 
Panel B: Combined Reporting Index Based on Corporate Subsidiary Locations 
Estimation 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Dependent Variable Inside 
Network? 
CAPEX CAPEX + 
R&D 
Inside 
Network? 
CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D (non-
missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log(Centrality)  0.073 1.777***  2.189*** 1.994*** 
  (0.75) (10.69)  (10.46) (11.10) 
Log(Centrality) × Q  -0.151*** -0.291***  -0.424*** -0.234*** 
  (-5.53) (-6.26)  (-7.77) (-5.01) 
Log(Centrality) × CF  -0.414 0.901  1.988*** 1.432** 
  (-1.28) (1.64)  (3.06) (2.57) 
Q -0.003 1.108*** 2.321*** -0.001 2.536*** 1.436*** 
 (-0.28) (14.56) (17.83) (-0.04) (16.19) (10.67) 
CF -0.402*** 2.601*** 8.219*** -0.377*** 6.160*** 4.904*** 
 (-5.49) (3.97) (7.37) (-4.48) (4.59) (4.26) 
Log(Assets) 0.353*** 0.190 -3.113*** 0.328*** -3.182*** -3.215*** 
 (36.41) (1.35) (-12.84) (26.66) (-11.56) (-13.58) 
Informativeness -0.085*** -0.262*** -0.852*** -0.086*** -1.025*** -0.939*** 
 (-8.16) (-3.33) (-6.32) (-6.22) (-5.70) (-6.07) 
Informativeness × Q 0.014*** 0.043** 0.248*** 0.010** 0.262*** 0.242*** 
 (3.95) (1.98) (6.63) (2.43) (5.93) (6.37) 
Diversification -0.055 -1.545*** 1.354 0.122 0.646 1.456 
 (-0.57) (-2.85) (1.45) (0.98) (0.54) (1.42) 
Diversification × Q 0.173*** 0.269 -2.194*** 0.130** -1.801*** -1.851*** 
 (3.83) (1.22) (-5.76) (2.42) (-4.10) (-4.90) 
Combined Reporting 0.078***   0.094***   
 (3.05)   (3.03)   
Inverse Mills Ratio  1.469** -4.266***  -3.197** -2.994** 
  (2.21) (-3.74)  (-2.20) (-2.39) 
       
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,363 13,252 13,252 11,795 9,846 9,846 
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Robustness Tests (Full Tables) 
This table tests the robustness of the negative relation between alliance network centrality and investment-
to-price sensitivity. The dependent variable is capital expenditure (CAPEX) in Column (1), capital plus 
research and development expenditures (CAPEX + R&D) in Column (2), CAPEX + R&D of firms with non-
missing R&D in Column (3), and non-missing R&D in Column (4). All dependent variables are measured 
in percentage points. Specifications (1) – (7) use alternative settings of investment regressions. Specification 
(1) estimates the cumulant estimator of Erickson, Jiang and Whited (2014) that provides unbiased estimates 
of coefficients in errors-in-variables panel regressions. Specification (2) uses Total Q (Peters and Taylor 2017) 
that incorporates both tangible and intangible capital in estimating firms’ total capital to measure price-
based investment opportunities. Specification (3) uses a value-weighted industry-level (SIC 3-digit) Tobin’s 
Q to measure price-based investment opportunities. Specification (4) includes the square-term of Tobin’s 
Q to control for the potential non-linearity in investment-to-price sensitivity. Specification (5) controls for 
additional set of firm characteristics that may affect investment decisions: firm age, sales growth, book 
leverage, and cash holding. Specification (6) excludes firms experiencing more than 20% of changes in total 
assets to isolate the impact of firms with ongoing material changes in operations. Specification (7) reports 
the cross-sectional differences in the impact of alliance network centrality on investment-to-price sensitivity 
by estimating Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Specifically, the reported coefficients 
are the average of cross-sectional coefficients estimated each alliance network between 1994 and 2013 with 
industry (SIC 3-digit) fixed effects. Specifications (8) – (11) test alternative assumptions for the construction 
of alliance networks. Specifications (8) and (9) test the robustness of results for alternative assumptions on 
alliance duration: 3- and 7-year (see Section 2.1). Specification (10) uses centrality measures constructed 
from alliance networks consisting of alliance deals involving at least two U.S. firms in Compustat/CRSP 
merged database. Specification (11) uses centrality measures constructed from alliance networks consisting 
of entire global alliance deals involving not only firms but also universities, government agencies, and other 
institutions. Specifications (12) – (16) test the robustness of results for alternative measures of network 
centrality. Specification (12) uses degree centrality that only counts the impact of direct connections. 
Specifications (13) and (14) use alternative parameter choices for the calculation of Bonacich centrality. 
Specifications (15) and (16) check the robustness of results using eigenvector and betweenness centrality. 
See Section 3.2 and Appendix 2 for more detail on various measures of network centrality. The main 
independent variable is the interaction term between Log(Centrality) and Tobin’s Q, a proxy for price-based 
investment opportunities. See Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 4 for the 
list of winsorized variables. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Specification (1) Cumulant Estimator (Erickson, Jiang and Whited 2014) 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 4.759*** 4.977*** 5.940*** 7.286*** 
 (7.51) (6.83) (6.28) (4.39) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -1.982*** -2.105*** -2.404*** -3.061*** 
 (-6.95) (-6.52) (-6.29) (-4.50) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 3.558*** 3.960*** 4.111*** 4.369*** 
 (4.77) (3.98) (3.80) (3.03) 
Q 5.789*** 7.389*** 8.294*** 9.609*** 
 (9.34) (9.52) (8.59) (5.44) 
CF -2.649** -2.404 -2.619 -8.616*** 
 (-2.08) (-1.43) (-1.32) (-2.95) 
Log(Assets) -0.618** -3.773*** -4.449*** -2.259*** 
 (-2.49) (-11.18) (-10.32) (-3.78) 
     
Firm FE (de-meaned) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
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Specification (2) Total Q (Peters and Taylor 2017) 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.081 0.597*** 0.693*** 0.651*** 
 (0.84) (3.45) (3.22) (3.75) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.094*** -0.113*** -0.171*** -0.066* 
 (-3.20) (-2.58) (-3.52) (-1.74) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.526 1.038 1.342* 0.454 
 (1.38) (1.58) (1.81) (0.76) 
Q 0.559*** 0.715*** 0.821*** 0.265** 
 (8.51) (6.61) (6.31) (2.50) 
CF 2.303*** 4.419*** 4.670*** 2.625** 
 (3.74) (3.75) (3.30) (2.22) 
Log(Assets) -1.789*** -6.868*** -8.154*** -6.656*** 
 (-12.42) (-23.45) (-22.71) (-21.38) 
Informativeness -0.348*** -0.523*** -0.519*** -0.253*** 
 (-6.53) (-6.24) (-4.75) (-2.82) 
Informativeness × Q 0.025 0.039 0.021 0.018 
 (1.54) (1.30) (0.59) (0.62) 
Diversification 0.614 1.879*** 2.194** 1.477** 
 (1.35) (2.62) (2.40) (2.01) 
Diversification × Q -0.050 -0.385 -0.416 -0.360 
 (-0.17) (-0.92) (-0.82) (-1.42) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.186 0.249 0.288 0.230 
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Specification (3) Industry Q 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.145 0.753*** 1.020*** 0.913*** 
 (0.97) (3.14) (3.36) (3.88) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.154*** -0.212** -0.310*** -0.155* 
 (-3.11) (-2.47) (-2.98) (-1.88) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.471 1.103* 1.333* 0.530 
 (1.32) (1.79) (1.95) (0.96) 
Q 0.654*** 0.681*** 0.683** 0.058 
 (4.87) (2.91) (2.40) (0.25) 
CF 2.832*** 4.679*** 4.903*** 2.329** 
 (4.73) (4.20) (3.72) (2.11) 
Log(Assets) -1.516*** -6.198*** -7.342*** -6.109*** 
 (-10.11) (-22.49) (-21.96) (-21.22) 
Informativeness -0.772*** -1.581*** -1.764*** -1.082*** 
 (-12.95) (-15.18) (-13.29) (-9.76) 
Informativeness × Q 0.176*** 0.482*** 0.506*** 0.367*** 
 (9.07) (12.70) (11.76) (10.49) 
Diversification -1.020 1.395 2.182 2.643*** 
 (-1.25) (1.18) (1.49) (2.79) 
Diversification × Q 0.648 -0.278 -0.520 -0.936** 
 (1.51) (-0.41) (-0.62) (-2.01) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.175 0.273 0.315 0.265 
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Specification (4) Non-linearity: Controlling for Q2 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.082 0.637*** 0.899*** 0.837*** 
 (0.71) (3.18) (3.77) (4.27) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.103** -0.124* -0.225*** -0.108* 
 (-2.47) (-1.79) (-2.96) (-1.71) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.326 0.732 1.083 0.398 
 (0.88) (1.17) (1.54) (0.69) 
Q 1.751*** 2.187*** 2.139*** 0.598** 
 (10.64) (7.42) (6.31) (2.10) 
CF 2.018*** 3.671*** 3.803*** 1.975* 
 (3.41) (3.30) (2.87) (1.74) 
Log(Assets) -1.217*** -5.696*** -6.856*** -5.890*** 
 (-8.43) (-20.56) (-20.38) (-20.22) 
Informativeness -0.220*** -0.650*** -0.682*** -0.578*** 
 (-3.17) (-5.72) (-4.74) (-4.71) 
Informativeness × Q -0.003 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.208*** 
 (-0.13) (3.99) (3.41) (4.67) 
Diversification 0.943 4.593*** 5.323*** 4.017*** 
 (1.17) (3.76) (3.48) (4.00) 
Diversification × Q -0.241 -1.726** -1.877** -1.535*** 
 (-0.55) (-2.49) (-2.20) (-3.12) 
Q2 -0.073*** -0.053** -0.033 0.023 
 (-4.86) (-2.03) (-1.11) (0.96) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.199 0.294 0.335 0.272 
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Specification (5) More Controls: Age, Sales Growth, Leverage, and Cash 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.214* 0.771*** 1.023*** 0.855*** 
 (1.88) (3.94) (4.40) (4.44) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.129*** -0.148** -0.239*** -0.106* 
 (-3.19) (-2.22) (-3.24) (-1.70) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.509 0.974 1.239* 0.432 
 (1.39) (1.58) (1.79) (0.75) 
Q 1.011*** 1.665*** 1.810*** 0.858*** 
 (10.82) (9.72) (9.18) (4.91) 
CF 1.461** 2.740** 3.163** 1.727 
 (2.49) (2.45) (2.42) (1.56) 
Log(Assets) -1.187*** -5.617*** -6.809*** -5.878*** 
 (-8.04) (-20.10) (-19.95) (-19.75) 
Informativeness -0.197*** -0.603*** -0.649*** -0.556*** 
 (-2.87) (-5.36) (-4.50) (-4.52) 
Informativeness × Q -0.015 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.203*** 
 (-0.65) (3.65) (3.19) (4.55) 
Diversification 0.701 4.534*** 5.328*** 4.169*** 
 (0.92) (3.83) (3.59) (4.13) 
Diversification × Q -0.067 -1.631** -1.827** -1.595*** 
 (-0.16) (-2.41) (-2.20) (-3.22) 
Log(Age) -1.259*** -1.848*** -1.637** -0.813 
 (-3.25) (-2.83) (-2.05) (-1.23) 
Sales Growth 0.197*** 0.080 0.096 -0.055 
 (2.63) (0.48) (0.50) (-0.33) 
Leverage -4.425*** -6.340*** -5.192*** -1.455 
 (-6.56) (-5.64) (-3.96) (-1.30) 
Cash Holding 0.073 -1.172 -1.986 -2.080** 
 (0.13) (-1.07) (-1.60) (-1.97) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.208 0.301 0.339 0.273 
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Specification (6) Excluding Firms with More than 20% of Asset Changes  
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.104 0.575*** 1.060*** 0.892*** 
 (0.99) (3.13) (4.69) (4.68) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.067* -0.075 -0.190** -0.115* 
 (-1.89) (-1.01) (-2.24) (-1.68) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.480 0.528 0.142 -0.269 
 (1.48) (0.84) (0.19) (-0.42) 
Q 0.604*** 0.925*** 1.134*** 0.518** 
 (6.62) (4.83) (4.82) (2.55) 
CF 2.441*** 4.207*** 5.655*** 3.242** 
 (3.83) (3.24) (3.45) (2.28) 
Log(Assets) -0.189 -3.242*** -4.368*** -4.208*** 
 (-1.44) (-10.35) (-11.67) (-11.60) 
Informativeness -0.155** -0.498*** -0.431*** -0.378*** 
 (-2.38) (-4.32) (-2.91) (-2.98) 
Informativeness × Q -0.035 0.116** 0.094 0.146** 
 (-1.43) (2.06) (1.36) (2.36) 
Diversification -0.662 1.776* 2.780** 2.561*** 
 (-0.91) (1.78) (2.29) (3.46) 
Diversification × Q 0.511 -0.467 -0.553 -0.918** 
 (1.23) (-0.80) (-0.80) (-2.56) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,987 11,987 8,410 8,410 
Within R2 0.149 0.184 0.222 0.180 
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Specification (7) Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) -0.210* 1.852*** 2.471*** 2.699*** 
 (-1.90) (6.00) (5.65) (6.72) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.066 -0.104 -0.300* -0.275** 
 (-1.54) (-1.06) (-1.96) (-2.12) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.668 2.005*** 3.114*** 2.290*** 
 (0.89) (2.91) (2.99) (3.54) 
Q 0.731*** 1.912*** 2.078*** 1.533*** 
 (12.20) (10.15) (7.95) (6.87) 
CF 2.741*** 8.509*** 7.194*** 5.129*** 
 (3.08) (8.83) (7.73) (4.20) 
Log(Assets) -0.023 -2.770*** -3.242*** -3.329*** 
 (-0.43) (-22.54) (-24.57) (-27.71) 
Informativeness -2.337*** -0.584 -0.828 0.307 
 (-3.81) (-0.67) (-0.65) (0.26) 
Informativeness × Q 0.828** -1.156* -0.725 -1.284 
 (2.65) (-1.91) (-0.76) (-1.47) 
Diversification -0.080 -1.523*** -1.583*** -1.466*** 
 (-1.15) (-18.24) (-9.52) (-17.85) 
Diversification × Q -0.016 0.421*** 0.454*** 0.397*** 
 (-0.75) (9.54) (8.03) (8.93) 
     
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
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Specification (8) 3-year Alliance Duration 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.302** 0.951*** 1.251*** 0.960*** 
 (2.40) (4.31) (4.76) (4.40) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.126*** -0.146* -0.245*** -0.110 
 (-2.59) (-1.89) (-2.92) (-1.56) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.446 1.126 1.480 0.854 
 (0.91) (1.37) (1.60) (1.13) 
Q 0.925*** 1.487*** 1.660*** 0.722*** 
 (9.22) (8.59) (8.43) (4.28) 
CF 2.566*** 4.607*** 4.740*** 2.090* 
 (3.77) (3.78) (3.28) (1.69) 
Log(Assets) -1.492*** -6.143*** -7.140*** -6.002*** 
 (-8.69) (-20.30) (-19.28) (-18.44) 
Informativeness -0.320*** -0.811*** -0.796*** -0.667*** 
 (-3.76) (-6.34) (-5.01) (-4.98) 
Informativeness × Q 0.023 0.224*** 0.217*** 0.245*** 
 (0.85) (4.69) (3.93) (5.07) 
Diversification 0.468 4.814*** 6.070*** 4.711*** 
 (0.58) (3.91) (4.07) (4.20) 
Diversification × Q -0.138 -2.017*** -2.517*** -1.898*** 
 (-0.33) (-2.92) (-3.19) (-3.54) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,816 14,816 10,838 10,838 
Within R2 0.207 0.320 0.360 0.291 
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Specification (9) 7-year Alliance Duration 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.032 0.517*** 0.731*** 0.701*** 
 (0.29) (2.75) (3.15) (3.60) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.114*** -0.120* -0.196*** -0.078 
 (-3.11) (-1.93) (-2.83) (-1.33) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.181 0.313 0.585 0.141 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.95) (0.28) 
Q 1.023*** 1.638*** 1.746*** 0.787*** 
 (10.95) (9.63) (8.90) (4.55) 
CF 2.856*** 5.046*** 5.193*** 2.686** 
 (5.02) (4.88) (4.18) (2.51) 
Log(Assets) -1.169*** -5.433*** -6.617*** -5.700*** 
 (-8.84) (-20.79) (-20.66) (-20.71) 
Informativeness -0.248*** -0.676*** -0.745*** -0.579*** 
 (-3.92) (-6.39) (-5.53) (-5.03) 
Informativeness × Q -0.010 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.207*** 
 (-0.48) (4.05) (3.56) (4.86) 
Diversification 0.141 3.740*** 4.573*** 3.931*** 
 (0.20) (3.36) (3.24) (4.07) 
Diversification × Q 0.023 -1.409** -1.550** -1.367*** 
 (0.06) (-2.23) (-1.99) (-2.75) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,365 21,365 15,416 15,416 
Within R2 0.185 0.276 0.317 0.256 
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Specification (10) Within U.S. Networks 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.067 0.628*** 0.885*** 0.872*** 
 (0.55) (2.85) (3.34) (3.86) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.107** -0.128* -0.214*** -0.113 
 (-2.40) (-1.71) (-2.61) (-1.59) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.420 1.020 1.375 0.605 
 (0.98) (1.32) (1.53) (0.82) 
Q 0.970*** 1.595*** 1.703*** 0.825*** 
 (10.24) (9.18) (8.55) (4.61) 
CF 2.227*** 3.533*** 3.516** 1.534 
 (3.64) (3.05) (2.51) (1.27) 
Log(Assets) -1.316*** -5.801*** -6.980*** -5.937*** 
 (-8.46) (-20.10) (-19.98) (-19.56) 
Informativeness -0.272*** -0.625*** -0.646*** -0.476*** 
 (-3.79) (-5.43) (-4.44) (-3.84) 
Informativeness × Q 0.001 0.161*** 0.165*** 0.189*** 
 (0.03) (3.62) (3.15) (4.09) 
Diversification 0.839 4.661*** 5.645*** 4.195*** 
 (1.16) (4.06) (4.02) (3.96) 
Diversification × Q -0.252 -1.781*** -2.125*** -1.575*** 
 (-0.66) (-2.77) (-2.79) (-3.05) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,253 17,253 12,467 12,467 
Within R2 0.200 0.295 0.337 0.272 
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Specification (11) Entire Global Networks 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) 0.042 0.424*** 0.593*** 0.524*** 
 (0.64) (3.78) (4.40) (4.66) 
Log(Centrality) × Q -0.076*** -0.102** -0.157*** -0.072* 
 (-3.19) (-2.57) (-3.55) (-1.91) 
Log(Centrality) × CF 0.360* 0.754** 0.701* 0.208 
 (1.96) (2.30) (1.87) (0.65) 
Q 1.016*** 1.744*** 1.860*** 0.890*** 
 (12.38) (12.61) (11.52) (6.56) 
CF 2.290*** 2.909*** 3.498*** 1.436 
 (4.71) (3.21) (3.20) (1.51) 
Log(Assets) -1.261*** -5.378*** -6.649*** -5.638*** 
 (-10.86) (-23.58) (-23.26) (-22.25) 
Informativeness -0.219*** -0.643*** -0.690*** -0.555*** 
 (-4.24) (-7.83) (-6.48) (-6.25) 
Informativeness × Q -0.004 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.177*** 
 (-0.19) (4.60) (3.75) (5.03) 
Diversification 0.118 3.589*** 4.145*** 3.842*** 
 (0.21) (4.03) (3.68) (4.83) 
Diversification × Q -0.085 -1.483*** -1.587** -1.368*** 
 (-0.25) (-2.71) (-2.37) (-3.25) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 30,423 30,423 21,470 21,470 
Within R2 0.173 0.260 0.300 0.240 
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Specification (12) Bonacich- Centrality (β = 0.01)  
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Bonacich-) 0.114 0.667*** 0.940*** 0.839*** 
 (0.89) (2.99) (3.49) (3.73) 
Log(Bonacich-) × Q -0.134*** -0.138* -0.241*** -0.095 
 (-2.75) (-1.75) (-2.77) (-1.29) 
Log(Bonacich-) × CF 0.274 0.894 1.308 0.672 
 (0.61) (1.19) (1.57) (1.00) 
Q 1.009*** 1.617*** 1.739*** 0.786*** 
 (10.69) (9.66) (9.02) (4.63) 
CF 2.480*** 3.956*** 4.041*** 1.697 
 (4.38) (3.73) (3.23) (1.61) 
Log(Assets) -1.263*** -5.725*** -6.869*** -5.868*** 
 (-8.66) (-20.66) (-20.40) (-20.19) 
Informativeness -0.245*** -0.672*** -0.697*** -0.574*** 
 (-3.52) (-5.90) (-4.80) (-4.62) 
Informativeness × Q -0.007 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.212*** 
 (-0.28) (3.94) (3.35) (4.62) 
Diversification 0.461 4.263*** 5.104*** 4.192*** 
 (0.59) (3.57) (3.41) (4.19) 
Diversification × Q -0.022 -1.579** -1.795** -1.615*** 
 (-0.05) (-2.32) (-2.15) (-3.31) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.195 0.293 0.334 0.271 
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Specification (13) Bonacich+ Centrality (β = 0.03)  
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Bonacich+) 0.127 0.593*** 0.804*** 0.722*** 
 (1.42) (3.83) (4.41) (4.89) 
Log(Bonacich+) × Q -0.088*** -0.109** -0.180*** -0.093** 
 (-2.98) (-2.17) (-3.23) (-2.00) 
Log(Bonacich+) × CF 0.400 0.539 0.691 0.019 
 (1.57) (1.20) (1.33) (0.04) 
Q 1.026*** 1.680*** 1.825*** 0.875*** 
 (10.68) (9.67) (9.25) (5.07) 
CF 2.017*** 3.836*** 4.068*** 2.357** 
 (3.36) (3.35) (2.94) (1.98) 
Log(Assets) -1.274*** -5.744*** -6.895*** -5.893*** 
 (-8.68) (-20.77) (-20.55) (-20.25) 
Informativeness -0.257*** -0.676*** -0.710*** -0.570*** 
 (-3.75) (-6.08) (-5.05) (-4.74) 
Informativeness × Q 0.000 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.208*** 
 (0.01) (4.16) (3.64) (4.80) 
Diversification 0.547 4.311*** 5.251*** 4.197*** 
 (0.70) (3.64) (3.56) (4.21) 
Diversification × Q -0.059 -1.585** -1.823** -1.588*** 
 (-0.14) (-2.34) (-2.20) (-3.27) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.195 0.294 0.335 0.272 
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Specification (14) Degree Centrality  
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Degree) 0.114 0.624*** 0.908*** 0.778*** 
 (0.84) (2.65) (3.18) (3.22) 
Log(Degree) × Q -0.129** -0.116 -0.216** -0.072 
 (-2.44) (-1.38) (-2.31) (-0.90) 
Log(Degree) × CF 0.082 0.917 1.342 0.924 
 (0.17) (1.10) (1.48) (1.28) 
Q 0.974*** 1.559*** 1.653*** 0.732*** 
 (10.78) (9.77) (8.92) (4.50) 
CF 2.681*** 4.142*** 4.308*** 1.655* 
 (5.26) (4.24) (3.75) (1.72) 
Log(Assets) -1.263*** -5.719*** -6.863*** -5.858*** 
 (-8.69) (-20.64) (-20.38) (-20.17) 
Informativeness -0.245*** -0.680*** -0.707*** -0.585*** 
 (-3.50) (-5.91) (-4.81) (-4.66) 
Informativeness × Q -0.007 0.176*** 0.179*** 0.217*** 
 (-0.27) (3.95) (3.37) (4.64) 
Diversification 0.470 4.309*** 5.164*** 4.248*** 
 (0.60) (3.61) (3.45) (4.24) 
Diversification × Q -0.029 -1.601** -1.826** -1.643*** 
 (-0.07) (-2.36) (-2.19) (-3.36) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.195 0.293 0.333 0.271 
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Internet Appendix Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Specification (15) Eigenvector Centrality 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Eigenvector) 2.507 9.381*** 14.243*** 11.493*** 
 (1.35) (3.01) (3.63) (3.65) 
Log(Eigenvector) × Q -1.692** -2.621*** -3.440*** -1.897*** 
 (-2.10) (-3.31) (-4.50) (-2.63) 
Log(Eigenvector) × CF 10.956 28.972* 31.526** 19.339** 
 (1.08) (1.91) (2.14) (2.11) 
Q 0.913*** 1.569*** 1.599*** 0.764*** 
 (12.09) (11.47) (10.29) (5.62) 
CF 2.459*** 4.019*** 4.427*** 1.789** 
 (5.62) (4.61) (4.40) (2.09) 
Log(Assets) -1.265*** -5.706*** -6.865*** -5.858*** 
 (-8.55) (-20.56) (-20.33) (-20.11) 
Informativeness -0.243*** -0.654*** -0.684*** -0.558*** 
 (-3.60) (-5.89) (-4.83) (-4.65) 
Informativeness × Q -0.003 0.166*** 0.171*** 0.203*** 
 (-0.14) (3.91) (3.44) (4.69) 
Diversification 0.495 4.204*** 5.093*** 4.089*** 
 (0.64) (3.55) (3.46) (4.24) 
Diversification × Q -0.057 -1.579** -1.830** -1.601*** 
 (-0.14) (-2.35) (-2.23) (-3.32) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.195 0.294 0.335 0.271 
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Specification (16) Betwenness Centrality 
Dependent Variable CAPEX CAPEX + R&D CAPEX + R&D 
(non-missing) 
R&D 
(non-missing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Betweenness + 1) 11.418 56.234** 70.560*** 57.858** 
 (0.83) (2.23) (2.79) (2.30) 
Log(Betweenness + 1) × Q -3.748 -13.634* -18.797*** -13.796*** 
 (-0.45) (-1.95) (-3.59) (-2.88) 
Log(Betweenness + 1) × CF -26.533 81.937 121.761 131.533 
 (-0.20) (0.41) (0.69) (1.54) 
Q 0.833*** 1.472*** 1.460*** 0.697*** 
 (11.92) (11.37) (9.96) (5.56) 
CF 2.757*** 4.721*** 5.193*** 2.224*** 
 (7.53) (6.17) (5.84) (2.92) 
Log(Assets) -1.264*** -5.685*** -6.814*** -5.815*** 
 (-8.57) (-20.48) (-20.23) (-20.02) 
Informativeness -0.278*** -0.692*** -0.745*** -0.584*** 
 (-4.12) (-6.25) (-5.26) (-4.90) 
Informativeness × Q 0.011 0.179*** 0.193*** 0.211*** 
 (0.48) (4.24) (3.87) (4.94) 
Diversification 0.590 4.220*** 5.132*** 4.062*** 
 (0.76) (3.51) (3.41) (4.19) 
Diversification × Q -0.088 -1.573** -1.826** -1.578*** 
 (-0.21) (-2.33) (-2.20) (-3.27) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,830 18,830 13,647 13,647 
Within R2 0.194 0.293 0.333 0.270 
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Internet Appendix Table 8 
Increase in Centrality and Firm-level Announcement Wealth Effects (Alternative 
Specifications) 
This table investigates whether the stock market reacts more positively to the announcement of alliances 
if new alliances more largely increase the announcing firm’s alliance network centrality. The dependent 
variables are cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). In Panel A, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are 
estimated over a 2-day (-1, 1) event-period using market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted index). 
In Panel B, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated over a 3-day (-1, 1) event-period using the 
market model (CRSP value-weighted index) in which parameters are estimated in the window (-239, 6) 
using at least 100 non-missing daily return observations. In Panel C, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
are estimated over a 2-day (-1, 0) event-period using the same market model specification. Log(Centrality) 
(at t – 1) is a natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality described in Section 2.2, measured at the 
previous year of alliance announcements. The main independent variable is Log(ΔBonacich) equal to the 
increase in Bonacich centrality of the announcing firm, calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus 
Bonacich centrality of alliance partner firm multiplied by 0.02 (Section 5.3). See Appendix 1 for the 
complete list of variable definitions. See Table 14 for the list of winsorized variables. Industry fixed 
effects are defined at the SIC 2-digit level. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: 2-day (-1, 0) event window with market-adjusted returns 
Dependent Variable 2-day Market-Adjusted CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) (at t – 1) 0.206*** 0.256*** 0.136** 0.181** 
 (2.94) (2.91) (1.99) (2.09) 
Log(ΔBonacich) 0.734*** 0.801*** 0.752*** 0.803*** 
 (4.94) (5.25) (5.11) (5.30) 
R&D Alliance 0.260 0.097 0.158 0.061 
 (1.26) (0.45) (0.76) (0.28) 
Non-R&D Alliance -0.370** -0.342* -0.346* -0.338* 
 (-1.98) (-1.81) (-1.86) (-1.80) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.203 0.033 0.048 0.003 
 (1.13) (0.17) (0.27) (0.02) 
Log(Market Capital) -0.565*** -0.621*** -0.321*** -0.363*** 
 (-9.46) (-8.90) (-5.17) (-4.87) 
ROA   -4.295*** -4.244*** 
   (-5.18) (-4.70) 
Cash Holding   1.499*** 1.233** 
   (2.83) (2.12) 
Leverage   0.573 0.435 
   (1.04) (0.71) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,782 6,782 6,782 6,782 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.063 0.066 0.075 
Continued… 
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Internet Appendix Table 8 (Continued) 
Panel B: 3-day (-1, 1) event window with market model 
Dependent Variable 3-day Market Model CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) (at t – 1) 0.168** 0.250** 0.109 0.171* 
 (2.22) (2.50) (1.40) (1.73) 
Log(ΔBonacich) 0.716*** 0.816*** 0.746*** 0.823*** 
 (4.45) (4.89) (4.65) (4.94) 
R&D Alliance 0.414* 0.237 0.341 0.210 
 (1.86) (1.01) (1.54) (0.91) 
Non-R&D Alliance -0.005 0.011 0.015 0.012 
 (-0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.456** 0.377* 0.346* 0.358* 
 (2.24) (1.73) (1.75) (1.67) 
Log(Market Capital) -0.546*** -0.602*** -0.320*** -0.340*** 
 (-8.76) (-8.30) (-4.57) (-4.16) 
ROA   -4.329*** -4.455*** 
   (-5.11) (-4.87) 
Cash Holding   0.961* 0.902 
   (1.80) (1.52) 
Leverage   0.423 0.419 
   (0.73) (0.64) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,782 6,782 6,782 6,782 
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.049 0.049 0.059 
 
Continued… 
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Internet Appendix Table 8 (Continued) 
Panel C: 2-day (-1, 0) event window with market model 
Dependent Variable 2-day Market Model CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Centrality) (at t – 1) 0.182*** 0.232*** 0.114* 0.151* 
 (2.73) (2.71) (1.73) (1.80) 
Log(ΔBonacich) 0.757*** 0.817*** 0.781*** 0.823*** 
 (5.23) (5.51) (5.44) (5.59) 
R&D Alliance 0.298 0.151 0.208 0.122 
 (1.52) (0.74) (1.06) (0.60) 
Non-R&D Alliance -0.276 -0.248 -0.254 -0.245 
 (-1.55) (-1.38) (-1.43) (-1.37) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.267 0.134 0.132 0.111 
 (1.52) (0.72) (0.77) (0.60) 
Log(Market Capital) -0.544*** -0.592*** -0.301*** -0.325*** 
 (-9.20) (-8.64) (-4.89) (-4.46) 
ROA   -4.463*** -4.532*** 
   (-5.54) (-5.19) 
Cash Holding   1.186** 0.941* 
   (2.32) (1.67) 
Leverage   0.366 0.246 
   (0.69) (0.42) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,782 6,782 6,782 6,782 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.060 0.065 0.074 
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Internet Appendix Table 9 
Synergy: Combined Centrality and Combined Announcement Wealth Effects 
(Alternative Specifications) 
This table investigates whether the stock market reacts more positively to the announcement of alliances 
involving firms with a higher alliance network centrality. In Panel A, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
are estimated over a 2-day (-1, 1) event-period using market-adjusted returns (CRSP value-weighted 
index). In Panel B, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated over a 3-day (-1, 1) event-period 
using the market model (CRSP value-weighted index) in which parameters are estimated in the window 
(-239, 6) using at least 100 non-missing daily return observations. In Panel C, cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) are estimated over a 2-day (-1, 0) event-period using the same market model specification. 
The dependent variable in odd-numbered columns is Combined CAR that is a value-weighted CAR of 
the portfolio of two firms, where the weight is determined by each firm’s market capital measured 50 
trading days before the announcement. The dependent variable in even-numbered columns is Combined 
Dollar Gain that is the sum of firms’ dollar wealth gain: CAR multiplied by market capital at the 
beginning of the event period. Combined CAR is measured in percentage points, and Combined Dollar 
Gain is measured in million dollars. Both Central is an indicator variable that equals 1 if both firms’ 
centrality values are above the median of centrality distribution within the event study sample, and 0 
otherwise. One Central is an indicator variable that equals 1 if only one firm’s centrality value is above 
the median of centrality distribution within the event study sample, and 0 otherwise. Combined Centrality 
is the sum of two firms’ Bonacich centrality measured in the previous year of announcement. See 
Appendix 1 for the complete list of variable definitions. See Table 14 for the list of winsorized variables. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: 2-day (-1, 0) event window with market-adjusted returns 
Dependent Variable Combined  
CAR 
Combined  
Dollar Gain 
Combined  
CAR 
Combined  
Dollar Gain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Both Central 0.554*** 458.810***   
 (2.95) (2.99)   
One Central 0.004 -113.490   
 (0.02) (-1.07)   
Combined Centrality   0.002*** 0.903 
   (3.25) (1.27) 
R&D Alliance 0.095 -67.632 0.069 -91.543 
 (0.58) (-0.43) (0.42) (-0.58) 
Non-R&D Alliance -0.039 -23.820 -0.052 -33.977 
 (-0.24) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.20) 
Horizontal Alliance -0.023 -12.468 -0.021 -12.663 
 (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.15) (-0.11) 
Combined Market Capital ($ billion) -0.001 1.572 -0.001 1.539 
 (-0.99) (1.17) (-1.57) (1.08) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,391 3,391 3,391 3,391 
R2 0.009 0.018 0.007 0.013 
Continued… 
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Panel B: 3-day (-1, 1) event window with market model 
Dependent Variable Combined  
CAR  
Combined  
Dollar Gain  
Combined  
CAR  
Combined  
Dollar Gain 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Both Central 0.627*** 475.864**   
 (2.82) (2.53)   
One Central 0.173 98.623   
 (0.88) (0.77)   
Combined Centrality   0.001** 0.138 
   (1.97) (0.16) 
R&D Alliance 0.085 -82.323 0.067 -92.422 
 (0.44) (-0.44) (0.34) (-0.49) 
Non-R&D Alliance 0.207 229.669 0.189 214.386 
 (1.05) (1.14) (0.96) (1.06) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.141 148.019 0.140 143.175 
 (0.84) (1.07) (0.84) (1.03) 
Combined Market Capital ($ billion) -0.002** -2.889* -0.002** -2.307 
 (-2.21) (-1.71) (-2.08) (-1.30) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,391 3,391 3,391 3,391 
R2 0.009 0.013 0.007 0.010 
Panel C: 2-day (-1, 0) event window with market model 
Dependent Variable Combined  
CAR  
Combined  
Dollar Gain  
Combined  
CAR  
Combined  
Dollar Gain 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Both Central 0.602*** 415.994***   
 (3.34) (2.80)   
One Central 0.115 -72.674   
 (0.72) (-0.70)   
Combined Centrality   0.002*** 0.809 
   (3.17) (1.15) 
R&D Alliance 0.111 -49.038 0.089 -69.276 
 (0.70) (-0.32) (0.56) (-0.45) 
Non-R&D Alliance 0.068 16.310 0.052 6.665 
 (0.43) (0.10) (0.33) (0.04) 
Horizontal Alliance 0.061 14.476 0.062 14.139 
 (0.45) (0.13) (0.45) (0.12) 
Combined Market Capital ($ billion) -0.001* 0.989 -0.001** 0.978 
 (-1.65) (0.74) (-1.98) (0.69) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,391 3,391 3,391 3,391 
R2 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.008 
 
